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ABSTRACT
III
This thesis examines the nationalist career of Patrick Sarsfield O’Hegarty - Irish separatist, 
literary critic, historian and exponent of an ‘intelligent patriotism’, which he emphasised as 
the key to asserting Ireland’s independence from English occupation. O’Hegarty was a 
member of the IRB Supreme Council, Sinn Fein Executive and prominent member of the 
Gaelic League during the early part of the twentieth century. He began his separatist career 
as an enthusiast of the Sinn Fein programme and brought to the movement a twentieth 
century style Fenianism that also embraced the Gaelic cultural revival as a means to create a 
sense of shared existence between the different cultures in Ireland.
During the period 1906-1914 O’Hegarty believed he witnessed the best and most productive 
period of the Sinn Fein movement but held serious misgivings and became severely 
disillusioned with the revolutionary and doctrinaire tone that Sinn Fein adopted after 1916 
which, he believed, created the conditions for the Civil War in 1922. Indeed his political 
views were very much shaped by the split in Sinn Fein over the Anglo-Irish in 1922 and the 
partitioning of Ireland and his polemical book The Victory of Sinn Fein offers a vivid 
account of the reasons behind the demise of the original ideals of Sinn Fein.
O’Hegarty counts as a significant eyewitness and commentator during the momentous 
events of 1914-22 whose aftermath still reverberates in Ireland today.
The chapters are divided into themes that O’Hegarty turned his broad and liberal mind to 
and cover in detail some of the most challenging issues of the period such as the role of the 
Catholic Clergy and the Anglo-Irish cultural revival.
IV
This thesis seeks to show that there was more to O’Hegarty than just an agitator for national 
independence and that he was willing to ask difficult, and seek solutions to, vital questions 
of culture and identity that many of his contemporaries chose to ignore.
O’Hegarty was a key thinker in the separatist tradition who influenced many significant 
nationalist figures such as Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith. He encouraged his 
generation to take a wider view of cultural and political matters and, arguably, his influence 
was increased after national independence through his writing of A History of Ireland under 
the Union which became a set historical text in Irish schools for fifteen years.
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1INTRODUCTION
In Ireland two over-riding forms of nationalism have contended with each other. The 
first is British nationalism, which is largely a product of state-building, of conquest, 
territorial incorporation, imperial expansion and contraction, and of the establishing 
of remarkably continuous state institutions. Here, state-building has preceded nation- 
building. The role of a national intelligentsia is historically secondary. In nationalist 
Ireland however, the project of nation-building is typically understood as preceding 
‘state-building.’ As in the case of most nineteenth and twentieth century 
nationalisms elsewhere, intellectuals in Ireland have been to the forefront in 
‘constructing’ or ‘imagining’ the nation, as investors and guardians of the national 
heritage, as key mobilisers of popular national movements armed at overthrowing 
the existing state dispensation. Liam O’Dowd, On Intellectuals and Intellectual Life 
in Ireland: International. Comparative and Historical Contexts (Belfast, 1996), p. 16.
Approaching the intellectual, cultural and political beliefs of P.S. O’Hegarty requires the 
drawing together of the multitude of roles he undertook within a long and industrious life. 
O’Hegarty, during various stages of his life, was an historian, prolific journalist, editor, civil 
servant, book seller, propagandist, literary critic and acquaintance of Arthur Griffith, 
Bulmer Hobson and Michael Collins not to mention his literary friends who numbered 
among them Robert Lynd, George Russell (AE), W.B. Yeats and many other noted 
contemporaries in Ireland during the early twentieth century.
The one theme that united all of the various roles described above was O’Hegarty’s deep 
veneration of the Irish nationalist tradition, and more specifically the Fenian/IRB 
programme to which he dedicated his time and energies, as did his younger brother Sean, 
although it must be stated their lives took very different and dramatic courses.
The Irish separatist movement owed its provenance in the twentieth century to a minority of 
dedicated Irish nationalists’ intent on exposing the constitutional framework of the Irish
2Party and its popular mandate as an inadequate method for the establishment of a culturally 
and politically distinct Irish nation free from its colonial tie to the United Kingdom.
As a separatist, O'Hegarty traced his separatist lineage to the United Irishmen movement, 
who, in the tradition of the French Revolution and its Republican ideology, asserted 
Ireland's independence through force of arms in their failed rebellion of 1798. This model of 
armed resistance toward the ensuing 1801 Act of Union was followed by two further 
rebellions in 1803 and 1848 before the Fenian movement, founded by James Stephens in 
1858, embraced physical force rebellion as the only means whereby the union with England 
could be severed and Irish independence obtained. The Fenian rebellion of 1865 met with 
the same fate as its predecessors but remained a cabalistic and significantly marginalized 
movement in the background of continuing constitutional Irish agitation for independence. 
It was left until the early twentieth century before Fenianism experienced rejuvenation in its 
direction of Irish separatist policy under the influence of Denis McCullogh, Bulmer Hobson 
and Tom Clarke, from 1905 onwards. This group also featured O’Hegarty as a prominent 
exponent of, and commentator upon, nationalist intellectual thought. O'Hegarty was bom 
into a family, which very much reflected the Fenian philosophy and was schooled at the 
North Monastery in County Cork and, customary to a Christian Brothers education, would 
have been enthusiastically introduced to the Irish language. From this background two of 
the central characteristics of his Irish separatism, the Fenian outlook and the centrality of 
language to an Irish national identity, burgeoned to become essential components of both 
his IRB and Sinn Fein membership.
After gaining distinction in his secondary education at North Monastery, O'Hegarty spent a 
brief time as a law clerk from 1895 before entering the civil service as a postal clerk in 
1897. Here, O'Hegarty's career was to have a profound impact on his Irish separatism, as,
3from an initial posting in Cork, he was moved to London where he lived and worked from 
1902 to 1913. As an Irish emigre in London, O'Hegarty quickly established himself at the 
heart of the separatist movement where he was to become secretary of the separatist 
organisations the Dungannon Clubs, the Gaelic League, sit on the Executive Council of 
Sinn Fein and member of the Supreme Council of the IRB representing the South East of 
England. In 1914, O'Hegarty was transferred from London to Shrewsbury and later 
Welshpool before resigning from the Post Office in 1918 after refusing to take the oath of 
allegiance, which had become a mandatory practice for all civil service employees at this 
time. Returning to Ireland O'Hegarty managed the Irish Bookstore in Dublin while 
continuing to campaign for Sinn Fein and independence until the establishment of the Irish 
Free State in 1921. At this point, he was appointed Secretary of the Irish Department of 
Posts and Telegraphs, a post he held while writing articles on contemporary Ireland and the 
previous revolutionary period, until his retirement as a public servant in 1945. It was from 
this period that O'Hegarty devoted his time to completing his magnum opus A History of 
Ireland Under the Union, a masterly analysis of Irish nationalism examining the period from 
1801-1922. He was to complete this ‘work of wide reading and dense texture’1 in 1952, 
three years before his death in 1955.
O’Hegarty’s political beliefs fused the central tenet of Fenianism, which consisted of the use 
of physical force to expel the English presence in Ireland, with the romantic literary and 
cultural revival of the early twentieth century through the Anglo-Irish tradition and the 
Gaelic League. Both these political and cultural themes that dominated O’Hegarty’s outlook 
were expounded by him through Sinn Fein led by Arthur Griffith, whom O’Hegarty praised 
as the champion of nationalist Ireland. Sinn Fein was a genuine movement which offered a
1 R.F. Foster, Paddy and Mr. Punch (Penguin, 1995), p.315.
4radical alternative to a largely discredited Irish party and Home Rule movement. O’Hegarty 
opted for Sinn Fein’s constitutional approach to obtaining Irish independence as he believed 
it offered the best separatist model to follow for the realisation of an independent Ireland. 
O’Hegarty’s advocating of physical force was not an arbitrary one as it was based on the 
moral justification for such action against the English occupation of Ireland. Furthermore, it 
could only be justified as a legitimate course to take if, as stated in amended IRB 
constitution,2 it was democratically supported by the majority of the Irish population and 
there was a realistic prospect of expelling the English forces. This interpretation of physical 
force was to have important repercussions for O’Hegarty’s separatism.
For O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein represented the purer side of nationalism as through its policies, 
expounded in the advanced nationalist press that he wrote for, particularly the United 
Irishman, transcended the narrower views of prominent nationalist figures such as D.P. 
Moran, whose ethnic based nationalism co-existed alongside O’Hegarty’s pluralist 
definition of what Irish nationalism consisted of. Sinn Fein, in O’Hegarty’s eyes, was above 
ethnic and party political interests during the first decade of its existence and this was the 
view O’Hegarty kept with him despite the changes that occurred within the movement after 
the tumultuous events of 1916 and the Easter Rising which once more transformed Ireland’s 
political landscape.
O’Hegarty was a key figure in the rejuvenation of the IRB which had fallen upon hard times 
after the ‘New Departure’ in which the Land League, under its leader Charles Stuart Parnell, 
failed to bring forth a measure of Irish independence and the Irish Party which had 
successfully reunited after the downfall of Parnell as leader, and the resulting split in the
2 Leon O Broin, ‘Revolutionary Nationalism in Ireland: the IRB, 1858-1924, Vol. 11, p . l l l  in T. W. Moody, 
(Ed.), (Belfast, 1978), Nationality and the Pursuit o f Irish Independence: papers read before the [12th] Irish 
Conference of Historians.
5party was resolved in 1900 under the leadership of John Redmond, once more found favour 
with the majority of Irish nationalists.
O’Hegarty’s move to London in 1902 was a very significant development in his political 
career as it was here that he met some of the most influential people in his life including the 
celebrated essayist and pacifist, Robert Lynd, and the future leader of the IRB, Michael 
Collins, the latter, like O’Hegarty, finding employment at the central post office at Mount 
St. Pleasant, and, significantly, it was O’Hegarty who had originally signed Collins’s IRB 
membership card. It was also while in London that O’Hegarty corresponded with his former 
schoolfellow and lifelong friend Terence MacSwiney, through which some of the most 
penetrating insights into O’Hegarty’s mind are revealed regarding the political situation in 
Ireland and the aspirations he held for the Irish nation. Significantly, it was ‘under the 
leadership of Tom Clarke and Sean McDermott in Dublin, Denis McCullough and Bulmer 
Hobson in Belfast, and P.S. in London, the IRB achieved a new dynamism and attracted 
younger members to its cause.’3
The purpose of this thesis is to bring together the political and intellectual thought of this 
significant but neglected key figure in Irish nationalism during a time when both external 
(for instance the wider concerns of the English government such as the impact of satisfying 
nationalism’s minimum demands for Home Rule) and internal political and social forces 
(such as the competing voices of the Irish Party and Sinn Fein) were to have an 
overwhelming impact on an unstable Ireland, the repercussions of which, continue to 
reverberate in Ireland, north and south, even today.
A discussion of O’Hegarty and his place in Irish history has been undertaken because the 
contemporary view of O’Hegarty has not altered or undergone any serious analysis outside
3 V.E. Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced Nationalist Press (New York, 1985), p.5.
6traditional characterisations of significant Irish nationalists who believed in two 
fundamental truths; the sanctity and centrality of the Irish people as consisting of a nation 
state and the necessity of freeing her from the colonial bonds believed to have been were 
imposed by English Imperialism. This was perceived as engendering an intense 
Anglophobia among those of O’Hegarty’s generation who championed the Irish language 
and culture over English culture. Given the political implications inherent in these beliefs 
and the depth of opposition to its aims, felt most particularly amongst Ulster Protestants, the 
received wisdom concerning O’Hegarty and his place in separatist thought focuses upon the 
stereotypical assumption of his straightforward defence of the nationalist position and the 
tendency to depict him as therefore incapable of addressing the more challenging questions 
illuminated by nationalist claims in the face of unionist opposition. Indeed, O’Hegarty’s 
major work, A History of Ireland under the Union has typically been taken as a version of 
Irish history which unionists quote from as a justification for resisting Catholic majority rule 
and for remaining a part of the United Kingdom rather than being absorbed into a united 
Irish government. An example of this can be see in Peter Gibbon’s examination of The 
Origins of Ulster Unionism4 in which the ‘Catholic particularism’ associated with the 
nationalist movement, as perceived by unionists, is demonstrated through Gibbon’s use of 
O’Hegarty.5
Principally this thesis seeks to address and find solutions to the following questions:
1) What were the arguments O’Hegarty deployed in arguing the nationalist case for a 
pluralist Ireland?
4 Peter Gibbon, The Origins o f Ulster Unionism: the formation of popular protestant politics and ideology in 
nineteenth century Ireland (Surrey, 1975), p.4.
5 Peter Gibbon, The Origins o f Ulster Unionism: the formation of popular protestant politics and ideology in 
nineteenth century Ireland (Surrey, 1975), p.4. For instance Gibbon cites the following from A History of 
Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.660: ‘there is no bigot anywhere quite as bad as the narrow 
Protestant bigot.’
2) What were the obstacles that acted to prevent O'Hegarty's inclusive vision of Ireland from 
emerging both endogenous (such as his nationalist contemporaries holding alternative 
visions of Ireland) and exogenous such as the unionist population of Ireland’s wish to 
remain a part of the United Kingdom?
3) Given the above, could O’Hegarty make a sustained case for a pluralist nationalism 
acceptable to all traditions in Ireland given the intense situation described above?
In order to answer these pertinent questions this thesis not only draws on O’Hegarty’s more 
well known works such as A History of Ireland under the Union and The Victory of Sinn 
Fein but also from his more ephemeral works such as his views on Sinn Fein in, Sinn Fein: 
An Illumination and his views on the Ulster question in, Ulster: A Brief Statement of Fact. 
Moreover a comprehensive survey and examination of his journalistic writings which 
spanned from the late nineteenth century until his death in 1955, has been undertaken in an 
effort to present a fulsome picture of O’Hegarty and the competing interpretations of 
nationalism and unionism, culture and identity, that fought for supremacy in the Ireland of 
his time. In this regard they stand as important publications and documents in understanding 
the mindset of nationalism. These documents offer the reaction of liberal nationalism to 
major events such as the arming of the Irish Volunteers and the Ulster Volunteer Force 
against the backdrop of the Great War and its impact on Ireland and the reaction of the 
British government. Principally, they offer an insight into Sinn Fein which started as a 
literary debating society and, following the 1916 Easter Rising emerged into the movement 
in Ireland which the British government was forced to come to terms with over the future of 
Ireland.
This methodology has been supplemented by bringing together and fully evaluating the 
existing secondary literature on O'Hegarty6 and analysing whether it is representative of his 
views and portrays him in a fair and consistent manner.
Collating this material has involved research at the Archives Department located at the
University College Dublin (UCD), the Newspaper Library in Belfast Central Library and the
Spencer Library at the University of Kansas, which contains the P.S. O’Hegarty Collection
and where I was awarded a Kenneth Spencer Fellowship travel grant in order to pursue my
studies. In utilising these resources many of O’Hegarty’s private papers and more obscure
journalistic writings have been located and examined in order to form an intellectual
biography of O’Hegarty. As with many of the published materials in which O’Hegarty is
quoted from as an eyewitness to events or in depicting the separatist interpretation of Irish
history, the UCD Archives Department proved an excellent resource in piecing together the
fragments of O’Hegarty’s correspondences. Here, the Batt O’Connor papers and the Ernest
Blythe papers were particularly relevant for O’Hegarty reminiscences regarding the period
before the Treaty. Moreover at UCD while examining the Richard Mulcahy Papers, this
individual’s criticisms of The Victory of Sinn Fein were located, and in the Terence
MacSwiney papers invaluable letters and personal correspondences between O’Hegarty and
MacSwiney were discovered. The National Library of Ireland’s Archives Department
proved invaluable in making available the Bulmer Hobson papers which gave an insight
into the thinking of the IRB Supreme Council and the evolving separatist mindset of the
period especially in the formation of the Dungannon Clubs in 1905. Access to the
O’Hegarty collection at Kansas University enabled the piecing together of the source
6 See for example Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland 1858-1928 (Oxford, 1987), which refers 
to O’Hegarty’s desire to see in Ireland a separation of politics form clerical interference, a theme developed in 
chapter one of this thesis. Also David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 19113-1921 (Cork, 1998), which adds 
weight to O’Hegarty’s views regarding the provenance of the 1919 Anglo-Irish War.
9material O’Hegarty used in his writing of nineteenth century history and for the leaflets and 
propaganda he collected especially during the Irish Civil War (1921-3), and the personal 
comments he added to them.
This thesis is structured thematically, spanning the cultural and political thought of 
O’Hegarty, tracing the ideals he developed through Sinn Fein and the disillusionment with 
the trenchant beliefs and opinions he encountered in his attempts to re-invent the nation 
along the lines of his civic and pluralistic ideas of Irish society.
Chapter One examines an institution which O’Hegarty believed was a major obstacle in the 
implementation of these ideals. The reason for beginning my discussion on the Catholic 
Church during the nineteenth century is that, by then, from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century the Catholic Church had risen to become a significant and powerful force in Irish 
society. The chapter questions how a Fenian such as O’Hegarty, who was in the minority of 
the nationalist tradition and indeed the country, could feasibly launch an attack on an 
enormously powerful institution that, in many ways, stretched across the secular as well as 
the temporal domains of the majority of the Irish population. The fact that the Catholic 
Clergy were deeply embedded into the catholic people’s perception of Irish identity was to 
cause major difficulties in his call for the strict delineation of the temporal and secular 
spheres and in relegating the clergy to a strict adherence to the former. Chapter One, 
therefore, describes the clash of idealism between the separatist tradition as defined by 
O’Hegarty and the role of the Catholic Clergy in Irish society.
O’Hegarty’s modem approach to the problem of the clergy in politics as he saw it owed a 
lot to the writings of the Fenian, Charles J. Kickham in the 1860s during the high point of 
Fenianism in Ireland. O’Hegarty was to experience many of the problems as his Fenian 
ancestor. The clergy could readily deploy moral arguments against the use of physical force
10
which was a mainstay of the Fenian programme for achieving Irish independence and were 
highly experienced by O’Hegarty’s era in retaining and bolstering their prominent position 
in Irish society, acting as the moral voice of the majority of the Catholic Irish. O’Hegarty’s 
position is examined through his correspondences with Terence MacSwiney. Significantly, 
his letters to MacSwiney in Cork are penned from his occupational residence in London, his 
movement away from Ireland seeming to have a critical impact on his views on the clergy 
and their role in political matters as they contain his criticisms of the long-standing clash of 
the clerical and political positions that he was eager to find a resolution. This chapter takes 
an historic perspective as defined by O’Hegarty and seeks to explain why he believed that 
the clergy had ruined every separatist movement from the nineteenth century on.
Chapter Two seeks to explain the reasons behind why O’Hegarty formed his views on Irish 
culture and why he placed particular emphasis on the promotion of the Irish language as the 
foremost duty among Irish separatists, a duty to which he placed enormous energies in 
learning the language himself and bringing up an Irish speaking family. In this respect the 
Gaelic League, established in 1893, which sought to re-introduce the Irish language to the 
Irish people was an essential arm in the separatist canon of Irish nationalist projects. The 
movement, largely directed by Dr. Douglas Hyde, was an attempt by Irish nationalists, in 
the period following the fall of the great nationalist leader Charles Stuart Parnell to add a 
keynote of respectability and enthusiasm toward Irish culture and to encourage the learning 
of the Irish language as a framework through which cultural diversity in Ireland could be 
accepted by all traditions on the island. It was a non-sectarian body set up at a time when in
cities such as Dublin and Belfast clubs and societies were usually organised on a religious 
basis.7
Irish cultural revivalism was therefore vital to O’Hegarty’s extension of the physical force 
tradition of Fenianism as the ability of the Irish people to express themselves culturally as a 
distinct nation, distanced from the Anglicisation of Ireland during the nineteenth century 
that O’Hegarty felt was bolstered by Daniel O’Connell’s neglecting of the Irish language. 
O’Hegarty’s arguments, most keenly expressed through his series of articles in Irish 
Freedom, entitled, ‘Fenianism in Practice: An Irish Ireland Philosophy’, was written to 
inform and encourage all projects, clubs and societies with a separatist bent, that they were 
Fenians at heart and doing good work for Ireland predominantly, as they were working 
toward Irish emancipation. Within these articles O’Hegarty placed particular emphasis on 
the Gaelic League as the main artery through which the civic virtue he extolled could be 
realised. O’Hegarty as an elected member of Ard Choisede would have been involved with 
the teaching of the language as he believed that the implicit message of the Gaelic League 
was liberal and pluralistic in outlook. This chapter seeks to explore the drawbacks to 
O’Hegarty’s philosophy relating to the Gaelic League and the promotion of the Irish 
language as a main factor in forming a solution to the cultural differences that were palpable 
between unionists and nationalists in the early twentieth century. Moreover, how 
O’Hegarty’s call for the de-Anglicisation of Ireland was seen, particularly among the Ulster 
Unionist population, as an attempt to override their British affiliation and impose an alien 
culture that, even if a modicum of Home Rule were implemented, would lead to their 
cultural and economic estrangement in Ireland. Furthermore, this chapter questions whether
7 Flann Campbell, The Dissenting Voice: Protestant Democracy in Ulster from Plantation to Partition, 
(Belfast, 1991), p.339.
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O’Hegarty was equipped with the terminology that could reach across the cultural divide 
and invoke a sense of collective Irishness or cultural cohesion among both unionists and 
nationalists and whether his idealism was open to a more narrow interpretation among his 
nationalist contemporaries.
Chapter Three builds on the indigenous cultural basis of O’Hegarty’s nationalism set out in 
Chapter Two. However, it introduces another important element in that it widens the 
parameters of O’Hegarty’s cultural mindset and develops upon the theme of the civic virtue 
he sought to inculcate among the citizens of Ireland. In the early twentieth century 
controversy had arisen over the cultural impact of the Anglo-Irish literary tradition and 
whether it was classifiable as Irish in origin, theme and content. The controversy developed 
over a body of literature that was distinctly ascendant in social class to the majority of the 
populace, which gave rise to questions over whether it could legitimately lay claim to the 
Irish heritage from which it derived much of its inspiration. These controversies were given 
added piquancy in that they took place against the backdrop of the Irish language revival 
which in the eyes of the nationalist majority rendered the Anglo Irish literary tradition even 
more characteristic of an English source and basis than an Irish one. These controversies 
were extended to include issues concerning immoral content, the debasing of the naturally 
moral Irish character and the propagandist harm such depictions served to hinder Irish self- 
government in the eyes of the English government and the English population in general. 
O’Hegarty took a completely different view to his contemporaries and asserted that there 
was no doubt that this literature was Irish in origin and that it played a key patriotic role in 
the cause of Irish independence. He was to write about the specific case of J.M. Synge’s 
‘The Playboy of the Western World’ in which the above criticisms of Anglo-Irish literature 
coalesced. O’Hegarty made a positive contribution to the arguments that had developed
13
between W.B Yeats, who represented the artistic defence of the plays produced at the 
Abbey Theatre and Arthur Griffith and D.P. Moran, who in their different ways were critical 
of the Anglo-Irish tradition. O’Hegarty exemplified toleration and sought a via media 
between the hot-headed reactions he detected dominated opinion on both sides. What is 
striking about O’Hegarty’s views, expressed in a series of articles entitled ‘Art and the 
Nation’ and published in the Republic, was his ability to envision the cultural repercussions 
of these arguments and that the natural outcome of undisguised calls for censorship from 
nationalist quarters could only work to the detriment of the Irish nation’s artistic standing 
and development. Moreover his interposition was bome of healing the divisions between 
the contributors to the Anglo-Irish literary tradition and separatists because it was proving 
intrinsically damaging to the spiritual and cultural relationship he worked toward and 
wished to see developing in Ireland. Again the emphasis in this chapter is whether 
O’Hegarty’s civic notion of culture was capable of breaking across the barriers relating to 
ethnic culture and identity.
Chapter Four tackles O’Hegarty’s political views and traces the beginning of his 
disillusionment with the Sinn Fein movement following the Easter Rising of 1916. Up until 
this point O’Hegarty spoke of a ‘golden age’ of separatism which he claimed began to 
decline sharply after the events of 1916. This period, previous to the Easter Rising, had 
marked for O’Hegarty the high point of Sinn Fein where toleration and an inclusive 
philosophy existed simultaneously as the overriding and defining features of the movement. 
Yet the massive influx of support for Sinn Fein that was engendered through the 
identification of the movement with the purpose of the Easter Rising was, as O’Hegarty 
termed it, a ‘double edged sword.’ While the executions and martyrdoms of the leaders of 
the 1916 rebellion rejuvenated nationalist Ireland on an unprecedented scale in support of
14
Irish independence and ‘blew a separatist wind’, to quote O’Hegarty once more, in the 
country, at the same time, it attracted into the Sinn Fein movement undesirable elements 
who proceeded to dilute the original Sinn Fein ideals. For O’Hegarty, this dilution led to the 
doctrinaire interpretation of the ‘Republic’ as the immediate goal of Sinn Fein. O’Hegarty 
was distraught by the fact that instead of continuing with the original Sinn Fein ethos the 
leaders of the movement, Griffith included, did nothing to calm the nationalist population 
down or make any attempt to avert the gradual slide into the guerrilla tactics enforced 
during the Anglo-Irish war. P.S. O’Hegarty’s brother Sean O’Hegarty is introduced into this 
chapter as he provides an example of the lack of cohesion and direction that came from the 
newly set up, in 1918, ‘underground’ Irish government, known as An Dail. O’Hegarty’s 
despair at the idea of violence as being intrinsically associated with Sinn Fein is related 
here. Ultimately, that this form of warfare sullied not only Sinn Fein but the IRB as it was 
not consistent with the ‘swift sword thrust’ or moral uprising against England that physical 
force represented for O’Hegarty. This view of physical force, held by O’Hegarty, is 
examined in relation to Richard Mulcahy’s criticisms of O’Hegarty’s position as an 
opponent of the Anglo-Irish War as depicted in The Victory of Sinn Fein and through his 
journalistic writings. This chapter asks was O’Hegarty realistic in his belief that civil 
disobedience and parliamentary abstentionism, i.e. the original tenets of the Sinn Fein 
programme could have been re-introduced given the highly charged political climate 
following the 1916 insurrection. In particular, reference is made to his book Sinn Fein: An 
Illumination, written in 1919, in which he sought to re-stamp on Sinn Fein its original goals 
and ideals.
O’Hegarty’s disillusionment with Sinn Fein is traced and explored in Chapter Five, this 
time, in relation to the eventual peaceful settlement between Ireland and England ratified in
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the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. O’Hegarty had supported the Treaty from the moment of its 
announcement and this chapter examines his reasons for doing so. It also examines his 
opponents, the anti-Treatyites, concentrating on two groups in particular, de Valera and the 
women of the Sinn Fein movement, Cumann na Bhan. O’Hegarty determined that within 
these groups the seeds of the bitter and searing split within Sinn Fein were developed over 
an ‘oath and a figurehead’, which consisted of the main objectionable points included in the 
Treaty. This had led to the civil war that Ireland endured during 1921-1922. O’Hegarty’s 
vociferous attacks on his opponents are mainly taken from The Victory of Sinn Fein and are 
notable for his defence of the Treaty using separatist arguments, thus invoking similar 
language to those who claimed to be defending the separatist and republican traditions. It 
also contains personal disclosures O’Hegarty shared with Michael Collins and the pragmatic 
considerations for accepting the Treaty and also questions whether O’Hegarty sacrificed his 
idealist notions of Irish independence in order to generate support for the Treaty which in 
the light of the conservative nature of the Irish Cumann na Gaedheal government he was 
still able to justify acceptance of the Treaty on separatist grounds.
Chapter Six addresses the most difficult concept for O’Hegarty to explain and find a 
solution to, using his separatist framework. The partition of Ireland in 1920 into north and 
south marked the nadir of O’Hegarty’s idea of a civic virtue existing and being shared 
among all Irishmen and women. O’Hegarty throughout his separatist career emphasised that 
the civic virtue he believed inherent in Ireland could be built up to finally transcend the 
cultural and religious differences of unionists and nationalists but ultimately his beliefs were 
shattered. O’Hegarty viewed partition as the worst possible outcome and in looking for an 
explanation for its realisation, blamed subsequent English government’s politicking and
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their creation of a ’false consciousness’ among Ulster Unionists in order to maintain 
England’s selfish material and defensive interests in Ireland.
The chapter addresses whether O’Hegarty’s separatist arguments, although built upon 
notions of civic virtue and pluralism, were capable of instilling the common idea of Irish 
nationality before any other notions of civic identity that Unionists might proffer for 
remaining a part of the United Kingdom. It asks whether O’Hegarty could address and 
resolve the fears of unionists who adamantly refused to accept his central premise that 
Ireland was a unique and distinct nation and whether his notion of the Irish people, or 
’underground nation’ was capable of understanding the unionists sense of isolation from 
this idea.
Through O’Hegarty’s correspondences with Ernest Blythe, an Ulster separatist, and his 
published work Ulster: A Brief Statement of Fact this chapter questions whether O’Hegarty 
really got to grips with unionist objections to home rule or any form of Irish independence 
and whether his concept of Irish nationalism was too monolithic in character to present a 
shared sense of collective unity among the different traditions in Ireland. Moreover did 
O’Hegarty ask the right sort of questions, i.e. that the rise of nationalism meant the erosion 
of protestant power in Ireland and therefore for protestants, a separate state with its own 
parliament but maintaining their British citizenship was worth going through in order to 
avoid the alternative?
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CHAPTER I
THE CATHOLIC CLERGY
.. .and it was the identification of Nationalism with Catholicism -  the religion of the 
dominant majority -  and the consequent sectarian bitterness were the chief causes of 
Ireland’s powerlessness and ill-fortune for many generations. ..but I want to 
emphasise the point that the nation must be so built up as to leave room within it for 
men of all creeds and no creed and that the one thing to be avoided in propaganda is 
anything which would help to identify Nationalism today with Catholicism. Our only 
possible basis of unity is a basis which will banish sectarianism utterly from all 
considerations of Nationalism, and which will build up the nation on a purely 
national basis, depending solely on the national appeal. Religion has its own sphere 
of action, and if it attends to that properly it will have no time to attend to purely 
secular concerns; if it goes outside its own province it must neglect its own function. 
Next to the British government in Ireland the greatest enemy to Nationalism has 
been the Political Church. Whatever political influence is exercised in Ireland from 
Rome is an immoral influence, an abuse of spiritual power, and as such it should be 
fought tooth and nail....The remedy is to create in Ireland a public opinion which will 
not tolerate interference in Irish affairs from either England or Rome, and which will 
force the Church in Ireland to recognise that its function is spiritual, not political.’ 
NOTE. -  The Editor of the “Republic” does not make himself responsible for all 
expressions of opinion of his contributors.
The Republic. (1907), ‘Fenianism in Practice: An Irish -  Ireland philosophy’, IX, 
article entitled -  ‘The Chief Danger.’
The above extract, complete with the editor’s assurance that these were the views of the 
author, alone provides a useful foundation for examining the views of P.S. O’Hegarty as it 
represents the controversial and polemical thoughts that characterised his Fenian position in 
the twentieth century. The article outlined how there were two perennial dangers that the 
Irish nation had to be alive to, the English government and the politicised clergy, if Ireland
18
were to successfully gain its independence from its political and social masters. O’Hegarty 
maintained that there was a source within Irish nationalism that was alive to these dangers, 
the separatist or IRB/Fenian tradition to which he was deeply committed. This movement 
had been formed to combat these forces as they carried the potential for subsuming the Irish 
people into an alien cultural, political and social system which was unreflective of their 
natural right to independence. The Act of Union in 1801 had begun the process by which 
the Irish people were becoming assimilated into English national culture and O’Hegarty 
believed that Fenianism was the best form of resistance to the process known to Irish 
nationalists as Anglicisation.
The Fenian version of England’s role in Ireland depicted the latter as colonisers 
illegitimately seeking absorb Ireland into the British Empire through a mixture of repressive 
and assimilative measures ranging from exercising their superior military might during 
organised Irish resistance, political and social exclusion and educational policies designed to 
hasten the eradication of the indigenous culture. The permananet resistance to these 
measures was the spiritual mindset of the indigenous Irish people, an equally potent force, 
who remained unbowed despite suffering the indignation of occupation and the inability to 
express their distinct social and poltical culture. Following the 1801 Act of Union, which 
formally integrated Ireland into the United Kingdom, the idea of a united people or, as 
O'Hegarty described them, the ‘Underground Nation’ vigorously maintaining their cultural 
existence was an overwhelning expression of their right to govern themselves under their 
own cultural and poltical freedoms. This led to his description of those who refused to 
accept Anglicisation as a superior civilisation as their own and who remained unbowed and 
unbroken in their desire to maintain their unique civilisation and free themselves from 
English interference, as the ‘Underground Nation’. Dating from the implementation of the
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1801 Act of Union by the English government, O’Hegarty’s history of the ‘Irish people’ 
was captured in his masterwork of the Irish nationalist movement A History of Ireland 
under the Union, justified Ireland’s struggle to rid herself from the ‘captivity’ of England’s 
political domination.
The Fenian movement which dated from 1858, under its founder James Stephens (see 
below), following in the tradition of the 1798 and 1848 rebellions advocated the use of 
physical force as the method most likely to fulfil the aim of gaining Irish independence from 
English colonialism. Due to this advocating of violent resistance1 toward English 
governmental authority, Fenianism adopted a necessarily subversive and conspiratorial 
nature, thus becoming the focus of the Catholic Church’s ire as a radical and disruptive 
element in Irish civil society. O’Hegarty was an archetypal Fenian, who, in holding these 
views, struck out against the Catholic Clergy’s moral arguments aimed at ridding Ireland of 
its politically revolutionary elements. For the clergy to adopt this philosophy and seek to use 
their moral influence on their parishoners in dissauding them from the Fenain ideology was, 
for O’Hegarty, to eradicate the most viable method of establishing an independent Irish 
nation. O’Hegarty was a representative of the Fenian tradition who also found a natural 
affinity with the Sinn Fein movement formed and led by Arthur Griffith which promulgated 
a separatist but constitutional method distinct from the Westminster-centred policy of the 
Irish Party who formed the main artery through which nationalist Ireland’s grievances were 
aired. Sinn Fein, in its early period, were considered a fringe radical group incapable of 
eating into the overwhelming support the Irish Party commanded amongst the nationalist 
electorate. In this respect Sinn Fein were largely ignored by the latter and, as O’Hegarty
1 The use of violence or ‘physical force’ was justified by the Fenian movement as representing the moral right 
of the Irish nation to free itself from English occupation.
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commented, their differing perspectives on how best to pursue the Irish nationalist agenda 
meant they both appealed to different audiences and therefore rarely clashed in public 
debate in the decade before 1914.2
The purpose of this chapter is to define P.S. O’Hegarty’s separatist reading of the 
politicisation of the Catholic Church and its pivotal role in the pursuit of Irish independence 
and is structured in the following way. The main arguments focus on how O’Hegarty, 
continuing the Fenian tradition in the early twentieth century, identified the politicised 
clergy as a threat to the pursuit of Irish national independence in a continuation of their 
policy in the nineteenth century. This accusation is analysed through the role of the clergy in 
the era of nationalist leaders such as Daniel O’Connell, Charles Stuart Parnell and Sinn Fein 
prior to 1916 when henceforward there was a general clamour among the clergy to support 
Sinn Fein’s bid for power in the 1918 election and finally the role they played during the 
ensuing split in Sinn Fein over the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.
This chapter also focuses upon a series of correspondences that occurred between 
O’Hegarty and Terence MacSwiney (who was also a member of Sinn Fein but not the IRB), 
which reveal much of O’Hegarty’s views on the clergy and the impact on his thinking of his 
living in London between the years 1902 and 1914.
O’Hegarty’s nationalist depiction of the relationship between England and Ireland or, as 
O’Hegarty would term it, between coloniser and colonist has often been criticised as 
traditionalist, or, as a biased depiction of the complicated relationship of continuity and 
change that characterised Irish history and its relationship to England.3 What will be 
examined therefore is the extent to which O’Hegarty’s Fenian principles were forced to
2 P.S O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.17.
3 J.C. Beckett, Confrontations: Studies in Irish History (London, 1972), p. 16.
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come to terms with the power that the Catholic Clergy had accrued in Irish society during 
the nineteenth century through the majority of the Catholic population’s identification with 
their social and political leadership. It will be demonstrated that despite the tone of the 
opening quotation to this chapter, in which O’Hegarty attacked the clergy for their historical 
hindrance to the cause of Irish separatism, he was, like the Fenian movements that preceded 
him, reticent to fully confront the power of the clergy given their powerful position in Irish 
nationalist society.
It is important to emphasise that O'Hegarty was not embarking on a theological debate 
regarding the validity of the Catholic faith, rather, his focus was directed toward its ubiquity 
in the political sphere and the unfair advantage the ‘priests in politics’ held in seeking to 
influence the layman through their inherited moral superiority as clerics. Ultimately, for 
O’Hegarty, the Catholic Clergy were therefore hindering the right of the Irish people to 
govern their own future in an Irish parliament. As J.C. Beckett has noted, from the 
beginning of the nineteenth century the Catholic Church had risen to become a significant 
and powerful force in Irish society: “The Roman Catholic Church was the one public 
institution in which the great bulk of the people could see embodied their sense of a 
corporate national existence.”4
As the Catholic people profited from the British government’s educational reforms during 
the nineteenth century5 under the leadership of Daniel O’Connell nationalist Ireland 
organised itself for political agitation and formed a mass offensive against the engrained 
social structure of Irish society. This constitutional movement was primarily aimed at the 
Protestant ascendency, who, whether as residents in Ireland, or, as absentee landlords, were
4 J.C. Beckett, Confrontations: Studies in Irish History (London, 1972), p.97.
5 The British Government, in an attempt to redress Catholic grievances, disestablished the Anglican Church in 
1869, and, previous to this, in 1831, redesigned the schooling system so that both Protestant and Catholic 
children were able to receive denominational education in their respective faiths.
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seen as the purveyors and certainly the main benefactors of English rule in Ireland. It was 
due to their identification with England that the Protestant ascendancy were seen by 
nationalists as forming the core of English repression in Ireland. The mass organisation of 
nationalists and the fear of open rebellion in Ireland led to the 1829 Catholic Emancipation 
Act thus ending the discriminatory Penal Laws which had prevented the social aspirations 
of Catholics in Ireland. This was closely followed by O’Connell’s agitation for the repeal of 
the union the purpose of which was to hand over democratic control to the Catholic 
majority in an Irish parliament.
Embedded within O’Connell’s nationalist resistance to English hegemony in Ireland was the 
Catholic Church who, as a disciplined and organised body, enabled the disaffected Catholic 
majority population to form a sense of national identity and awareness of their right to 
manage their political affairs. As O’Hegarty related in A History of Ireland under the Union 
the clergy’s involvement was crucial to O’Connell’s campaign: ‘only the church possessed a 
national organisation that extended into every part of the country and could act as a means 
of transmission between the urban middle class and the large tenant farmers who were the 
rural backbone of O'Connell's campaigns.’6 The clergy were an effective means through 
which a united nationalist front stretching across the town and country divide could be 
transmitted.
While British educational reforms during the nineteenth century led to an increase of the 
Catholic majority’s sense of injustice regarding their position and methods for appealing to 
the English government the Catholic clergy had long been delivering their own brand of 
nationalist education. As primitive as this education was it proved highly effective in 
reinforcing the Catholic majority’s belief that the English presence in Ireland was the cause
6 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union, (London, 1952), pp.462-3.
of their second class citizenship in their Irish homeland. The scholar Tom Inglis has drawn 
attention to this:
As late as 1845, an English commentator described the poverty of the Irish Catholic 
church as follows: “They worship in hovels, or in the open air, from the want of any 
place of worship. Their religion is the religion of three fourths of the population. Not 
far off, in a well-windowed and well roofed house, is a well-paid Protestant 
clergyman.. .crying in the wilderness.. .furious against the errors of Popery.7
O’Connell had recognised the growing importance of the Catholic Church in the political 
landscape and as a result nurtured and developed a closer working relationship with the 
clergy.
Indeed O’Connell’s success with the Catholic population of Ireland was largely due to the 
organising power of the localised clergy and their fulfilling of the sociological needs of Irish 
Catholics.
The campaign led by Daniel O’Connell was for civil religious rights and freedom. It 
was a struggle for meaning and identity, and for the freedom to worship and preach. 
The willingness to adhere closely to the Catholic Church was located in a desire to 
be and be perceived as morally equal, if not superior, to their colonisers. In other 
words, it is important to see the change in Irish Catholic religiosity -  that is people 
becoming more ethical, spiritual and closely allied to the institutional church -  not 
just as an end in itself, not just as the fulfilment of some inherent natural allegiance 
to the Church, but as part of a struggle to attain religious, cultural and symbolic 
power.8
Moreover, in line with O’Connell’s position, the clergy were committed also to observing a 
strict form of constitutionalism which forbade any notions of armed resistance and this 
relationship developed symbiotically as O’Connell and the clergy condemned unequivocally 
the use of violence in any form.
7 Tom Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall o f the Catholic Church in Ireland (Dublin, 1998), p. 104.
8 Tom Inglis, Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall o f the Catholic Church in Ireland (Dublin, 1998), p.98-99.
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Consequently running throughout the Catholic Church’s philosophy in the nineteenth 
century and up to the time of the end of the civil war in 1923, the clergy had determined that 
it was better to work within the law for constitutional change in Ireland with O’Connell.
One of the main reasons for the clergy’s and O’Connell’s shared union of purpose and 
direction can be construed through O’Connell’s attitude toward rebellion and the use of 
physical force. O’Connell repudiated Wolfe Tone, leader of the United Irishmen rebellion of 
1798, as an instigator of immorality, indeed, as a ‘criminal’ who had brought the cause of 
Irish nationalism into disrepute:
As to 98 we leave the weak and wicked men who considered force and sanguinary 
violence as part of their resources for ameliorating our institutions, and the equally 
wicked and designing wretches who fomented the rebellion and made it 
explode.. .We leave both these classes of miscreants to the contempt and indignation 
of mankind.9
This attitude toward the use of rebellion and physical force coloured O’Hegarty’s historical 
view of the clergy and of O’Connell, as he believed the use of physical force would prove 
essential for the eventual overthrowing of the English government in Ireland. As the 
clergy’s standing in the eyes of the Catholic majority increased and their alliance with 
O’Connell’s constitutional agitation became cemented, so too, they formed an important 
point of contact with the British government. Subsequently their future role as successful 
organisers solidified and they became the channel through which British legislation was 
related to the Catholic people. This policy of mutual cooperation with the English 
government emphasised, particularly as the century wore on, the Fenian perception of the 
‘priest in politics’ as a consummately conservative force. Their role as intermediaries 
between nationalists and the English government particularly when they were seen to be
9 Paul Johnson, Ireland: A Concise History from the 12th Century to the Present Day (1981), p.7.
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supporting British policy in Ireland earned the hierarchy the disparaging title of ‘Catholic 
Bishops’ working alongside ‘Castle Catholics’10 within separatist circles. Much of the 
resentment between the Fenians and the clergy centred on the clergy’s implacable 
opposition to the formation of secret societies such as the IRB/Fenians and their link to 
agrarian violence committed against Protestant landowners. Commencing from the 18th 
century onwards the Catholic ‘Defenders’ and ‘Whiteboy’ groups had been formed to direct 
these criminal activities in the name of disgruntled tenant farmers many of whom believed 
they had an historic claim to the land they now worked on for their keep. Such groups 
proved particularly effective in targeting the property and livestock of absentee landlords.
To re-emphasise the Cathlic Church’s and O’Connell’s position, both had agreed on a strict 
philosophy of non-violent and constitutional means in pursuing their political programmes 
for Catholic emancipation and later repeal of the union. They condemned the destruction of 
property and the taking of human life under any circumstances.
O’Hegarty’s library11 contains documented evidence of Thomas Drummond’s12 appearance 
before the Select Committee of the House of Lords entitled, ‘On the state of Ireland in 
Respect of Crime Committed by the Ribbonmen’. In forming his views on the clergy what 
becomes interesting from O’Hegarty’s point of view was their centrality in the very 
substance of Irish rural life:
Q: Have you any means of knowing what course the Roman Catholic clergy have
taken with regard to the riband society?
10 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union, (London, 1952), p.406.
11 The bulk of O’Hegarty’s library is located at the Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University.
12 P.S. O'Hegarty’s A History of Ireland under the Union, Chapter XII, is devoted to the good work that the 
civil servant, Thomas Drummond, did in Ireland during the period 1835-40. This detached view of the civil 
servant as a figure capable of taking a step back, free of bias, for the benefit of the Irish nation was a trait 
admired by O’Hegarty as this Chapter testifies to.
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A: In every case they have taken a most decided part against ribboninsm, in 
denouncing it wherever it was known to exist...13
As these agrarian societies formed a major factor in the rural life of Ireland the role of the 
parish priest was a pivotal one in either providing taciturn approval for the actions of these 
groups or in denouncing their acts as contravening Catholic doctrine. In the political context 
the clergy argued that these acts only succeeded in further alienating the Catholic people in 
the light of English common law and the sanctity of property rights therein.
The Fenians established in 1858 under the leadership of James Stephens and despite their 
avid denials of complicity in the committing of agrarian violence, inherited the clergy’s 
long-standing revulsion toward secret societies and, as will be demonstrated were to further 
incur the clergy’s wrath with their denunciation of the clergy’s frequent forays and 
involvment in the pursuit of nationalist politics.
As a twentieth century Fenian O’Hegarty would have been fully cognisant of the existing 
animosity between Fenians and the clergy and in line with this background was to believe 
too that the clergy were an unwelcome voice in political matters. He contended that it was a 
misplaced presumption of the clergy to involve themselves in the political sphere as this 
was to deviate from their proper function in society which consisted of providing spiritual 
sustenance alone.
To demonstrate O’Hegarty’s insistence on separating the clergy from political issues and to 
give a counter argument to his belief that the clergy should confine their remit to spiritual 
matters the view of a fellow separatist, Terence MacSwiney, follows below. The 
background to the clerical debate within separatism which generated these correspondences
13 Report on the State of Ireland in respect of crime committed by the ribbonmen of the Select Committee 
of the House of Lords (Dublin, 1839), p. 128.
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was fuelled by the ubiquity of the clergy throughout the nineteenth century in the Irish 
nationalist movement particularly in its alignment with Daniel O’Connell’s successful 
campaign in obtaining the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act and later in his unsuccessful 
attempt at repealing the 1801 Act of Union.
In its most immediate effect occurring just before O’Hegarty’s generation came to political 
consciousness and the romantic nationalism of the twentieth century took hold, the debate 
concerning the priest in politics centred upon the issue of the clergy’s role in the Land 
League under the leadership of Charles Stuart Parnell from 1880. Parnell, despite his 
essentially parliamentarian campaign was a figure for whom separatists, like O’Hegarty, 
readily ascribed separatist tendencies due to his gesturing toward Fenian physical force 
doctrine as a last resort and his more frequent threats to withdraw Irish MPs from the 
Westminster Parliament. O’Hegarty gave a primary place to Parnell after the Fenian 
movement in the separatist tradition, in A History of Ireland under the Union. He viewed 
Parnell’s downfall as the result of the clerical campaign to oust him from the leadership of 
the nationalist movement and that this had ultimately resulted in the ‘death of a lion’ in the 
cause of Irish independence.14
The following correspondences can be viewed therefore as coloured by these recent events 
and the different experiences of O’Hegarty as a resident in London, and his “stay at home”15 
school-friend, Terence MacSwiney, demonstrate a measure of the tensions that were 
generated by the question of the ‘priest in politics’ within separatist circles. O'Hegarty,
14 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.588.
15 Tom Garvin, in his introduction to P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1998), p.xvii.
28
writing years later in an obituary of his friend W.P. Ryan16 in Dublin Magazine set the 
tumultuous political background in which he and MacSwiney discussed the issue:
Ireland in London was then, in 1902, convulsed by the question whether clergymen 
should be eligible to be members of the Ard-Choisede of the London Gaelic League, 
of which Liam was honorary secretary, and he and I were slaughtering each other 
weekly in New Ireland, in the United Irishman, and other papers of the time.17
During his years of employment in England as a civil servant O’Hegarty experienced 
London’s metropolitan environment and in reference to the politicised clergy, the way the 
English cleric as opposed to the priest in Ireland, remained detached from the political 
process. The issue of the priest in politics forced many Irish separatists with a Catholic 
upbringing in the twentieth century into uncomfortable positions given the historical enmity 
over the legitimate use of physical force in the pantheon of Irish resistance to the English 
presence in Ireland. The following correspondences between O’Hegarty and MacSwiney 
therefore provide an interesting insight into how the emotional influence of the clergy could 
affect separatists to varying degrees. For O’Hegarty the issue of the priest in politics had 
become a much more simplified concept as one only had to escape the confines of Ireland 
and view the clergy from an external perspective to clarify their objectionable influence to 
the separatist cause. Yet through MacSwiney’s views the dilemma that many separatists 
experienced regarding the ubiquitous and more complex role of the priest in Irish society are 
revealed. It appeared that MacSwiney wrote the following lines in the assumption that 
O’Hegarty would agree the sentiments:
16 A contemporary of O’Hegarty’s, W.P. Ryan, held a similar view to O’Hegarty in his advocating civic 
nationalism and like O’Hegarty became an anti-censorship campaigner in independent Ireland. They differed 
however over the importance of socialist thought to the remedying of Ireland’s political and economic 
shortcomings.
17 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1939.
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There are many in our ranks who seem to regard priests as our natural enemies and I 
heartily wish they would show us their backs as I am convinced they are a greater 
source of danger to our cause and our ultimate hopes of success than all of the power 
of the British Government.18
O’Hegarty though, was not of this opinion and informed his friend of his position regarding 
the potential sources of danger that the clergy represented to the separatist cause:
From your letter I suppose you’ll be surprised to hear that I’m an anti-cleric.. .1 don’t 
hold that the priests are our natural enemies but I do think strongly that they have 
acquired the habit and that nothing but strong determined action will break their 
effort. They ruined every movement - directly or indirectly - since the passing of the 
Maynooth grant in 1795 and we have to put them in their places if we are to do 
anything. Even today the United Irishman is an ‘atheistic’ paper and daren’t be 
openly sold outside of the towns. There’s no use in shutting our eyes to the fact that 
the hierarchy are governed indirectly from London through Rome...
You say the rock on which we are most likely to founder is the antagonism between 
Separatist nationalism and the Church. Quite so, but I would not put it just like that 
way; I would say the antagonism of the church is with nationality. If we are going to 
even make anything out of Ireland this question must be faced openly and strongly 
on its merits and not on its prejudices....At the same time I do not quite understand 
your point of view. You appear to assume that anti-clericalism is atheism, which it is 
not. Anti-clericalism as I look at it and as most fellows I know look at it is simply 
anti-political-priestisms. We all know that a distinction must be - or rather should be 
- drawn between the priest as Irishmen and as individuals and as ministers of 
religion. So far, so good: How are you to draw the distinction? If an ordinary layman 
runs counter to nationalist principles you are apparently defending liberty to go for 
him to the best of your abilities, man to man, and he defends himself, it is a fair 
battle and the man who is right wins. Can you argue with the priest as an individual, 
can you reason with him, can you fight him as Irishman to Irishman? You cannot 
and it is there that the whole difficulty lies. If you say a word against the political 
priest, against any political action or dogma of his, you are an atheist, a damned soul, 
you are anathema....You may do the magnanimous and try to distinguish between 
the priest and the church but he won’t let you, he deliberately and immorally utilises 
his priestly influence to supplement the want of reason in his attitude.19
O’Hegarty’s polemical and anti-clerical tone would have been read with great surprise by 
his former schoolfellow especially in relation to his description of the priest as capable of
18 Terence MacSwiney to P.S. O’Hegarty, Terence MacSwiney Papers, University College Dublin, Special 
Collections, P48/374-378.
19 P.S. O’Hegarty to Terence MacSwiney, Terence MacSwiney Papers, University College Dublin, P48/374- 
378.
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engaging in an ‘immoral’ use of his “priestly influence.” O’Hegarty was the first to suggest 
that MacSwiney would probably have been shocked to know that he, (O’Hegarty), was 
‘anti-clerical’ regarding the clergy’s political role in Irish nationalism as if the very notion of 
‘anti-clericalism’ within the confines of Ireland was an unthinkable one. O’Hegarty and 
MacSwiney had attended the same Christian Brothers school, North Monastery in County 
Cork, which undoubtedly would have had a similarly profound impact on their particular 
brand of Irish Nationalism fuelled as it was by the Christian Brothers and their 
determination to produce educated Catholics fit for middle class occupations. Yet the 
difference’s in O’Hegarty’s and MacSwiney’s views were palpable and O’Hegarty was to 
continue with his anti-clerical tone broadening his condemnation of the priest’s influence in 
Irish politics to the source and apotheosis of the Catholic Clergy’s power base in Rome. 
O’Hegarty identified and attacked the conflict of interests he believed existed between the 
clergy’s allegiance to the Roman Pontiff as head of the Catholic Clergy and the demands 
placed on those who had sworn fealty to the cause of Irish Independence notably separatists 
such as himself. As a final point of criticism O’Hegarty revealed the source of his 
iconoclasm, as that of being able to view the clerical-political dilemma externally, away 
from the clerically-enclosed atmosphere of Ireland itself:
Ireland not having independence enough to demand recognition of Rome as Ireland 
is only regarded as a means of converting the heathen, of gathering Peter’s pence, of 
wringing a concession or two from England for papal schemes. The Catholic Church 
in Ireland wants reform root and barrel, quite as much as it did on the Continent 
prior to Reformation. We have no true religion in Ireland for our religion is alien not 
national. Most of the fellows here are anti-clerical to a greater or lesser degree.. ..It is 
only when a man leaves Ireland that he begins to see straight on some things, this 
amongst them.20
20 P.S. O’Hegarty to Terence MacSwiney, Terence MacSwiney Papers, University College Dublin, P48/374- 
378.
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This final sentiment expressed by O’Hegarty above that, ‘It is only when a man leaves 
Ireland that he begins to see straight on some things, this amongst them’, and in his 
description of how London in 1902 was ‘convulsed by the question of whether priests 
should be members of the Ard-Choisede’ (a debate which reflected the wider implications 
of clerical membership in positions of influence), it can be surmised that 0 ’Hegarty‘s 
residency in the English capital proved to have an enlightening impact upon his youthful 
mind.
While the Catholic Clergy proved very important in managing the social and cultural 
adaption of the emigrant Irish in London,21 L.H. Lees has drawn attention to the impact of 
the Irish living in London during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as having 
being greatly exposed to the more secular ideology of fellow London workers and to the 
lifestyle of the Evangelical Protestant.22
The experience of nationalism amongst Irish emigres took place in an environment where 
radical views could be aired more freely within the London-Irish community without the 
pressure to conform to the traditional provincial community values which were rooted in the 
parishes of Ireland. In Ireland the idea of the clergy as forming a central presence in the lives 
of the population contrasted deeply with the cosmopolitian environment of London. As 
revealed above through O’Hegarty’s and MacSwiney’s correspondences O'Hegarty believed 
that “ever since Maynooth” every nationalist movement worth pursuing had been ruined by 
the clergy in Ireland. Therefore in order to explain this assertion it is necessary to detail the 
historical background to the Catholic Church’s role in Irish society, before returning to the 
implications of O’Hegarty’s views in his correspondences with MacSwiney.
21 L.H. Lees, Exiles in Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, (Manchester, 1979), p. 164.
22 L.H. Lees, Exiles in Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, (Manchester, 1979), p. 164.
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A well respected commentator on Ireland, Sean O’Faolain, believed the conservative nature 
of the clergy began most conspicuously in 1795 with the creation of the Maynooth 
Seminary, wherein, well-to-do Catholic families mainly from tenant farmer stock could 
begin to send their sons to train for the priesthood without having to leave Ireland.23 This 
was significant as previous generations of prospective clergymen had been forced to train on 
the continent as a result of the penal laws. O’Faolain contended that the establishment of the 
Maynooth Seminary in Ireland was to prove enormously influential on the Catholic Clergy’s 
attitude toward nineteenth century Irish nationalism and consequently impacted upon 
O’Hegarty’s contention that ‘ever since Maynooth’ the Church’s political influence had 
proved debilitating to separatist movements and the goal of Irish independence. The 
seminary at Maynooth was conceived and set up from British government funding and for 
its continued financial support accepted the British government’s visits and inspections as 
the norm from 1795. Regarding this arrangement O’Faolain pertinently commented, ‘in 
1799 the entire board of bishops...agreed to subject all Catholic bishops to the visa of that 
foreign government, which is surely the apex of lay control?’24
The impact of revolutionary Europe during this period was also described by O’Faolain as 
exerting a powerful influence on the clerical mindset in Ireland:
In 1795, the year of Maynooth’s foundation, there were a great many French refugee 
professors and teachers to whom any haven, the most frugal pension, would have 
been welcome.. ..That is: ‘in politics, through their hatred of the revolutionary spirit, 
in their devotion to the old monarchial absolutism, they filled the mind of most Irish 
priests, all through O’Connell’s great fight against Britain, with the traditional 
Gallican belief that all things, even many privileges of the church, must lie in servile 
subjection to the throne.25
23 Most keenly expressed in his book entitled, The Irish, (London, 1947).
24 Sean O’Faolain, The Irish (London, 1947), p.l 11
25 Sean O’Faolain, The Irish (London 1947), pp.94-5.
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Given the spirit of revolutionary fervour that had gripped Europe during this period the 
Catholic Church’s fears of subversive secret societies such as Fenianism was an 
understandable one. O’Hegarty was to set the backdrop to the rise of Fenianism in A 
History of Ireland under the Union:
...the starvation, and the failure of the insurrection of 1848, halted resurgent Ireland 
and threw it back. It strengthened the conservative tendencies in politics, inherent in 
the church, and led it rather to discourage bold national politics and to view the 
future evolution of Ireland as necessarily conditioned by whatever could be 
accomplished by an acceptance of English domination and English civilisation. This 
tendency was reinforced by consideration of the growing Irish Catholic populations 
in Great Britain and in the United States, and on the possible importance, in the ever 
growing-in-importance English-speaking world, of a Catholic Irish people at the 
heart of the British empire with a large number of representatives in the British 
Empire.26
Fenianism was viewed by the clergy (erroneously in 0 ’Hegarty‘s view) as an enemy of the 
people whose philosophy, if taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to another failed 
rebellion and the slaughter of many Irish citizens at the hands of England’s professional 
soldiers. This view was exacerbated by the seeming dismissal of the clergy’s edicts and 
pulpit denouncements of membership of the organisation. The clergy’s official line on 
secret societies such as the IRB described their members as anti-religious and their 
perpetuation was condemned in a number of Papal decrees culminating in the 1864 Syllabus 
of Errors.27 Through the pages of the weekly paper, The Irish People, which ran from 1863 
to 1865 the Fenian line was calculated to stir up the sort of nationalist sentiment that had
26 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.400.
27 Donal McCartney ‘The Church and the Fenians’ in Mark Hannon (Ed.), Fenians and Fenianism (Dublin, 
1968), p.13.
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fuelled the armed rebellion of 1798. O’Hegarty described the purpose of the Fenian weekly 
paper as:
The Irish People if it had not a motto, had a principle and a policy. Its principle was 
the restoration of Irish independence, by the separation of Ireland from England, and 
its policy was Force, not Force of opinion only but Force of opinion and physical 
Force.28
The clergy’s revulsion toward the use of physical force was tied into the Fenian’s negative 
philosophy regarding the clergy’s involvement in political matters. The responsibility of 
launching the Fenian campaign in the pages of The Irish People was devolved to Charles J. 
Kickham a committed Fenian and also a devout Catholic.29
From the tone and style of Kickham’s writing it is evident that O’Hegarty was deeply 
influenced by this figure in his approach toward the issue of clerical involvement in politics. 
This claim can be verified through O’Hegarty’s extensive use of quotations from Kickham 
in his A History of Ireland under the Union, particularly chapter XXXTV and from 
O’Hegarty’s own articles on the subject in the advanced nationalist press as featured in the 
opening quotation to this chapter.
Kickham was careful to acknowledge on behalf of the Irish people that they were mindful 
and appreciative of the much needed guidance the clergy had provided in the past a fact that 
O’Hegarty readily accredited the clergy in singling out their role in the Great Famine as one 
of deep selflessness and humanitarianism. (See A History of Ireland under the Union 
chapter XXV.) Kickham’s Catholicism reflected the tensions inherent in attacking the 
clergy in regard to their eminent position in Irish society. This view was maintained while at 
the same time the ecumenical services which the clergy provided were highly praised. It was
28 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.428.
29 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.438.
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clear from Kickham’s approach to the overall role of the clergy in Irish society that the 
Fenians were careful to limit their criticisms of the clergy to their influence in the political 
sphere. But in many respects this was the point the Fenians were making, that in matters 
regarding the religious sphere the Fenians held no jurisdiction while maintaining that the 
clergy held no jurisdiction in the political sphere. Moreover while Kickham, and later 
O’Hegarty, emphasised that the clergy had in the past proved admirable leaders of the 
people this was limited to the past rather than the present and they determined that the Irish 
people had since developed the political maturity necessary for self-government and no 
longer required moral guidance in the secular sphere. Kickham took up this theme in the 
following article:
The Irish priest assumes authority over his flock which the clergy of other Catholic 
countries never dream of assuming, yet this is not to be wondered at. The history of 
Ireland explains it. The fiendish tyranny of England ground our people down to the 
condition of ignorant slaves. In this state of compulsory ignorance and serfdom the 
people naturally looked for guidance to the only educated class that cared for or 
sympathised with them. But times are changed. The people are now comparatively 
educated, and demand the right possessed by the people of other Catholic countries 
of acting according to the dictates of their own judgement in all worldly concerns.30
O’Hegarty suggested that it was essential for Fenians to adopt a sometimes venomous 
stance on the issue of the clergy’s political incursions as the enormous resources they held at 
their disposal were pitted against Fenianism which was still very much a minority 
movement, in the confessional, in the press, in the homes, and in the pulpit.31 
To demonstrate this venomous tone O’Hegarty in A History of Ireland under the Union 
provided the following example of Kickham’s anti-clerical arguments:
30 Donal McCartney ‘The Church and the Fenians’ in Mark Harmon (Ed.), Fenians and Fenianism (Dublin, 
1968), p.17.
31 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.442.
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We saw from the first that ecclesiastical authority in temporal affairs should be 
shivered to atoms before we could advance a single step towards the liberation of our 
suffering country. Yet shallow fools and designing knaves wonder, or affect to 
wonder, why we “attack the priests.” We never uttered a word against the priests as 
ministers of religion. But we challenged, and we do challenge, their right to dictate 
to the people in politics.32
As well as the clergy’s hatred of the Fenian physical force doctrine the Fenians incurred the 
wrath of the hierarchy in Ireland in challenging the clergy’s organisation of social activities 
within local parishes as this was a position they formally monopolised. During the 
nineteenth century and despite the mandatory swearing of the secret oath in order to become 
a Fenian member, Fenianism organised social gatherings such as sports events and ‘picnics’ 
and supplemented these social activities with openly held military drills. These events 
attracted the young men of the parishes a factor which increased the social standing of the 
Fenians in the public eye. This feature added another reason for the clergy’s condemnation 
of the Fenian influence in Irish society as it provided a rival source of personal fulfilment 
and stirred up the social unrest normally associated with Irish nationalist feeling and 
sentiment. R.V. Comerford has observed:
.. .most of those who exercised ‘social control’ during the decades after the Famine -  
clergymen, landlords, magistrates, policemen -  discouraged organised popular sport 
in the interests of peace and public order....Fenianism, then, appealed most strongly 
to sections of the population that were ready for an organisation that would provide 
members with a sense of personal fulfilment through identifying with a group of 
their peers in autonomous social activities. So it flourished in Dublin and in many of 
the towns and villages of Leinster and Munster, among young men who very often 
were already in contact with one another through their employment but had 
previously lacked any specific pretext for fraternisation in their free 
time....Fenianism had been converted to a social purpose for which it had not been 
intended. It was providing young men with a forum for fraternal association and 
communal self-expression, even to the detriment of its formal conspiratorial
32 Irish People, 21 May 1864 quoted in P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1968), 
p.441.
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objective...In the mid nineteenth century any popular organisation among Irish 
Catholics whatever its initial or nominal purpose was likely to become a vehicle for 
nationalist feeling.33
Comerford has thus described how Fenianism struck at the heart of those who held the right 
to impart the social and moral values of the majority of the Irish people:
The Catholic clergy were even more concerned with social control than were the 
landlords. The full intensity of clerical opposition to Fenianism in the 1860s can only 
be understood in terms of a struggle to maintain the dominance of the parish priest 
over certain areas of parochial life.34
Despite the nineteenth century Fenian movements encroachment on the clergy’s authority it 
was difficult for O’Hegarty to accept that even during their most popular period the Fenians 
remained a minority movement. Pertinently it was the clergy during particularly low points 
in the nationalist agitation who commanded the allegiance of mainstream nationalist politics 
a factor bome out in nationalist Ireland’s adhesion to constitutionalism rather than the extra- 
parliamentary methods that Fenianism advocated in anticipation of using physical force. 
Indeed, it was due to the failure of Fenianism during this period that toward the end of the 
nineteenth century that many Fenians converted to the Pamellite model of constitutional 
nationalism. Near the beginning of this chapter O’Hegarty suggested in his letter to Terence 
MacSwiney that every separatist movement of note had been crushed by the clergy4 s 
unwarranted interference in political matters. Even though Parnell worked from within the 
English parliament O’Hegarty uncritically included him within the canon of separatist 
nationalism as did many Fenians at the time in their agreeing not to hinder his 
constitutional framework for obtaining Irish self-government. O’Hegarty argued given
33 R.V. Comerford ‘Patriotism as Pastime: the appeal of Fenianism in the mid 1860’s in Irish Historical 
Studies, no. 22 (1980-81), pp.239-250.
34 R.V. Comerford, ‘Patriotism as Pastime: the appeal of Fenianism in the mid 1860s in Irish Historical 
Studies, no. 22, (1980-81), pp.244-248.
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Parnell’s seeming alignment with the Fenians that if Home Rule had been achieved his 
agitation would have continued for increased separation from England in much the same 
way that O’Hegarty supported the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty as a bridge to full 
Irish independence. O’Hegarty stated of Parnell: ‘But the simple truth is that he was an 
Irishman.. .and wanted to rise Ireland up and put her on a level with the Nations.’35 
The Catholic Church held an important political role during the Parnell era but in 
O’Hegarty’s view was ultimately responsible for his downfall. This was further exacerbated 
as the reasons behind their anti-Parnell campaign was not based on any political objections 
to his position but was justified on the grounds that he had abnegated his right to lead the 
nationalist movement due to a highly publicised lack of moral rectitude in his personal life. 
For O’Hegarty, this intensified his view of the Catholic Church granting primacy to an 
irrelevant personal issue over the primary objective of Irish independence. The following 
paragraph describes the tactics utilised by the clergy in the crucial 1892 election which held 
serious repercussions for Parnell’s political future. These tactics symbolized O’Hegarty’s 
argument for the non-participation of the clergy in political affairs and for him represented 
the clergy’s ability to misuse their powerful political influence in Irish society:
The climax came in 1892 at the general election, when the whole force of the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy was mobilised and used as an overwhelming campaign force in 
every parish in Ireland. At the Cork election, in July 1892, the Roman Catholic 
priesthood went to work in a business like manner to carry the “Pope’s men,” as they 
were called -  viz., Mr. William O’Brien, M.P., and Mr. M. Healy, M.P., Mr. W. 
Redmond, M.P., and Mr. Hogan were the Pamellite candidates. The plan of 
campaign was simple, but effective, and consisted in declarations by the priests that 
it was a sin to stand by Mr. Parnell’s teachings, and a “mortal sin of the deepest dye” 
to vote for Mr. Parnell’s Independent party.36
35 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.589
36 P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University, B3/599.
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To affirm this ecclesiastical right to indulge freely in political affairs Canon O’Mahony 
declared:
In view of this further development of Pamellism, I wonder is there any one in this 
city who thinks that it was going too far to say it was a crime, a sin, a mortal sin of 
the deepest dye, to vote for them or to support them in any way? I am sure if any of 
you were to be so misguided as to vote for those, or even to fail in doing your utmost 
against them, you would look back upon your action or omission with sentiments of 
the deepest remorse hereafter. In the first place, we must hold responsible for this 
crime all those who signed the nomination papers of John Redmond last November, 
all those who canvassed for him, and all those who voted for him, for even there the 
evil character of this Pamellism was evident to any reflecting man. It had 
perpetuated deeds, which ought to make any man see its immoral nature. It had 
shown itself to be a bad tree that could only bring forth bad fruit. But whatever was 
the responsibility of those who, by their action last November, helped to perpetuate 
and give life to this infamous cause, still greater is the responsibility of the men who, 
with the knowledge of what Pamellism has done since, deliberately again resolved 
that they would publicly affix their names to the nomination papers, canvass them, 
and vote.37
As a collector on all aspects and opinions of Irish history as his collection at the Spencer 
Library illustrates it is unsurprising that O’Hegarty collated these pamphlets which amply 
demonstrate the power of the arguments utilised by the clergy in the name of political 
morality. O’Hegarty’s deep aversion to such tactics adopted by the clergy in politics and 
their initial support of Parnell which proved fickle as it was suddenly withdrawn causing the 
movement to split into pro and anti-Pamellites and creating the conditions for Redmond’s 
(in O’Hegarty’s view), pro-union leadership. In defence of the clergy however failure to 
provide moral guidance would have amounted to a dereliction of their spiritual duties 
especially as they could not have been seen to do nothing in the light of the Liberal leader 
W.E. Gladstone and his fellow non-conformists in England openly denouncing Parnell’s 
personal conduct.
37 P.S. O'Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University, B3/599.
40
O’Hegarty believed the clergy’s attitude toward Sinn Fein as merely a continuation of their 
nineteenth century policy toward separatist movements. The main tenets of the Sinn Fein 
policy consisted of civil disobedience and abstention from the constitutional process of 
Westminster as a more effective policy than applying the parliamentary tactics of the Irish 
Party. The clergy therefore dissaproved of the Sinn Fein policy as it affronted their natural 
aversion to any action that defied the civil authority which in Ireland’s case consisted of the 
English government.
In league with clerical dissaproval of Sinn Fein was D.P. Moran the editor of the popular 
Catholic nationalist journal The Leader. Moran openly campaigned for the alignment of 
nationalism with Catholicism and encouraged the active involvement of the clergy in 
politics in contrast to O’Hegarty’s disapproving of their participation as it alienated Irish 
Protestants from identifying with the prospect of Irish self-government. Moran dismissed 
the leader of Sinn Fein, Arthur Griffith, and his attempts to heal the cultural and political 
objections of unionists toward Irish independence with, what was an essential truth to him, 
that Ireland was a Catholic nation and when it gained its independence then Protestants 
would have to adapt accordingly to the new reality.
Moran advocated a Catholic centred cultural revivalism (as opposed to O’Hegarty’s 
attempts to broaden the canon of Irish culture to include the Anglo-Irish tradition as 
described in Chapter HI of this thesis) as the antidote to the degenerative Anglicisation of 
Ireland that he blamed much of Ireland’s economic and cultural failings. Moran 
characterised the Irish Catholic Clergy as the natural leaders of a renewed and re-invigorated 
Catholic nation who would gradually eradicate every Anglicising impulse out of Ireland.
The Irish clergy supported Moran’s withering attitude toward Sinn Fein as being comprised 
of ‘tinpikemen’ or, to quote another of Moran’s derogatory terms, ‘the Green Hungarian
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band’ due to Griffith’s Hungarian policy disseminated in pamphlet form in 1904 as a means 
to render English authority in Ireland negligible. (This was later re-named the Sinn Fein 
policy in 1908.)
Before the 1916 Easter Rising the clergy, as a whole, were distinctly anti-Sinn Fein but this 
view was to change considerably as the tide of popular opinion desserted the Irish Party 
following the execution of the leaders of the Rising and the mistaken assumption that Sinn 
Fein were behind its planning and enactment. Given the rise in popularity of Sjnn Fein the 
clergy embraced the organisation as a legitimate nationalist movement. The clergy’s new 
position regarding Sinn Fein was outlined in a pamphlet disseminated in Dublin on 
September 5th, 1918 and was particularly insightful for the foreword written by Reverend 
Michael O’Flanagan:
This pamphlet, written by one of the most earnest and brilliant of the young priests 
of Connaught, deserves the serious consideration of all the Irish people. Sinn Fein 
has nothing to fear from free discussion, and as the writer shows, the servile slavish 
and futile policy of the “Domestic Party” stands no chance when contrasted with the 
manly, straightforward, fearless policy of Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein wants no unthinking 
mob to rush blindly to the polls. Sinn Fein deserves and expects the Irish people to 
use the brains God gave them and to give intelligent consideration to the case it 
submits. If there is yet left an honest Irishman or Irishwoman who believes with John 
Dillon that Sinn Fein has no policy, he or she ought to consider why England is so 
anxious to silence the exponents of Sinn Fein.38
The views of the ‘western priest’ continued in this vein and culminated with a statement 
that implied that the clergy were a traditional supporter of Sinn Fein ‘...especially during 
election times, people are told by Irish party liars and hypocrites that the Church is opposed 
to Sinn Fein.”39
38 P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University, pamphlet entitled ‘Sinn Fein or 
Parliamentarianism’ by a Western Priest, C2789.
39 P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University, pamphlet entitled ‘Sinn Fein or 
Parliamentarianism’ by a Western Priest, C2798.
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This change of direction for O’Hegarty provided further evidence of the clergy’s ability to 
align themselves with the popular tide of public opinion and that as a body they were 
unscrupulous in their desire to remain in favour with the current political climate. This was 
certainly the conclusion that Sean O’Faolain came to when he commented that the priest 
‘comes out from his cautious seclusion only when he finds the flood in full spate around 
him.’40 That:
The key to the nature of the priest is that he is elusively twofold. His secret is that of 
all the arcane professions. It is impossible to isolate, in any one of his acts, his 
personal from his professional elements....Each one makes a sacrifice of his 
personal liberty, of the single-mindedness, or unity of his personality, in order to 
achieve the enlargement of power that comes with membership of a great powerful 
caste.41
Given O’Faolain’s critique of the clergy it is possible to to extricate from O’Hegarty’s own 
views a similar outlook regarding the capacity of the clergy to arrive at an unbiased, or, 
‘personal’ rather than ‘professional’ opinion. Indeed it is explicit in O’Hegarty’s 
correspondences with MacSwiney quoted earlier in this chapter through his cynical 
description of Ireland’s merely functional use to Rome and of the priest’s ability to invoke 
fear of damnation from his morally superior position.
As this undesirable trait dominated over the spiritual components inherent within 
O’Hegarty’s nationalist framework the clergy were an unwelcome ambiguity that found its 
highest expression after the polarisation of Sinn Fein into two groups - pro and anti- 
Treatyites. (See Chapter VI for an explanation for the reasons behind the split in Sinn Fein.) 
In order to demonstrate that both pro and anti-Treatyites were aware of the importance of 
the clergy’s moral backing of their respective positions an extract from a memorandum
40 Sean O’Faolain, The Irish (London, 1947), p.l 16.
41 Sean O’Faolain, The Irish (London, 1947), p. 109.
written by the ‘republican’ anti-Treatyite Liam Mellowes to Eamonn de Valera is quoted 
below as it lists the failings of the Catholic Clergy and the divisive elements they brought to 
Irish nationalism from the separatist point of view:
Hierarchy only opposed conscription when forced to do so by attitude of people. 
Against IRA during terror. Bishop Cohalan’s excommunication decree of December 
1920. Hierarchy’s abandonment of principle, justice and honour by support of 
Treaty. Danger to Catholicism in Ireland from their bad example -  their exaltation of 
deceit and hypocrisy, their attempt to turn the noble aspect of Irish struggle and bring 
it to their level of putrid politics, their admission that religion is something to be 
preached about from the pulpits on Sundays but never put into practice in the affairs 
of the nation, their desertion of Ulster, etc.42
O’Hegarty refused to use the clergy’s backing of the pro-treatyite position as an argument to 
support his views in favour of the Treaty. For O’Hegarty the fact remained that the official 
support given by the clergy to the pro-Treatyite position did not bolster or in any way 
represent the separatist arguments (as opposed to the conservative beliefs of the clergy) he 
used to support the ratification of the Treaty.
The following emotional appeal of a priest in 1922 who took the anti-Treatyite position 
during the civil war was disseminated in pamphlet form and contained explicit references 
designed to draw on the moral authority of his position compelled as he was by his faith to 
decide upon the rightful course for the Irish people in order that they might adhere to their 
dutiful and moral obligations:
In this dreadful hour I appeal to you, as an Irish Priest, to do your duty to your 
country, and support the men who are defending the liberties and the rights, the 
honour and the dignity of the Irish nation. I tell you, as a Priest, that your duty is to 
assist by your co-operation and your prayers the soldiers who are fighting in defence
42 Liam Mellows to/from Mr. Eamonn de Valera and others regarding the general situation dated 26/8/22. 
Taken from a collection of correspondences this letter was marked private but was in O’Hegarty’s possession. 
P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer Library, Kansas University, C2799.
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of the republic, which was begotten of the blood of the men of 1916, which was 
afterwards established by Irish law, and which now at England’s bidding is being 
threatened by the so-called Government of Michael Collins.
I appeal to you in the name of Pearse and MacSwiney and Barry and all their 
comrade martyrs, not to help in the further commital of this generation to the 
disgraceful Treaty-Pact with England. This generation has no moral power to 
surrender even for a time, the inviolable rights of the Irish Nation. The men and 
women of to-day are bound to hand down these rights to their children and receive 
them. The future will curse those of you who are trying to consummate this 
infamous crime.
I will not give my name. My name matters not. I am only one of the goodly numbers 
of Ireland’s young “rebel” Priests.43
While O’Hegarty could never marry his civic nationalism to Pearse’s sacrificial and 
Catholic inspired interpretation of Ireland’s right to independence the reference made above 
in relation to MacSwiney’s death on hunger strike in 1919 would have proved a particularly 
pertinent one as it illustrated the attempted monopolisation of the clergy in what was a 
politically inspired act of sacrifice. Yet as Tom Garvin has commented, in the social climate 
of the time, Catholicism was a badge of respectability for many separatists in the light of the 
nationalist ideology’s failure to become an acceptable norm across all traditions on the 
island of Ireland:
...it was difficult for a Catholic to be fully respectable but it was possible for a 
Catholic to be spiritual; Patrick Pearse and Terence MacSwiney, with their 
exaggerated postures of self-sacrifice, were being respectable in a way possible only 
for Catholics.44
MacSwiney believed that nationalism was a spiritual force as the following note addressed 
to him from Bulmer Hobson testified to, ‘There are so few people who see that nationality is
43 Published in pamphlet form, dated 3/7/22, contained in the P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer 
Library, Kansas University, C2599.
44 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.47.
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really a spiritual thing.’45 Likewise for O’Hegarty the form of spiritualism that he identified 
with and would consistently argue that other separatists such as MacSwiney took their 
inspiration from was not married to any particular religious creed as the priest quoted in the 
above pamphlet had emotively argued. Instead separatism was grounded in the civic spirit 
of Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen whose central ideas had been incorporated into the 
IRB led Dungannon Clubs, of Belfast, London and Dublin. These principles were extolled 
through nationalism in the form of the separatist tradition and transcended the idea that the 
Irish nation was a fractiously divided one based upon religious denominations.
O’Hegarty’s article which was quoted from at the beginning of this chapter stated that to 
align the cause of Irish nationalism with Catholicism was an erroneous one. Yet it would 
have greatly comforted Terence MacSwiney, that, unlike his sister Mary MacSwiney, who 
emulated her brother Terence’s hunger strike and was excommunicated from the church for 
her protest against the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, that he retaned the majority of clerical 
support for his action.. The centrality of Catholicism to Terence MacSwiney can be 
construed from the following observation made by Tom Garvin: ‘O’Hegarty and Michael 
Collin’s joined the IRB, MacSwiney refused to join, like the young Eamon de Valera, as he 
respected the Catholic Church’s prohibition on membership of secret, oath sworn 
societies.’46
Yet despite maintaining his position on the clergy in political matters O’Hegarty could not 
deny that the clergy were the backbone upon which nationalism relied during its lean 
periods. Indeed, despite their assertion for the division of church and politics Fenians were
45 Bulmer Hobson to Terence MacSwiney, 7/11/1910, Terence MacSwiney Papers. This was written to 
encourage MacSwiney to contribute further to the IRB paper Irish Freedom University College Dublin, 
P48b/381.
46 Tom Garvin, in his Introduction to the reprint of P.S. O'Hegarty’s The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1998), 
Introduction.
not above accepting the help of the clergy whenever there were sympathetic voices to be 
heard amongst the ranks of the clergy. The most prominent example of how the clergy and 
Fenianism could act in concert and to the benefit of each other were the several high profile 
funerals of ex-Fenians such as O’Donovan Rossa and the anniversary celebrations of 
distinguished Irish nationalist activists. Regarding Parnell too it must be stated that what 
O’Hegarty did not address in his criticisms of the clergy was that one of the main reasons 
for a Protestant landlord becoming a leader of the nationalist movement was because of the 
Catholic clergy’s recommendation of Parnell to their community. They may have helped 
bring about his downfall but they were essential in creating the climate into which he 
aspired and was accepted into the leadership role. Evidently what O’Hegarty never really 
got to grips with was that just because the clergy were conservative in their nature this did 
not mean that they were pro-British in their outlook and as the pamphlet quoted from above 
illustrated not all priests followed the Hierarchy’s orders. Indeed many of the clergy were 
more than capable of following their own individual consciences on matters of political 
importance. Yet from a practical perspective the issue for O’Hegarty was that separatism 
contained a distinct policy whereby in planning the overthrow of the established authority of 
the British government through physical force methods and the necessary membership of a 
secret society of its adherents the clergy’s implacable opposition proved counter-productive. 
In the final letter of O’Hegarty and MacSwiney’s correspondence on the nature of the clergy 
in politics O’Hegarty proposed the following remedy presumably to be implemented after 
independence (O’Hegarty did not believe at this point that Irish independence was 
achievable during his lifetime) in preventing the clergy’s unwarranted influence in political 
matters:
47
What is my remedy, you ask? There are two. First and preferably but I think 
unrealistically during our lifetime, the nationalisation of Church government; i.e., the 
power of appointments, Bishops etc; giving preferments; and so on, not to be vested 
in foreigners what ever, but, say, the primate of all Ireland, or a “Council of the Irish 
Church.” Let the Pope be head of the Church and let him dictate in doctrinal matters 
but let the Irish Church manage its affairs. Keep all clergymen strictly out of all 
secular movements, Gaelic League as well as everything else...quite recognise your 
point that the priests are of the people our own flesh and blood.47
Notably however this was only expressed in a private correspondence with MacSwiney and 
not expressed in the separatist press and therefore it could be said that O’Hegarty displayed 
a typical Fenian attitude toward the clergy in his unwillingness to tackle their position of 
power directly.
The reticence of Fenianism to tackle the power of the clergy goes some way to explaining 
Sinn Fein’s dilemma regarding the politicised clergy also. Its leader, Arthur Griffith, was 
not above courting clerical favour if the opportunity arose but ultimately Sinn Fein was not 
noted for its deference to the Catholic clergy. Following the 1918 election and Sinn Fein’s 
rise to political power it was necessary to assure the clergy that Sinn Fein were not looking 
to implement the recommendations to combat the power of the politicised clergy that 
O’Hegarty was suggesting in the above letter to MacSwiney. O’Hegarty’s recommendations 
were idealistic and as with Thomas Davis and the Young Irelander of the 1840’s, who had 
moderately questioned the power of the Catholic Church it would have taken a massive 
cultural shift in Ireland to remove the Catholic Clergy’s deeply embedded roots in Irish 
society.
Ultimately therfore O’Hegarty’s proposed solution to prevent the continuing influence of 
the ‘priest in politics’ would have proved too radical for the Irish people to accept. In 
outlining his views on the clergy, O’Hegarty’s views were set against a very experienced
47P.S. O’Hegarty to Terence MacSwiney, Terence MacSwiney Papers, University College Dublin, P48c/297.
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organisation, who, as a united body, proved too powerful for the Fenian movement to 
attempt to set political boundaries to their role as representatives of the majority of the Irish 
population.
In comparison therefore to other European countries who experienced anti-clerical 
movements and particularly when measured against their French republican ancestors 
Fenian anti-clericalism proved relatively weak. It may have openly attacked the Catholic 
Clergy for its intervention in political matters but dating from its formation in the 1860s it 
also desperately wanted to negotiate a way forward so that the church and the separatist 
values of Fenianism could co-exist. Fenians were not looking to confront the church head 
on hence their carefulness to include their recognition of the church’s productive and 
humanistic side in Irish society. So too, as O’Hegarty pointed out, two highly effective 
writers in the Fenian movement Thomas Clark Luby and John O’Leary were both 
Protestants48 but it was deemed a prudent move not to provoke the clergy further by 
expressing Fenian discontent through Protestant penmanship. ‘Whenever priests or bishops 
had to be taken to task...it was left to Kickham; O’Leary and Luby were both Protestants, 
and all the articles in the paper dealing with priests in politics were Kickham’s.’49 
O’Hegarty maintained that ‘the Fenians were not, in any sense, educating the people they 
were telling them; they believed that the people were sound enough and national enough 
provided they were properly led.’50 For O’Hegarty this leadership was by necessity separatist 
and answered only to the call of nationalism as the highest good and therefore as the clergy 
were ultimately answerable to Rome this leadership was not to be found in the clergy.
48 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.435
49 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.435
50 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.432.
In the twentieth century O’Hegarty went further than Kickham in proposing a radical re­
structuring of the Catholic Clergy in Ireland yet this may be explainable by the fact that by 
O’Hegarty’s era even though the church was still a very powerful organisation which 
formed a major part of social and political life in Ireland there was not any one figure such 
as Cardinal Cullen during the nineteenth century who dominated the political and social 
landscape. Indeed from the 1880s as the political Irish nationalist movement undertook a 
more respectable constitutional line under Parnell’s Land League agitation and Fenianism 
was reduced to toeing the constitutionalist line through the ‘New Departure’, separatists 
such as Kickham who had endured the wrath of the clergy during the 1860s paradoxically 
became heroic figures to be venerated for their dedication to the cause of Irish 
independence. Although as Oliver MacDonagh has pointed out this invariably involved a 
sufficient passing of time in order for the clergy to safely elevate these figures to the canon 
of nationalist sainthood.51 It might be construed as paradoxical therfore for O’Hegarty in A 
History of Ireland under the Union52 to have praised the sterling work of clerical figures 
such as Archbishop Croke of Cashel one of the founding members of the Gaelic Athletic 
Association. Archbishop Croke proved a seminal figure in the promotion of Irish sports 
such as hurley and gaelic football over English sports which were deemed ‘not racy of the 
soil’.53 In his praising of such clerical figures O’Hegarty was, no less, admitting that they 
were engrained in the political sphere as well as in Irish society in that during such 
politically sensitive times the choices you made regarding which sport to play, or in 
choosing to learn the Irish language, were no less than political actions.
51 Oliver MacDonagh, ‘Ambiguity in Nationalism: The Case of Ireland4, in Ciaran Brady (Ed.), Interpreting 
Irish History, (Dublin, 1994), p.l 17.
52 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.610.
53 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.612.
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For O’Hegarty the inhabitants of the ‘Underground Nation’ had rid themselves of one 
official politicised institution, the Anglican Church in 1869 and O’Hegarty definitely did 
not wish to see this institution replaced by another. It was left to de Valera in the 1930s to 
officially afford the Catholic Church a special position in Irish society. Like O’Connell, de 
Valera mastered the relationship between the political and the clerical. The involvement of 
the clergy in the political side of Irish nationalism had been evolving for a long time from 
the nineteenth century reaching its highpoint as a recent scholar has suggested during the 
latter decades where there was a:
development and formulation of an informal yet deep seated accord between Irish 
Nationalist politicians and Roman Catholic high clergy in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries on the respective roles each were to have in the emerging 
self-governing states of Ireland.54
Amongst the Catholic population the clergy became deeply embedded in the political as 
well as the social fabric of Catholic life. The clergy understandably were loath to give up 
this position and it was in the interests of self-preservation that they allied themselves with 
the prominent nationalist movments of their day as between them they reflected the majority 
of Irish Catholic opinion. As Antonio Gramsci has noted in addressing the historical 
motivation behind the clergy’s ability to change political allegiances in concert with the 
political climate:
Religion, or a particular church, maintains its community of faithful (within the 
limits imposed by the necessities of general historical development) in so far as it 
nourishes its faith permanently and in an organised fashion, indefatigably repeating 
its apologetics, struggling at all times and always with the same kind of arguments 
and maintaining a hierarchy of intellectuals who give to the faith, in appearance at 
least, the dignity of thought. Whenever the continuity of relations between the 
Church and the faithful has been violently interrupted, for political reasons, as
54 John Fulton, The Tragedy of Belief (Oxford, 1991), p.3.
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happened during the French revolution, the losses suffered by the Church have been 
incalculable...55
It would seem that the French Revolution ultimately inflicted a double impact on Ireland, 
influencing both the father of modem nationalism, the revolutionary-minded Wolfe Tone, 
and the stalwart of conservatism, the Catholic Clergy. It can be inferred that these 
conflicting influences sought for supremacy in Ireland from the nineteenth century as 
O’Hegarty asserted and that nationalism and clericalism had fought out an historical duel 
even when it would appear their interests were intertwined: ‘O’Connell beat them on the 
veto question, Young Ireland fought them, so did Fenianism, and so did Pamellism.’56 
The Catholic Clergy were not looking to create a free Ireland in the sense that the Fenians 
and O’Hegarty were. The latter saw Ireland becoming an independent Irish nation free from 
English interference forming its own government and conducting its affairs, politically and 
economically on its own terms. For the clergy and its grounding in constitutional principles 
the complete separation of Ireland from England was not envisaged at least not in the 
timeframe that separatists were working toward although a more short term agenda did 
become the view of a few radical clergymen who were willing to defy their superiors. This 
important factor was to provide succour and relax the fears of many radical nationalists who 
also held devoutly to their faith. In defence of their pro-separatist position and their attitude 
toward the use of physical force arguments were put forward that the Hierarchy were 
misinformed and the support of dissident republican priests put forward as proof of this.
It would be erroneous to depict the clergy as consisting of a united body opposed to secret 
societies or unsympathetic toward the separatist cause. Cardinal Cullen for instance felt it an
55 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks translated and edited by Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith 
(London, 1971), p.340.
56 P.S. O’Hegarty, Ulster: a Brief Statement of Fact (Dublin, 1918), p.25.
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important manoeuver to curb the enthusiasms of individual clerics such as Father Lavelle 
and Archbishop McHale for their open support of the separatist cause and their strongly 
opinionated anti-English sentiment. Yet Cullen, like O’Hegarty, also believed that a line 
should be drawn between the temporal and spiritual spheres. Cullen did not favour the 
involvement of the clergy in political matters but given their power in Irish society the 
clergy could in many respects choose where to draw the line between the temporal and the 
secular. Cullen determined in a pastoral letter that it was appropriate: “[To]...inculcate 
obedience to whom obedience is due, and whilst ready to give to Caesar the things which 
are his, determined to give only to God the things which belong to God.”57 
On the whole, however, O’Hegarty maintained that the clergy’s stance was conservative, 
and that it \ . .looked forward only to a modest place for Ireland in the English sun.’58 
O’Hegarty’s anti-clericalism encompassed a broad remit and in widening the issue of his 
particular strand of Irish nationalism it went to the heart of his profound belief in civic 
nationalism. It is unsurprising therfore that the scholar Tom Garvin made specific reference 
to O'Hegarty when he commented how: ‘In the minds of some Sinn Feiners, such as P.S. 
O’Hegarty, liberalism and individualism fought a battle with inherited deference to clerical 
authority.’59 This focus upon liberalism and individualism were features implicit in 
O’Hegarty’s thought across all of his nationalistic views as was his assertion that the Irish 
people were politically mature enough to deal with the divisions that seemed to prevent the 
nationalist ideal amongst all of the population. In helping to rejuvenate the IRB O’Hegarty 
took up a new Fenian line regarding the intimacy of the clergy with the Irish political
57 Pastoral letter of his Grace the most Rev Dr. Cullen Archbishop, etc., Primate of all Ireland.. .on the Feast of 
the Immaculate Conception’, in 1855. Pamphlet contained in the P.S. O’Hegarty Collection, Kenneth Spencer 
Library, Kansas University.
58 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.442.
59 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.24.
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situation. The emotional tone of his articles revealed the fervency of his belief and re­
emphasised the importance that the Fenians of the 1860s placed on the matter.
For O’Hegarty the fusion of IRB principles with the romantic revival of Irish nationalism 
marked an exciting opportunity for capturing the imagination of those such as unionists who 
were opposed to Irish self-govemement. His strongly held views on the interference of the 
clergy in the political sphere must be seen as a rejection of Catholic particularism and its 
association with the nationalist project as these traits were unrepresentative of the civic 
pluralism to which separatists of his ilk subscribed.
O'Hegarty inherited the tradition of Fenian ‘anti priest in politics’ as he believed it a policy 
based upon the betterment of the Irish nation as a whole rather than any enmity toward the 
Catholic Church. He was not looking to alter the influence of the clergy upon Irelands 
Catholics any more than he woulds wish to attack or interfere in the private sphere of the 
Protestant people and their their clerical representatives. O'Hegarty however was taking to 
task an organisation that had succesfully entered the public sphere of national life in Ireland 
was entrenched in Irish society and remained so until the cultural shift required in order to 
alter their primary position occurred during the 1960s. O’Hegarty too was not suggesting 
that the clergy’s impact in Ireland was wholly negative. He acknowledged their special 
relationship in A History of Ireland under the Union when he remarked that generally the 
clergy: ‘...has been of the people, from the people, and in the main with the people.’60 
Nevertheless given O’Hegarty’s firm advocacy of civic nationality and his deep dislike of 
perceptions of the ‘Underground Nation’ as exclusively consisting of the Catholic 
population, thus alienating much of the Protestant tradition in Ireland, he saw the clergy as 
an obstacle to the liberalism and pluralism he wished to see developing within Ireland.
60 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.400.
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CHAPTER II 
THE GAELIC LEAGUE
This chapter will examine the Irish separatist P.S. O’Hegarty’s endorsement of the Irish 
language and the Gaelic League in the early part of the twentieth century. O’Hegarty was to 
become an executive member of Sinn Fein, the IRB Supreme Council and elected member 
of Ard Choisede.1 His aspiration was to consolidate the Irish language in the struggle for 
Irish independence; he believed that in order for Ireland not to lose its individual identity as 
a nation the language could not be set aside as periphery to the cause of Irish nationalism. 
The purpose of this chapter on O’Hegarty’s involvement and promotion of the educational 
properties of the Gaelic League is to highlight O’Hegarty’s deep belief in the centrality of 
language in the formation of the nation’s sense of distinctiveness. O'Hegarty ardently 
supported the Irish language movement he was to write: ‘...and from 1903 to the present 
time I have been closely connected with every Irish movement of what I might call the 
language revival current... ’2
1 This was an elected group within the Gaelic League that developed strategies for promoting the Irish 
language. Ard Choisede translates as ‘Executive Council.’
2 P.S. O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.28. O’Hegarty was educated at the Christian 
Brothers School at North Monastery, Cork. A principal feature of a Christian Brother’s education was the 
theme of Irish self-reliance, which was best served through promotion of the nation’s national language and 
culture. Later, as a civil servant based in London and as a member of this newly educated Catholic middle
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The chapter is structured firstly through an examination of O’Hegarty’s views of the 
language movements throughout the nineteenth century with particular emphasis on his 
criticisms of Daniel O’Connell’s lack of commitment to the development of the Irish 
language before turning to O’Hegarty’s own generation and the legacy of the Gaelic League 
to the plural nationalism O’Hegarty so strongly advocated before examining the 
politicisation of the movement and whether O’Hegarty’s pluralistic view of Irish separatism 
was capable of inducing a shared sense of Irish identity across unionist and nationalist 
cultures in Ireland.
The Gaelic League was an attempt by Irish nationalists to re-discover the indigenous 
cultural heritage they felt was best reflected in the Irish language still spoken in Ireland but 
mainly confined to the north and south west of the island. The Gaelic League was to 
become the most significant organisation in raising public consciousness in Ireland toward a 
Gaelic cultural heritage.3
Yet the Fenian tradition to which O’Hegarty claimed heritage dating from 1858 was notable 
for its distinct lack of involvement in promoting cultural nationalism although some leading 
figures dabbled in Hibemo societies and reading clubs. Above all, however Fenianism was a 
military organisation and channelled its energies into one distinct aim - the overthrow of the 
British Government in Ireland. R.V Comerford has observed that principally:
There was...no Fenian policy on language, other than an implicit assumption that 
English was and would remain the language of power and politics in Ireland. The 
movement’s newspaper, the Irish People (Dublin 1863-6) had displayed very little 
explicit interest in any aspect of cultural nationalism, although the editor, John 
O’Leary, was later to claim credit for service to that cause by his ruthless exclusion 
of reams of bad patriotic verse submitted by readers.4
class, O’Hegarty was at the vanguard of the Gaelic League movement and became an emphatically strong 
supporter of the Irish language as a tool for furthering Ireland‘s de-Anglicisation.
3 Encyclopaedia of Irish History and Culture, V ol.l, (London, 2004), p.268
4 R.V Comerford, Ireland: Inventing the Nation (London, 2003), p. 140.
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In line with the Fenian position with which a tenuous alliance named the ‘New Departure’ 
had emerged, Parnell’s movement too was not marked for its promotion of Irish culture or 
language, ‘Again, in the highly important agrarian and nationalist mobilisations achieved by 
Parnell from 1879 onwards, there was no identification of the Irish language as an essential 
of nationality.’5
Indeed, in many respects, it was left to the twentieth century and O’Hegarty’s generation of 
Irish nationalists to take up the linguistic drive toward cultivating a sense of indigenous Irish 
culture. Therefore as well as the physical force tradition of Fenianism O’Hegarty as a 
twentieth century Fenian was very much influenced by the romantic literary revival of the 
early twentieth century.
Despite the Fenian lack of interest in the promotion of Irish cultural nationalism O’Hegarty 
was to undertake the task of re-invigorating the Irish cultural heritage mainly through the 
promotion of the Irish language as an artery through which the Fenian doctrine could be 
disseminated. Indeed this line of action may be construed as O’Hegarty contradicting the 
original Fenian line here demonstrated by James Stephens founder of the IRB who 
scornfully wrote of the ‘young men...pushing about in drawing room society...creating an 
Irish national literature, schools of Irish art and things of that sort.’6
While certainly not an aficionado of drawing room society7 O’Hegarty viewed the cultural 
education of the Irish people as a pre-requisite for the achievement of Irish independence. In 
this respect, O’Hegarty argued that the building up of cultural nationalism was a natural 
objective for Fenians in the battle for national independence. O’Hegarty in utilising the
5 R.V Comerford, Ireland: Inventing the Nation (London, 2003), p. 140.
6 D.G. Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland (London, 1982), p. 177.
7 See for example O’Hegarty’s comment on Thomas Moore as a poet of the English ‘drawing room’ variety in 
Chapter III of this thesis.
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breadth of Fenianism as he saw it saw Sinn Fein, under Arthur Griffith’s presidency, as 
another vehicle through which the committed Fenian could work for independence, 
politically and economically. Sinn Fein was a vessel through which practical policies 
dealing with social and economic arguments for Irish self-reliance were expounded which 
importantly O’Hegarty contrasted with the Irish Party’s lack of economic discussion and 
their dependency on the whims of the Westminster model of constitutionalist politics. So 
too the Gaelic League preached Irish self-reliance as it was the movement through which 
the Irish language was dispersed and brought to the Irish people as a core principle of 
hishness. Because of its early successes in this enterprise and because of O’Hegarty’s 
emphasis on cultural rejuvenation the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein represented the foremost 
public entities that were capable of uplifting the nation culturally and economically. 
(Unsurprisingly the Fenians or IRB were unable to expound their views in a widespread 
public campaign due to their conspiratorial nature and their ultimate aim of overthrowing 
the British government.)
The twin track directives of Sinn Fein and the Gaelic League inspired O’Hegarty’s 
following article in The Republic dated February 28, 1907, which emphasised his analysis 
of the modem Fenian approach:
The present attempt is the most self-conscious and comprehensive of any. The 
revival of today may be taken as a confederacy of movements all forming an organic 
whole, yet bound together very loosely, originating independently, and to a large 
extent acting independently. But they have all a common driving force, and a 
common goal, the assertion of the Irish nation, each is striving for that assertion in its 
own particular portion of the national life, and, collectively, they tend to the assertion 
in toto of the nation.
Many years later in 1939, O’Hegarty was to elaborate on this feature of the separatist 
programme in the decade before 1916 in a review of Edward Lysaght’s Irish Life in the
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Seventeenth Century: after Cromwell, in which O’Hegarty emphasised the intellectual 
stimulation through which Sinn Fein and the Gaelic League’s principles operated. The 
Gaelic League had been much more than a policy for the promotion of a language in decay 
for O’Hegarty as it held the key to the entire separatist ethos, ‘The sword of light is of 
course, the Irish language and the culture to which it is the key... ’8
Given O’Hegarty’s faith in the language as an essential weapon in the separatist armoury 
and his faith in the intellectual framework of the Sinn Fein movement he confidently 
asserted in 1907 that:
The Sinn Fein man supports and works not only for his own particular section of the 
movement, the political side, but for every section -  every movement which aims at 
the realisation of any portion of the national life by action within Ireland has his 
support, and he welds them all together.. .hence the Sinn Fein policy is Fenianism in 
practice -  on the lines of passive resistance, the clogging of the machine of British 
government, the building up of the intellect of the nation, as well as its muscle. 
Hence the Sinn Fein Fenian who heads this article.9
O’Hegarty believed that the Irish language was the foundation upon which the 
‘Underground Nation’ (O’Hegarty’s term to describe Irish Ireland’s emergence out of 
‘bondage’), could lead the way in the dispossessed reclaiming their national identity. For 
O’Hegarty the historical legacy and current rejuvenation of the Irish language represented 
resistance to the peaceful but effective penetration of English culture and tradition into 
Ireland’s cultural heritage. This is not to say that O’Hegarty bore any animosity toward the 
English language or English culture, rather, he felt that the Irish language and culture were 
unfairly depicted as an inferior and redundant medium in the rapidly modernising world.
8 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1939.
9 The Republic, 1907.
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The language therefore represented the source of the Irish people’s defiance and cultural 
continuation in the light of Ireland’s growing social and economic Anglicisation dating 
most noticeably from the 1801 Act of Union. The language embodied the form of self- 
reliance through which Irish culture had maintained itself and this rather than distaste or 
animosity toward England enervated his enthusiasm toward the language revival.
In addition, O’Hegarty sought to apply the principle of the Irish language as a forge of 
potential cultural unity between the competing cultural traditions on the island. In the same 
manner as Wolfe Tone leader of the United Irishmen movement in the late eighteenth 
century, O’Hegarty was attempting to unite ‘Catholic Protestant and Dissenter’ under a non- 
discriminatory Irish government free from its colonial standing within the British Empire. 
O’Hegarty saw the Irish language as representing Ireland’s claim to nationhood a line of 
argument frequently utilised at the beginning of the twentieth century by other European 
peoples aspiring to achieve recognition of their rights to national independence. Yet crucial 
to the aims of O’Hegarty’s language revival argument as a means to unite all traditions in 
Ireland was the question as to whether, given Ireland’s unique situation, his civic 
nationalism held a real possibility of success where others such as the Young Irelander 
movement of the 1840s had failed? This chapter will demonstrate that while his intentions 
were honourable he was unable to dissolve the real fears of the Protestant minority who 
stressed their British nationality as the protectorate of their tradition and identity on the 
island of Ireland. That contrary to his pluralistic notions of an Irish society free from 
sectarian animosity O’Hegarty further alienated those who did not wish to facilitate a 
replacement of Anglicisation with the nationalist interpretation of the Irish language and 
culture as the core identity of Ireland.
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For O’Hegarty the most important spiritual ally in the survival of the ‘Underground Nation’ 
was the Irish language. He was at one with Douglas Hyde’s aims of reviving the language as 
a living tongue viewing it as necessary in creating a culturally unique Irish nation distinct 
from England.
O’Hegarty conceded the enormous task set before those, who, previous to Hyde, attempted 
to protect the language from obscurity and therefore from ‘becoming a relic of antiquity.’10 
The provenance of such attempts to rediscover the Irish language emanated from ‘learned 
and cultural societies’,11 which, as O’Hegarty illustrates, included the
Gaelic Society of 1806, the Ibemo-Celtic society of 1821, the Irish Archaeological 
Society, the Celtic Society, and the Ossianic Society, of the forties to the sixties- 
studied the language, produced a large number of texts, prose and poetry, edited, 
translated, and annotated. Remarkable native scholars, of whom the chief were 
Eugene O’Curry and John O’Donovan, appeared. The Annals o f Ireland, written in 
the seventeenth century, embodying older records, were edited and translated, and a 
respectable body of scholarly work was done on the language.. ,12
The connection between these clubs and societies despite their separate existences and 
chronological disparity was a love of the indigenous language and culture motivated by a 
genuine desire to see it studied as a legitimated scholarly pursuit. As O’Hegarty has 
emphasised a major feature of this scholarly interest was the prevalence of the Protestant 
Ascendancy who were the most conspicuous group involved in the nineteenth century’s 
engagement with the Irish language and culture. The importance of this social group to the 
study and translation of Irish writing was encapsulated by O’Hegarty in his assertion that as
10 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.615
11 For corroboration of O’Hegarty’s views of these societies see Padraig O'Riagain, Language Policy and 
Social Reproduction: Ireland 1893-1993 (New York, 1997), p.8
12 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.614
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they ‘were of the garrison section... [They found] in that an outlet for patriotism to which 
they shrank from giving political expression.’13
Political differences aside O’Hegarty saluted their service to the language, which was 
undoubtedly essential to its survival into the twentieth century. As a civic nationalist 
holding, no animosity toward any social group in Ireland O’Hegarty acknowledged the debt 
owed despite the tendency for these groups to be unmoved toward the widespread 
dissemination of the language. Moreover, he observed how:
They were of both Irish and Ascendancy origin, and the scholars amongst them, even 
those of pure Irish blood, took only a scholarly and an antiquarian interest in the 
language, they did not envisage its revival as a spoken tongue. They were patriotic, 
intelligent, and unselfish bodies, but they were aloof, and towards the end of the 
century, the scholars’ aloof interest in the Irish language was reinforced and 
completed by a new movement, a movement of the people, springing up 
spontaneously and taking instant root.14
While scholarly interest was to create some measure of hope for the ‘Underground Nation’ 
and its cultural existence it drew strength from more visceral movements who were intent 
on combining the language with an Irish patriotism: ‘they wanted to revive it as a spoken 
language, to have it taught in the schools, and in one way or another a certain amount of lip 
service was paid to the language by public men even in the political stress.’15 Yet the 
problem as O’Hegarty identified it remained as they too consisted of ‘individual efforts, 
they were not associated, and they were not organised nor directed.’16 
In A History of Ireland under the Union. O’Hegarty contrasted the Protestant Ascendancy’s 
enthusiastic if somewhat aloof attitude toward the language with Daniel O'Connell and his
13 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), pp.614-615.
14 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.615.
15 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.615.
16 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.615. Modem research too reflects 
these views. See R.V. Comerford’s Ireland: inventing the nation (London, 2003).
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complete neglect of the language during his constitutional agitation for the eradication of the 
discriminatory penal laws and later the repeal of the Act of Union. The contrast is 
interesting as it encompasses O’Hegarty’s belief that those who were seen by many on the 
nationalist side as enemies of the people, i.e. the Protestant Ascendancy, were perhaps more 
unconsciously Irish in their outlook then they cared to admit and that nationalist movements 
if its leaders were unaware of the usefulness of the cultural argument could damage the 
organic wholeness of nationalism he referred to in his articles on Fenianism above. As a 
consequence it was partly through O’Connell’s neglect of the language that O’Hegarty 
reasoned that the nineteenth century proved the most effective era in England’s suppression 
of Ireland politically, economically and culturally. In this regard, O’Hegarty iterated the 
impact of the nineteenth century as further distancing the Irish people from their language 
and their heritage with O’Connell firmly in a position to influence and reverse the process 
blatantly neglecting to do so. O’Hegarty’s view of O’Connell therefore, in this chapter, will 
serve as a useful contrast to the good work of the Gaelic League and in how the spiritual 
aspects of O’Hegarty’s framework of nationalism existed as the centre point of his 
programme for reviving the Irish language. Therefore, it is appropriate to trace the centrality 
of O’Connell in A History of Ireland under the Union on this issue as it reinforces the 
primacy of the Gaelic League’s remit for O’Hegarty and its work in attaching a key note of 
reputability and mass interest in the language. O’Hegarty believed all the factors involved in 
the re-capturing of this spiritual past, pre-nineteenth century, were in need of embracing as it 
was essential that the language revival succeeded in undoing the exclusive notion that 
nationalism was interchangeable with the ethnic claims of the indigenous Irish population. 
During the nineteenth century, the Irish language had increasingly become equated with 
economic backwardness and lower social status. As the scholar Patrick Maume has
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illustrated the situation in the nineteenth century had emerged from the Protestant 
ascendancy’s unwillingness to concede democratic rights to the Catholic majority in Ireland 
as this would have placed their ascendancy under threat and rendered them a political and 
economic minority existing within a predominantly Catholic country. As a result, when 
such rights were eventually wrested from the British government through O’Connell’s 
Catholic Emancipation agitation it was too late to merge the demand for more rights into the 
political system:
...despite protests from defenders of Protestant ascendancy, British governments 
tried to secure Catholic loyalty by developing and co-opting Catholic lay and clerical 
elites, whose status rose with the increasing power and prestige of the church 
leadership and the growth of a class of provincial traders and large farmers 
supporting Catholic professionals drawn from their own families and gaining local 
patronage as they challenged the landlord’s dominance of institutions such as the 
board of guardians. The high point of this policy can be seen as the alliance in the 
eighteen-thirties between O’Connell and the Melbourne government, and the first 
Gladstone government, which seemed for a few years after 1868 to have made 
liberalism the political vehicle of Irish Catholic and Presbyterian identities and 
grievances against the old regime, as it harnessed national feeling in Wales and 
Scotland through deploying central power for reformism against particularistic Tory 
aristocracies. Liberalism dominated the Irish parliamentary scene, even establishing 
a base in Tory-dominated Ulster. Catholic representation in the higher levels not 
regained until the first decade of the twentieth century; competitive examinations 
allowed surplus children of the Catholic middle class, trained by the growing 
Catholic public schools, to compete for civil service jobs in Ireland and the 
Empire.’17
The policy of increasing Anglicisation in Ireland persisted alongside the efforts of the 
Young Irelanders in the 1840s to invigorate interest and impute respectability toward the 
Irish language among the readers of its paper the Nation. O’Hegarty was puzzled at how the 
nineteenth century, following the Young Irelanders positive depiction of the language was 
marked by an almost total neglect among patriotic periodicals and journals of articles
17 Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation (Dublin, 1999), p.3
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referring to and promoting the Irish language.18 Quoting from the Irish literary journal, the 
Shamrock. 10 June, 1871, O’Hegarty referred to the customary approach adopted toward 
the language issue when intermittently the topic was admitted printed space:
...we very much doubt that the Irish tongue will ever again attain its former 
importance as a living language. Nor is it desirable that it should be revived for 
ordinary purposes of communication, seeing that the world has advanced beyond 
its vocabulary, and it is not adequate to the civilisation of the day. These are not to 
be counted as defects, for, up to the point at which the Irish ceased to be a Nation, 
the language is as perfect as any of its contemporaries. But when the national life 
became contaminated in Ireland and the civilization of the country was checked, 
the language like a sensitive barometer, ceased to indicate any further rise.
O’Hegarty’s separatist narrative depicted a downtrodden people culturally re-arming and 
emerging out from underground and reclaiming their past dignity and heritage the following 
passage represented the magnitude of combating Ireland’s growing Anglicisation. In this 
context Anglicisation represented the force in the political, linguistic and social spheres that 
had created the conditions whereby English cultural hegemony in Ireland had been 
achieved, if not, as O’Hegarty believed, fully secured. As previously stated the process of 
Anglicisation began with the forcing underground of the Irish nation and necessarily, along 
with their subterranean existence, followed their indigenous language. Subsequently 
O’Hegarty’s separatist narrative most definitively laid out in A History of Ireland under the 
Union is one of hope for the Irish people intent on re-claiming their unique character despite 
enduring the humiliating despair of cultural deprivation:
At the end of the seventeenth century the Irish language had gone underground with 
the Irish people, and during the whole of the eighteenth century both remained 
underground, fighting to get out. During the eighteenth century, the English 
language, and everything which a language brings with it, was placed for the first 
time in a dominating position in Ireland. For the first time a complete framework of
18 Irish Book Lover, June, 1945.
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government, governing and ordering the whole of Ireland without question, and 
using nothing but the English language in everything, the actual government itself, 
the law, trade, public business of all kinds, public institutions, was set up and 
maintained in Ireland. In that century English became the language of government, 
of life, of intercourse, and Irish survived only underground. If the Irish were to hold 
their own in that new world of the Bearla (i.e. the English language) which they 
found clamped down on their old world, they had to make themselves proficient in 
English.19
What is readily apparent in O’Hegarty’s treatment of O’Connell over the language issue is 
the contrast affirmed by O’Hegarty of his admiration for O’Connell as the political 
‘liberator’ of the Catholic people with his disconsolate view of O’Connell’s indifference 
toward the cultural implications of implanting the national language as a core feature of 
Irish nationalism. Indeed, as a young man and because of the Penal laws, O’Connell had 
been sent to the continent in order to train as a barrister. His return was marked by his 
determination to redress the grievances and inequalities to which his Catholic co-religionists 
were subject to in Ireland under the British government. As O’Hegarty protested this period 
was one of an intensification of the English language and culture in Ireland as much as it 
was for the furthermost reaches of the British Empire. Furthermore, O’Hegarty highlighted 
that for any influential leader or movement during the mid-eighteenth century to revive the 
language under the relentless pressures of Anglicisation was as remote a possibility as 
O’Connell ever achieving repeal of the union solely through the methods stipulated by the 
parliamentary process. In O’Hegarty’s view O’Connell never thoroughly grasped the 
centrality of the language to the national spirit of the people and consequently O’Hegarty 
was to characterise the leader of catholic Ireland in a negative way, underscoring the
19 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.613.
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following desultory observation, ‘O’Connell.. .was a native speaker of Irish, but one without 
any reasoned conscious of nationality.’20
O’Hegarty in identifying and elevating to a prominent position the natural spirit he saw 
existing in the ‘Underground Nation’ portrayed O’Connell as possessing an essentially 
English and utilitarian outlook that stemmed from his lack of Irish spiritual consciousness. 
This was undoubtedly the case in O’Connell’s general social and political philosophy, but in 
O’Hegarty’s view, in relation to the colonial experience of Ireland and the spiritual context 
of Irish nationalism, it was a misplaced philosophy to apply.
Despite O'Connell’s strict adherence to pacifism and his staunch rejection of physical force 
which was a cornerstone of the Fenian ideology this was not considered O’Connell’s main 
failing for O’Hegarty. Although he did consider it a serious flaw in the development of the 
‘Underground Nation and its legitimate right to use physical force in the implacable 
opposition of Ireland’s enemy to renounce its immoral usurpation of its people. Despite this, 
it was O’Connell’s distinct lack of understanding and support for the Irish language that was 
to form the main cause of O'Hegarty’s chagrin. This view derived from O'Hegarty’s belief 
in the importance of the nation’s language in retaining its individual cultural identity, indeed 
as representing the cornerstone of nationhood.
In addition to this major failing for O’Hegarty was the fact that O’Connell was fully capable 
of speaking to the enormous crowds that gathered together for his ‘monster meetings’ in the 
Irish language but refrained from doing so. Apart from his gesturing, a few token words in 
the Irish language in order to confuse Dublin Castle’s security presence O’Connell believed 
that to encourage the use of the Irish language among the Irish people was irresponsible as it 
was ill equipped for the modem world and could not hope to compete with the English
20 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.613.
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language. For O'Connell to revive the English language would have marked a retrogressive 
step in the Irish campaign geared as it was towards appealing toward the English 
constitutional enlightenment, in opposition to this view O’Hegarty specified how the Irish 
language had become unfairly associated with backwardness and had declined in usage 
from the English governments determined Anglicisation policy which in Ireland had 
proved most effective through peaceful penetration dating from the of the 1801 Act of 
Union. Yet O’Connell, the great champion of nationalist Ireland, refused to bolster its 
endurance and utility. O’Hegarty likened this to a criminal act, stressed the language, and as 
its corollary cultural preservation, as the bulwarks against the Irish people’s assimilation 
into a parody of English culture. Following the 1829 Emancipation Act O’Hegarty felt that 
this presented the ideal opportunity for O’Connell to promote the Irish language as he was at 
the height of his power21 and could have incorporated the Irish language as a means of 
inspiring the Irish people. O’Connell was in a position to help undo the years of linguistic 
and cultural suppression but neglected to fulfil a role that O’Hegarty felt languished 
underneath an agenda that sought the material betterment of Catholics at the expense of 
Protestants and over the potentially unifying cultural neutrality of the Irish language. In his 
ability to successfully play at the Anglicised model of politics O’Connell had mastered the 
Westminster political arena (an arena O’Hegarty greatly disliked) but had underestimated 
the potential of the home-grown cultural sphere. O’Hegarty was fully aware of O’Connell’s 
statement that all he ever really wanted was the union of England and Ireland to be 
recognised as an equal partnership with the restoration of equality and opportunity for all its 
citizens - but this contravened the Irish nation’s rightful claim to independence. 
Incontrovertibly, O’Connell was pursuing a dichotomous policy that seemed fully at home
21 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.137.
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with promoting Anglicisation while elsewhere in Ireland he attacked mostly everything 
which was derivative of English influence, a strategy which very cleverly allowed him to 
play to the nationalist crowds while permitting a modicum of trust to develop between 
himself and the Liberal English government who provided his main bargaining chip in the 
English parliament as it could be construed that his encouragement of the Irish people to 
speak in the English language was a linguistic and cultural pledge of allegiance to the union. 
This negative view of O’Connell must be tempered however by O’Hegarty’s deep 
admiration for the political side to O’Connell’s work leading up to the abolishment of the 
penal laws in 1829. O’Hegarty considered it a political masterstroke in bringing the 
‘Underground Nation’ to political consciousness even if this achievement failed to address 
and draw upon the cultural strengths of the people. In a review of Sean O’Faolain’s 
biography of O’Connell entitled The King of the Beggars. O’Hegarty made allowances for 
O’Connell’s cultural shortcomings so that his political genius could be recognised as part of 
the separatist canon:
In the past O’Connell has been criticised mostly because he was not a Gaelic leaguer 
or a separatist. But he was sufficient to his time, and he had to work with the 
materials of his time. He was a political realist, doing a specific job, and blind and 
deaf to everything else. His work was done in 1829...O’Connell’s real achievement 
was that he made his people stand up on their feet, with their heads up, and face their 
oppressors. He put courage and hope into them. He fought the ascendancy, and beat 
them, in their own courts and Corporations. He made his successors possible. 
Surrounded by weaklings and incompetents -  he could not really work with equals -  
he spent himself in their service. And if he was dead to spiritual values, 
contemptuous of tradition, blind to the Irish language and what it meant, that is only 
to say that he was a utilitarian political realist.. .it was necessary to do it in his way as 
a preliminary to the evolution in the Irish consciousness of the spiritual and 
intellectual concepts which came in with the Young Irelanders and never afterwards 
quite left us. Men have to stand up and face the sun before they can move into the 
light. It was O’Connell who made us stand up.22
22 Dublin Magazine, October - December, 1938.
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In his A History of Ireland under the Union O’Hegarty elaborated on these important points 
in the separatist cause to free the Irish nation and there is a lot of admiration present for 
O’Connell in his own time doing what he could for Ireland, which ultimately for O’Hegarty, 
ensured that O’Connell through his doing good work for Ireland passed the test of Irish 
patriotism.
Yet in order to balance O’Hegarty’s separatist interpretation of O’Connell it must be stated 
that for O’Connell the English language was the language that ushered in the new themes of 
democracy and liberty as universal devices for ensuring equality among all peoples. 
Consequently O’Connell’s agitation can be seen as seeking to enlighten the British 
government to its political follies and social mistreatment of Ireland and to redress the 
balance of power in Ireland toward the catholic majority. As a dedicated Fenian O’Hegarty 
could never have accepted the implications of O’Connell’s reasoning as it partly excused 
the English government from the crimes that had maintained Ireland as a colony held in 
captivity under a corrupted union. Implicitly for O’Hegarty, O’Connell had no intention of 
affecting a total break with England or of building an intellectual framework upon which 
the Irish people could rediscover their culture via the Irish language. O’Connell desired his 
co-religionists be granted the same democratic opportunities under the rule of British law as 
their protestant counterparts in what he correctly identified as an increasingly cosmopolitan 
world through which Imperialism exported the English language as the language of 
modernity and progress. It was not unusual therefore to understand why O’Connell wanted 
Ireland to be thought of as an Imperial ally and share in England’s commercial prosperity. 
He did not link this view of progress to any re-discovery of the Irish language or the 
kulterkampf O’Hegarty saw as entwined in the cultural progress of the Irish people. Given
70
the nature of O’Connell’s dismissal of the Irish language, O’Hegarty understandably saw in 
Thomas Davis, founder of the Young Irelanders, an Irish cultural champion. Davis, through 
his promotion of the Irish language and patriotic poems and ballads laid the foundation for 
the future Gaelic League’s successes. Essentially Davis had created a romantic and 
transcendent notion of Irish nationalism complete with a call for the indigenous language to 
be considered a vital passageway into the distant past where he postulated that the divisions 
in Ireland did not pre-date recent history. Comerford has related how:
In 1842, a romantic version of nationality of a kind flourishing on the continent 
began to be promulgated in Ireland in a newly founded weekly, the Nation. Their 
chief ideologue was Thomas Davis who had imbibed an essentialist concept of 
nationhood, and that concept owed much to German theorists for whom language 
was the nation’s soul. Indeed, the inhabitation was not only spiritual but had a 
physical basis: ‘the language which grows up with a people is conformed to their 
organs’. Language, like other features of the nation, was a manifestation of race: 
‘how unnatural -  how corrupting -  ‘tis for us, three fourths of whom are of Celtic 
blood, to speak a medley of Teutonic dialects.’ The deduction that ‘a people without 
a language of its own is only half a nation. A nation should guard its barriers more 
than its territories’ was in logic the prelude to an all-out campaign to make the 
revival of Irish the first item on the nationalist agenda.23
Davis’s project consisted of the following:
...to impose another language on such a people is to send their history adrift among 
the accidents of translation -  ‘tis to tear their identity from all places -  ‘tis to 
substitute arbitrary signs or picturesque and suggestive names -  ‘tis to cut off the 
entail of feeling, and separate the people from their forefathers by a deep gulf -  ‘tis 
to corrupt their very organs, and abridge their power of expression.’24
Building on Davis’s notions regarding the Irish language and its need for revival the Gaelic 
League aimed at capitalising on recent British educational reforms, which had created a 
newly educated class of Catholics eager to get in touch with Ireland’s past heritage. For
23 Nation, April 1, 1843 quoted in R.V. Comerford, Ireland: Inventing the nation (London, 2003), p. 138
24 Thomas Davis ‘Our National Language’, in the Nation, 1 April 1843, quoted in the Field Day Anthology of 
Irish Writing volume II, Seamus Deane (Ed), (Derry, 1991).
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O’Hegarty, the Gaelic League marked the culmination of his cultural and spiritual belief in 
Irish nationhood and the requirement of bringing this to the attention of the Irish people. 
The Gaelic League was to meet with considerable success in the period leading up to the 
placing of the Home Rule Bill on the Statute book in 1912. O’Hegarty believed its 
provenance and linguistic mission was a revelation and one where ‘Ireland turned once 
more to her own culture and her own past, alive to her separateness, her distinctiveness, 
alive also to her danger’.25
The Irish language was the bulwark for maintaining the linear and unbroken separatist 
resistance he believed had existed through the ‘Underground Nation’ from pre-union Ireland 
despite O’Connell’s dismissal of the language’s importance: ‘the defences of a nation 
against annihilation are two, physical and spiritual.’ As related above for O’Hegarty the 
historical survival of the Irish language was the key to understanding the project of Irish 
nationalism as the following passage once again taken from O’Hegarty’s review of Sean 
O’Faolain’s book The King of the Beggars will illuminate. Within the following passage 
O’Hegarty demonstrated his voluminous knowledge of Irish history and the role of the 
language in the survival of the ‘Underground Nation’, that of a people submitted to the 
humiliation of conquest and yet refusing to acknowledge or accept subjugation as a fact of 
their existence. Essentially O’Hegarty criticised O’Faolain for his lack of understanding of 
how the language performed this critical function:
He is in revolt against and irritated with, Mr. Corkery’s extremes, and therefore he is 
unduly bellicose against the Gael. He exaggerates the wretchedness of the Irish in the 
eighteenth century, and misunderstands the Irish aristocratic temper and civilisation 
as a tyrannical one, which it was not -  we are still an aristocratic people, not a 
democratic one, and we shall remain so. He does not understand at all that, were it
25 P.S. O'Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.l.
26 P.S. O'Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p .l.
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not for the Irish language in the century after 1691, there might be no Irish people at 
all. In the darkness of this period the people reformed themselves behind the rampart 
of Irish, and re-conquest. And his general view of the soul of a nation is strangely 
materialistic. He does not seem to have considered the conception of it as a thing of 
itself, apart from odd materialistic manifestations of it in political matters. Nor was 
there ever any chance of this country becoming like Scotland or Wales. They bowed 
the head. We never did. There is such a thing as an unconquerable will. We had it 
and they had it not.27
This didactic approach to the concept of spiritual nationality underscored O’Hegarty’s 
approach to the language issue as a central aspect of his cultural examination of Irish 
nationalism and identity. In a series of articles containing an overview of William Rooney’s 
short career and political thought on the goal of Irish independence in Irish Freedom. 
O’Hegarty quoted approvingly Rooney’s repudiation of the term ‘advanced nationalist’ 
from being applied to contemporary separatists such as himself and recognised in Rooney 
the necessary Davisite approach to invigorate the Gaelic Revival. O’Hegarty commented:
From a grand national standpoint there is nothing “advanced” in this spirit. It could 
not look for less and remain national; it only deserves its name by the assertion that 
the active operation of all essentially Irish energies and influence is above 
nationality.28
O’Hegarty applauded the following objectives for the rejuvenation of the language’s 
fortunes as set out by Rooney:
...we must have an evening Irish class in every village and town, Irish speaking or 
otherwise where, as well as calling into service the seanchaidhe, the scribe shall 
again become an institution to set down and prepare for the permanency of print, the 
stories, histories, songs and ballads that are even yet been produced in every part of 
Gaelic Ireland.29
27 Dublin Magazine, October - December, 1938
28 Irish Freedom, December 1910.
29 Irish Freedom, January, 1911.
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As with O’Hegarty, Rooney placed special emphasis on the language revival. During his 
short life he was at the centre of ‘building up a literary and political movement’ in Dublin 
originally, then throughout Ireland.
The spark that generated O’Hegarty’s interest in the Gaelic League, as with many other 
future language enthusiasts was ‘The Necessity for de-Anglicising Ireland’, the title of a 
lecture given by Douglas Hyde in 1892. Hyde drew attention to the fact that the language 
had been reduced to a few remote areas in the West of Ireland, or, alternatively referred to 
as the Gaeltacht, and, save for a few scholars intent on preserving it as a specialised interest 
and antiquity remained virtually absent elsewhere. Hyde, in assessing the present condition 
of the language necessitated the following activities as a remedy to the decline:
In order to de-anglicise ourselves we must at once arrest the decay of the language.
We must bring pressure upon our politicians not to snuff it out by their tacit 
discouragement merely because they do not happen to understand it. We must arouse 
some spark of patriotic inspiration among the peasantry who still use the language 
and put an end to the shameful state of feeling - a thousand-tongued reproach to our 
leaders and statesmen - which make young men and women blush and hang their 
heads when overheard speaking their own language.30
The scholar Dominic Daly, in his study of the ‘Young Douglas Hyde’ confirms the urgency 
to which Hyde attributed to furthering the language revival:
In a letter to Horace Reynolds, Hyde was to underwrite the challenge that was faced 
by the Gaelic League: ‘My aim was to save the Irish language from death it was 
dying then as fast as ever it could die and that ambition did not lend itself to English 
writing except for propagandist purposes... ’31
30 Extracted from Dr. Douglas Hyde’s Presidential address to the Dublin Society, November, 1892. See 
Dominic Daly, The Young Douglas Hyde: the Dawn of the Irish Revolution and Renaissance 1874-1893 
(Dublin, 1974), p.xvii.
31 Dominic Daly, The Young Douglas Hyde: the Dawn of the Irish Revolution and Renaissance 1874-1893 
(Dublin, 1974), p.xvii. Also Dublin Magazine, vol. 3, 1938, p.29.
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O’Hegarty agreed with Hyde’s aim of reviving the language as a living tongue viewing it as 
necessary in creating a culturally unique Irish nation, distinct from England. In this regard 
O’Hegarty was to welcome the provenance of the Gaelic League as re-asserting Davis’s 
emphasis on language (although it must be stated that O’Hegarty overstated Davis’s 
commitment to the Irish language as one that would eventually challenge the English 
language as the national tongue) with the same regard as he welcomed the Sinn Fein policy 
as new methods to further the basic tenets of Irish nationalism in the twentieth century. 
O’Hegarty was to see in Sinn Fein and the Gaelic League a cultural and economic 
resurgence that would provide the motivation for the de-Anglicisation of Ireland and the 
achievement of independence. O’Hegarty was convinced that in order to ensure that the 
work of the Act of Union to completely assimilate Ireland would not be completed in the 
twentieth century that the Gaelic League project needed to be pursued with an energy and 
patriotism which embraced all traditions in Ireland. In the same vein he was to welcome the 
provenance of the Gaelic League with the same enthusiasm that he welcomed the 
publishing of the United Irishman (Arthur Griffith’s first newspaper carrying the separatist 
Sinn Fein philosophy), as new methods to further the basic tenets of Fenianism in the 
twentieth century. The policies outlined by both these movements would fulfil the purpose 
of healing the deep rift that had opened up between the Irish people and their ancestral 
national identity. Crucially the two movements:
...brought with them for the first time the possibility of a comprehensive movement 
for the recovery of everything lost, for an attack upon the dominant civilization at 
every point of contact....And the twentieth century, brought the movement itself in 
the Sinn Fein movement.32
32 P.S. O'Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.7.
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For O’Hegarty, with the advent of the Gaelic League and the enthusiasm in which it was 
met the sentiments contained in the above quotation could have become a reality if the 
spiritual patriotism he desired to see in his fellow countrymen had been shared with the 
same value and commitment exemplified by the writer and educator, P.W. Joyce. In 1914 
O’Hegarty was to write an appreciation of P.W. Joyce evaluating his contribution to the 
Irish language as a vital one not least in his writing of key school texts which introduced 
many Irish children to the Irish language. O’Hegarty acknowledged his and many other 
language enthusiasts, debt to Joyce as an influential figure for the preservation of the 
language. Consequently P.W. Joyce was granted high praise and while not:
one of the big archaeological, or literary, or political names, (such as Ferguson, 
Mitchel or O’Donovan) but all his life he gave his leisure time to Irish affairs, and all 
his life he was a hard worker.. ..His “Origin and History of Irish Names of Places” -  
a fascinating and stimulating book to place in the hands of a young man - and his 
various books on music and folk song would have been quite enough work for a 
nominal lifetime; but added to that were a whole host of books, Irish grammar, 
Anglo Irish dialect.. .33
Clearly O’Hegarty’s admiration stems from Joyce’s application to the preservation of the 
Irish language and in his aptitude to work tirelessly toward promoting it. Indeed, in 
reference to the extrapolation of the language as an essentiality of culture and identity, 
O’Hegarty goes so far as to say ‘if everybody said that for Ireland, as Dr. Joyce said his, the 
“Irish question” would settle itself very speedily.’34
In sum like Douglas Hyde and the poet W.B. Yeats, (see next chapter), P.W. Joyce passed 
the patriotic test of doing good work for Ireland. They were to embody the spirit of 
nationalism in their sterling work as each in their own way served the nation to the best of
33 Irish Freedom, February, 1914
34 Irish Freedom, February, 1914.
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their ability. It was a leitmotif that O’Hegarty was to apply throughout his life praising those 
who were tireless in helping to achieve Ireland’s freedom. A measure of O’Hegarty’s 
commitment to this cause was emphasised in an article from the Irish Times written to mark 
the anniversary of his birth:
A constant theme in Irish Freedom and elsewhere was the Irish language. He 
believed that not even full political freedom could sustain an independent Irish 
nation, so close to England, without the bulwark of its own language. He called for 
‘language bigots, for aggressive language propagandists, for people who are quite 
truculent and unreasonable, to go out and speak the language....Learn the language, 
make your children learn it, stand up for it always; the Irish nation depends on it.
He did as he had urged. He learned Irish, his wife learned Irish, they raised an Irish 
speaking family, spending their summers for many years in the Donegal Gaeltacht. 
Had they not, made that unreasonable effort, our generation might never have seen 
Cre na Cille in print.
He was the best read of the political nationalists, and his judgement in literary 
matters was remarkable. He was perhaps the first critic to recognise that Padraic 
O’Conaire was laying the foundations of a modem literature in Irish.
It was clear in O’Hegarty’s mind what neglecting the Irish language revival would mean. He 
was to write on the essentiality of the Irish language to uphold the ‘Underground Nation’ 
against the English language and culture from overwhelming the Irish nation:
If we do not revive and develop Irish, we must inevitably be assimilated by one of 
these two communities, or by the combined power which they must eventually 
form, and in that case our name and tradition and history will vanish out of human 
ken, and our national individuality will be lost. There is no disputing that, and no 
use in refusing to look it in the face.
There is no case known to history where a nation retained its individuality, its 
separateness, once its language had been lost, and there are innumerable cases where 
a composite nation has adopted the language of one of its components, and, with it, 
the culture and traditions of that one component, to the exclusion of the others.36
35 Cian O’Hegarty, Irish Times article -  Centenary Tribute published in Irish Times, 4 January, 1980.
36 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 176-7.
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O’Hegarty emphasised that the Irish people were in need of recapturing the spiritual past 
and to:
Place it in relation to the antecedent history of Ireland, above all to show it in its true 
light as an attempt, inspired by the language revival, to place Ireland in touch with 
the historic Irish nation which went down in the seventeenth century under the Penal 
laws and was forced, when it emerged in the nineteenth, to reconstitute itself on the 
framework which had been provided for the artificial state.. .37
Until the Gaelic League’s creation, the Irish language had lacked a central cultural base 
from which to work at seeking to permeate the whole of Ireland. It was to become the most 
dynamic movement in the years following Parnell’s demise and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1921. Similarly, the Gaelic League was to engender a renaissance of what constituted an 
Irish citizen and what made the nation distinctly different from the Anglicising influence of 
England. Its functions: ‘went beyond the objectives of earlier organisations. Its goals were 
the revival of Irish in areas where it had ceased to be spoken and the creation of a new 
modem literature in Irish, rather than just simply trying to preserve the language.’38 
Established in 1893, the Gaelic League emerged as the stronghold of core principles that 
O’Hegarty believed were necessary for the Irish nation to reclaim its important contribution 
to the highest standards of the European cultural tradition. For O’Hegarty the Gaelic League 
became the real ‘vacuum filler’ that nationalist Ireland turned to in the period after the fall 
of Parnell. It was another weapon in the armoury of nationalist Ireland looking to build upon 
the Fenian tradition of resistance. O’Hegarty as a modem day Fenian did not consider the 
period after the disastrous Fenian rising of 1867 as an era where conspiratorial nationalism 
and physical force was at its lowest ebb. Indeed O’Hegarty saw the IRB as tactically playing
37 P.S. O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.3.
38 Padraig O’Raigain, Language Policy and Social Reproduction: Ireland 1893-1993 (New York, 1997), p.8
the waiting game and that the energy and personnel of the movement remained unbowed 
rather than demoralised. O’Connell and Parnell, the latter whom O’Hegarty praised for his 
underlying separatism, supported the constitutional process as the way forward for 
nationalist Ireland but constitutionalism meant an acceptance of English authority in Ireland 
and to a Fenian mind such as O’Hegarty’s this only served to dilute Ireland’s rightful claim 
to separate nationhood. It has been commented on that what mattered most to the separatists 
of O’Hegarty’s generation ‘were ideals more than politics’39 and this can be asserted in 
O’Hegarty’s commitment to the work of the Gaelic League. The Gaelic League’s main role 
for O’Hegarty was to inculcate a positive notion of cultural revivalism, which parried the 
ethnic divisions in Ireland as insurmountable. Also, it discerned a viable method for 
achieving a self-confident nation with the necessary cultural self-reliance and 
distinctiveness in opposition to the Irish party’s Anglicised policy of sending elected MPs to 
the alien parliament of Westminster. The Gaelic League represented a model and a method 
for many cultural nationalists including O’Hegarty that would bolster the separatist 
argument in concert with the Sinn Fein movement. The Gaelic League and Sinn Fein 
represented in O’Hegarty’s view the superior alternative to the attendance of greatly 
outnumbered Irish MPs at Westminster. O’Hegarty deemed the political programme of Sinn 
Fein and the positive Irish cultural image embodied in the Gaelic League as the way forward 
in gaining the separatist objectives of freedom from English political and cultural 
hegemony. This belief in the language as the cornerstone of Ireland’s nationalist identity 
was married to the Sinn Fein policy which looked to the creation of an Irish nation 
independent of English economic control thus enhancing O’Hegarty’s belief in the cultural
39 See Tom Garvin’s chapter ‘The Mind of Republicanism after 1922’, in Nationalist Revolutionaries in 
Ireland (Oxford, 1987.)
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and economic self-reliance that featured heavily in the arguments put forward by Thomas 
Davis and John Mitchel. O’Hegarty placed a great deal of emphasis on this cultural aspect 
of separatism as in the prevailing circumstances of the early twentieth century the likelihood 
of celebrating a Fenian military victory over England was extremely remote.
For O’Hegarty the embodiment of the Gaelic League’s cultural pluralism was represented in 
its first President Dr. Douglas Hyde in whom O’Hegarty saw combined the spiritual and 
intellectual concepts that he recognised as essential to the creation of the nationalist citizen. 
The Gaelic League’s impact under Hyde was described as follows by an individual whom 
O’Hegarty greatly admired for his creative independence of thought, W.P. Ryan.40 
O’Hegarty edited an Irish language journal, entitled t-Eireannch in 1913 after his good 
friend, former editor and fellow columnist in the United Irishman and New Ireland.41 W.P. 
Ryan, left to argue the case for the socialist movement. Both had been members of the 
London branch of the Gaelic League and after initial disagreements with Ryan regarding the 
membership of priests on the Ard-Choisede (O’Hegarty was against the measure, Ryan was 
for it) O’Hegarty was eventually elected onto the Ard-Choisede himself in 1908. This was 
to become another pillar in O’Hegarty’s remit to embody the spirit of the language and to 
promote its cultural centrality to the nation he wished to see emerging in a free Irish state. 
Ryan was to affirm O’Hegarty’s belief in the utility of the Gaelic League:
It began and encouraged a general examination of conscience: every institution in the 
land was shown how it had sinned against itself and the soul and vitality of the 
nation by its neglect of the national language. Political leaders, on the whole, heard 
the plainest truths, mainly on the subject of the distinction between politics and 
nationality and on the flowery phrase-making they had substituted for serious 
thinking.42
40 W.P. Ryan, The Pope’s Green Island, (Dublin, 1912), p.55. Ryan gave his reasons for joining the Gaelic 
League as a means to fulfilling his spiritual and cultural needs.
41 Dublin Magazine July-September 1943, p.41.
42 W.P. Ryan, The Pope’s Green Island (Dublin, 1912), p.51.
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For O’Hegarty, Hyde became the inspiration for a generation deluded by political 
misgivings and distrust having put their faith in the Pamellite movement only to see it 
internally destroyed and emerge as a pale imitation under John Redmond‘s leadership. (This 
was a theme that W.B Yeats also took up on order to generate enthusiasm for cultural 
rejuvenation. See the next chapter for the relevance of his contribution to O’Hegarty’s view 
of doing good nationalist work for Ireland.) O’Hegarty was in no doubt when he asserted 
that ‘He [Hyde] was to the language movement what Parnell was to the Home Rule 
movement, in that he was the cement which held the language movement together.’43 
Ultimately, the Gaelic League marked a new and positive departure in the cultural and 
literary sense with Hyde at the helm and one that O’Hegarty felt was a vital addition to the 
nationalist canon.
O’Hegarty as a resident in London and secretary of the Dungannon Club accentuated the 
importance of the Gaelic League as a welcome measure of home from home. In an article 
entitled ‘Faile Padraig in London’ he enthusiastically wrote of the League’s success and 
impact among the Irish emigres residing in the English capital through its annual festival. 
O’Hegarty was deeply imbued with a sense of cultural awareness that found an outlet in the 
London branch of the Gaelic League complemented through staged events designed to 
provide solace to the homesick:
It is more or less a truism that any kind of an Irish concert will fill London on St 
Patrick’s night, but to the Msh-Irelanders the annual festival of the Gaelic League is 
the event, and to it the Gaels come in their hundreds. Not for the sake of having a 
night, or killing time, or through mere custom, but because of the Ireland-hunger that 
lies at the heart of much of our gaiety. And that fact, which I have no doubt the
43 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.616.
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league recognises, should be its main guide in the organising of the festival. Few, 
save those, who have experienced it, can realise the dull, dreary, monotonous 
existence of the exile.44
The Gaelic League’s public commitment to a non-political stance under Hyde and his 
refusal to allow the League to become entwined in the Home Rule for Ireland debate 
allowed for an open policy of cultural awareness to be pursued despite Dublin Castle’s 
belief that its membership consisted of a hotbed of advanced nationalists. Unlike the 
conspiratorial and esoteric IRB, the League could openly promote public events such as the 
one referred to above. As a result, its membership benefited substantially as it trebled its 
membership in 1905, from 600 branches in 1903. The Gaelic League was to form an 
important component in the idea of nationalism and reflected a wider patriotism 
experienced throughout Europe at this time and which approved the elevation of distinct 
cultural nations as politically independent states. The Gaelic League was therefore a force in 
asserting this argument especially in its capacity to attract such widespread support. As 
O’Hegarty declared in a passage displaying a belief in the possibility of the Gaelic League 
not just for cultural renewal but cultural unification among the different traditions on the 
island of Ireland:
The Gaelic League was all-embracing in the matter of its appeal and its membership. 
Into it went gentle and simple, old and young, Catholic and Protestant, Fenian and 
Home Ruler and Unionist, all sorts and all conditions of men and women, drawn to 
its re-discovery of the essentials of nationhood and held by that re-discovery. The 
League had no political principles and no political affiliations and it was very careful 
never to cross in the smallest particular the political border, but its effects on its 
members was undoubtedly political, in no narrow or party sense.45
44 United Irishman, March 31,1906.
45 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.619.
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O’Hegarty was very much at the centre of the movements he believed were attempting to 
strengthen the bonds between Irishmen at a time when these movements really did look like 
they could combat what was seen among Irish Irelanders as the ineffectiveness of the 
constitutional Irish Party and the cultural apathy that had also marked the years preceding 
the formation of the Gaelic League.
For O’Hegarty the cosmopolitanism of the English capital allowed for a wider perspective 
on Irish life to develop and as a member of Irish cultural clubs such as the Dungannon 
Clubs and the Gaelic League would have experienced an accelerated pace of change to the 
cultural and political changes that were also occurring in Ireland simultaneously at the turn 
of the twentieth century.46 The following notes are contained in the MacSwiney Papers at 
University College Dublin Special Archives Department, and are addressed to ‘Terence’s 
daughter’47 which provide an insight into the context in which O’Hegarty moved to London 
and the position of authority in which he was held in the English capital especially through 
the umbrella organisation of Cumann na Gaedheal which acted as the link between Sinn 
Fein, the Gaelic League and Fenian inspired organisations such as the Dungannon Clubs. In 
gaining the chairmanship of Cumann na Gaedheal it can be surmised that O’Hegarty was 
central in the movements described above which in 1905 amalgamated under the leadership 
of Cumann na Gaedheal. O’Hegarty described the period as one of new beginnings: ‘In 
1902, when I was 2 2 ,1 left for London ...it was a time when Ireland was being broken up 
and new moulds made, when the Gaelic League ferment was at last beginning to work 
properly.’48
46 L.H. Lees, Exiles o f Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London (Manchester, 1979), p.214.
47 Probably written in preparation for his book Terence MacSwiney: a short memoir Dublin, 1920.
48 ‘Recollections of Terence MacSwiney by P.S. ’ [O’Hegarty] a lifelong friend University College Dublin, 
P48c/105.
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O’Hegarty’s involvement in the literary revival continued during his visits back to Cork 
where he: attended meetings of the Celtic Literary Society which Liam de Roiste had started 
in Cork.. .1 was then chairman of the London branch of Cumann na Gaedheal.. .”49 
In analysing Irish political dissidents in London, Tom Garvin has postulated the following 
observation:
The central Post Office at Mount Pleasant in London seems to have housed many 
Irish national radicals, particularly perhaps those from the Cork area, like P.S. 
O’Hegarty. Many of the young men who revitalised the IRB, the Gaelic Athletic 
Association...and the all-important Gaelic League were civil servants, and they felt 
more free to engage in this quasi-subversive form of activity after the advent of the 
Liberal government of 1906.50
Garvin has cited the following British government report on the impact of the Gaelic 
League in London amongst emigres:
Eleanor Hull was struck by the extraordinary appeal which the League had for young 
Irishmen and women living in London at the turn of the century. It was taken up 
typically by those in clerical jobs who had emigrated from small-town and rural 
Ireland. She was also impressed by the ‘enthusiasm and earnestness’ with which they 
had taken up the language and lore of rural Ireland.51
O’Hegarty, exemplifying the spirit of self-regeneration and the language revival for Ireland 
must claim a place in the successful prosecution of the League’s objective to broaden its 
base of support inside and outside of Ireland. While there occurred serious disagreements 
among members of the Gaelic League over its objectives (for instance Pearse’s later view of 
the League in 1913 as being a spent force and that now it must provide the personnel for the 
Easter Rising of 1916), and even the form of dialect that the language should be taught. Yet
49 ‘Recollections of Terence MacSwiney by P . S [O’Hegarty] a lifelong friend University College Dublin, 
P48c/105.
50 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.29.
51 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, (Oxford, 1987), pp.87-88.
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there did emerge a collective patriotism that O’Hegarty was very much a part of as he 
possessed and held a life long fascination for Irish culture and the methods by which it 
could it best be utilised as a unifying principle and as a means to assert Ireland as a distinct 
cultural nation.
O’Hegarty undoubtedly believed that the Gaelic League could unite the divergent identities 
that were manifest in Ireland. He saw these identities as belonging to one integrating factor, 
that they all inhabited Ireland and that their differences could be subsumed under this 
vibrant dynamic if it were given time to ferment. O’Hegarty’s strong friendship with Robert 
Lynd an Ulster protestant who ‘discovered his nationalism and Gallicism while living in 
London’52 was an example of this. O’Hegarty spoke of Lynd that: “He was typical of the 
best side of Sinn Fein, which derived through Griffith, from Thomas Davis.”53 Lynd’s 
schoolmaster had advised him to flee Ireland in what was already a stifling environment. 
O’Hegarty was to leave Ireland under similar circumstances mainly to secure good 
employment but like Griffith’s move to South Africa, this enabled a deeper understanding 
of Ireland’s place in the world to develop. Griffith however was not to apply this to the role 
of the artist in society or the role of language for the perpetuation of Irish culture in the same 
way as O’Hegarty. Lynd and O’Hegarty were to meet in 1905 when the Dungannon Club in 
London was at the ‘height of its power.’ Interestingly while the two could not accept each 
other’s position regarding physical force O’Hegarty was for it if necessary, Lynd was 
implacably opposed under any circumstances but remained cohorts in supporting the Gaelic 
League (and the Abbey Theatre). This gives credibility to the view that Ireland at the turn of 
the century could accommodate those with opposing views and discover common ground in
52 Roy Foster, Mr. Paddy and Mr. Punch (London, 1995), p.300.
53 Dublin Magazine, January-March, 1950, p.44.
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their Irishness. The following quote from F.S. Lyons seems to back up this assertion, 
‘Superficially, it seemed, as the nineteenth century ended, that a new era was opening, an 
era of constructive thinking and doing in which men and women of different cultures might 
join in friendly collaboration.’54
This was supported by specific cases of influential Orangemen in the North East who 
subscribed to the notion of the Irish language as fomenting common ground between 
different traditions on the island. In some respects, O’Hegarty was justified in talking of the 
enthusiasm of many Protestants toward the Gaelic revival.
As Garvin has affirmed: ‘the Irish language had quite an appeal to certain Protestants who 
saw in it a way of claiming an Irish identity without having to pay the heavy price of giving 
up their religion and conforming to the Catholic faith of most Irish people.55 
There was further evidence of the optimism in which the language was greeted among 
nationalists in a letter from Patrick McCartan to Joseph McGarrity (Clan Na Gael) dated 25 
November 1905:
.. .there was a meeting of the independent Orangemen last night and they have taken 
a long stride in the right direction.. .in my opinion with the Gaelic League, like semi- 
literary, semi political and patriotic (not perhaps all you or I would like) Dungannon 
clubs and the independent Orange movement the task to join orange and green will 
not after a short time be very difficult.56
What remained pertinent throughout O’Hegarty’s involvement in the Gaelic League and 
indeed all the separatist organisations to which he belonged was a distinct optimism in the
54 F.S.L. Lyons, Culture and Anarchy in Ireland (Oxford, 1979), p.22
55 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p. 80
56 Ben Levitas, The Theatre of Nation (Oxford, 2002), p.l 10
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convictions he carried as being prevalent throughout members of the league and eventually 
among all the traditions on the island. This could be seen in his friendships with Lynd and 
Bulmer Hobson the two individuals both from the north east and protestant in religion, to 
whom he dedicated A History of Ireland under the Union. Indeed, it was the idea of 
promoting a shared heritage among the different religious factions that appealed so strongly 
to O’Hegarty. The revival had emphasised that the language needed to be awakened and 
revived but this had its troubling side also. What O’Hegarty objected to was that the Gaelic 
League was open to abuse from those promoting a racial and catholic superiority at the 
expense of the other cultures on the island. Cultural nationalists such as D.P. Moran through 
the pages of The Leader were to create this climate of suspicion and distrust. Moran who 
will also feature in the next chapter as an opponent of O’Hegarty regarding the Anglo-Irish 
Literary revival was to represent in O’Hegarty’s opinion the worst elements of this cultural 
exclusivity. The type that became synonymous with the Gaelic League and the cultural 
revival in general:
What was to give Irish nationalism that edge of insuperable permanence was, as 
F.S.L. Lyons and D.G. Boyce have pointed out, the Gaelic revival. Ironically aided 
by British reforms, which promised all the fruits of Anglicisation only to threaten the 
Irish identity, Irish nationalism enveloped a cultural dimension that at times in the 
writings of D.P. Moran verged close to racism and to an increasing intolerance of 
Anglo/Irish reconciliation.57
The Gaelic League represented the theoretical basis for creating a shared cultural experience 
between nationalists and unionists but as the likelihood of Home Rule for Ireland loomed 
ahead the existing enmity between unionist and nationalists increased until the Gaelic 
League openly declared its political partiality:
57 Andrew Gailey, in D.G. Boyce (ed) The Revolution in Ireland, 1879-1923 (London 1988), p.48-9.
87
Unlike the GAA, the Gaelic League was not from the beginning a sign of division 
between nationalist and unionist. As proselytising missionaries, as scholars, and as 
revivalists, Protestants had been strongly associated with the Irish language 
throughout the century. This long-standing interest was continued under the auspices 
of the Gaelic League. Indeed, the new movements spearheaded by the Gaelic League 
attracted many unionists because of its critique of the old political nationalism of the 
hurlers and its refreshing ethos of local co-operation and self-improvement. Not until 
1915 did the Gaelic League declare itself to be in the nationalist political camp, 
whereupon Hyde resigned as president of the organisation because, although a 
nationalist himself, he was committed to the political neutrality of the League. Soon 
the language would be synonymous with Sinn Fein nationalism.58
There was, despite O’Hegarty’s optimistic view, a negative side to the Gaelic League’s
remit. The above passage represented his complaints that the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein
turned their back on the original idealism that led to their creation in later years and
relinquished their moral obligations to build up the Irish nation. They moved from the goal
of creating an environment in which civic virtues were transcended in putting the separatist
agenda forward and in the fulfilling of short term concerns that as O’Hegarty described to
MacSwiney as so often ‘deploying] pettiness and jealousies’59 as determining the way
forward.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, not all Irish separatists were to share 
O’Hegarty’s liberal and pluralistic notions of the Gaelic League as a forum through which 
culture could unite different factions. O’Hegarty always viewed the influence of the IRB as 
a positive force in Irish nationalist society but there was a side to militant nationalism he 
could not control:
.. .in effect, the extremists confiscated the language.. ..By doing so they identified the 
language with a particular political ideology and thereby ensured that anyone who 
did not share that ideology or who was not willing pay at least lip-service to it would
58 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.142.
59 Terence MacSwiney Papers, University College Dublin, P48C.
boycott them....Essentially, the Irish language was valued not for itself but as a 
symbol of national distinctiveness.60
This chapter has conveyed that the demise of the Gaelic League into political factionalism 
bore no resemblance to O’Hegarty’s idea of what the cultural revival stood for. However, it 
is difficult to deny that the purpose of the Gaelic League, that of de-Anglicising Ireland, 
fitted neatly into the separatist’s agenda in general terms. Garvin’s criticisms of the Gaelic 
Revival are noticeable too in O’Hegarty’s writings as he defended the IRB infiltration of the 
Gaelic League, which as related above became the reason for Hyde’s eventual resignation in 
1915 when the League was taken over by the separatists. O’Hegarty defended the IRB’s 
actions with the following:
...some men were selected for representative positions in the Gaelic League for 
political rather than language reasons. That only shows that the general body of the 
league have a clearer conception of its mission and its relation to national 
development...and that they recognise that a strong nationalist, who is more of a 
nationalist than a simple Gaelic Leaguer is a fitter man to run things...than a 
lukewarm one.61
In relation to this opinion expressed by O’Hegarty, he would have witnessed the less than 
enthusiastic response to the Gaelic League by the Irish Party, and he did not wish to see the 
take over of the Gaelic League by moderate Irish Party men as occurred with the Irish 
Volunteers.62
60 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), pp.98-102.
61 The Republic, April 4, 1907.
62 The Irish Party defended their position in relation to the Gaelic League in the following pamphlet: “The Irish 
Party. What it has done for Ireland... “The fostering and revival of the Irish language has always been an 
object of solicitude to the Irish party...and, generally, they have given constant and valuable support to every 
legitimate movement for the preservation of the Irish language and of the literary and historical remains of 
Celtic Ireland.”
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O’Hegarty did not contribute to the disintegration of the Gaelic League into a political 
faction. O’Hegarty remained a supporter of the original principles behind the Gaelic League 
that of building a bridge between the nationalist and unionist traditions in Ireland. Yet the 
ideals established by civic nationalists such as O’Hegarty were subverted and matters were 
taken out of the liberal and pluralistic camp as O’Faolain related:
...the general idea of the ‘Gaelic nation’ is implicit in the title of Mr. P.S. 
O’Hegarty’s interesting book 'The Indestructible Nation’ which, note, was originally 
given as a series of lectures to the London Gaelic League ‘in (I quote the author’s 
own words) the first and best decade of Sinn Fein, in 1911-1913.’
There one can see the idea of a Revival shake hands with the idea of Revolution. As 
we know, the Gaelic League was shattered by that hand-shake. The first president 
and founder, Dr. Douglas Hyde, now President of Ireland, resigned from it in 1915 
when the militant separatists inside the League...insisted on making independence 
one of its avowed objects. From that day onwards politics infected Gaelic; and the 
idea of the ‘Gael’ and the ‘Gaelic Nation’ infected politics.63
The deep intellectual framework O’Hegarty sought to establish among his fellow cultural 
nationalists was met with a shallow response. There were those, who, in extremis, sought to 
impose the Gaelic vision of Ireland rather than establish it as a connective line of potential 
unity. Indeed the prevalence of the Irish language in movements such as the Young 
Irelanders to the Gaelic League was to fortify O’Hegarty’s claim that it was the cornerstone 
of national identity. In this, he sought to create a sense of national unity and idealistic 
though he was it was a genuine attempt to forge an Ireland where sectarian differences could 
be overcome. Through the Irish language and literature there was a sense of giving back to 
Ireland its heroic past where unity of race was emphasised and in one sense this did permit 
new interpretations of what it meant to be Irish to grow. The impact of the English language 
in Ireland growing evermore from the nineteenth century could not be diminished no matter
63 Sean O’Faolain, The Bell, December, 1944, vol. 9, no.3.
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the intention or exuberance of enthusiasts such as O’Hegarty. Ultimately, the English 
language remained the language of commerce and socialisation in the twentieth century. 
Despite the separatist belief in breaking the mould of English dominance, the cultural 
nationalist enterprise failed to live up to, the ideals espoused by the Gaelic League and 
indeed O’Hegarty’s interpretation suffered. His pluralistic notion of how Irish society could 
unite comes through and he persistently strove to extract from all these Irish nationalist 
movements a measure of unity of purpose and a sense of shared history and future among 
the traditions on the island of Ireland between Catholic, Protestant and dissenter. In this 
regard he did possess an intellectual and liberal intention. Yet in attempting to build bridges 
between the traditions, he cannot escape the fact that the language he used to describe the 
‘Underground Nation’ and his talk of the Irish people emerging from the bonds of cultural 
oppression were in their own way divisive. The people he saw as emerging from these 
bonds were no less the Catholic nation in the same mould as O’Connell championed the 
democratic majority in the nineteenth century. The dispossessed were emerging at the 
expense of those who now filled the role of possessors. O’Hegarty tried to circumvent this 
by claiming that it was the English Government who were the guilty party. Yet the 
Protestants of Ulster for instance would definitely question this interpretation of Irish history 
and the right of the underground nation’s culture via the language to dominate Ireland. 
Ultimately to produce a unitary form of culture O’Hegarty needed to communicate in a 
language acceptable to all the traditions and in that he was faced with an irresolvable 
dilemma.
Despite the repercussions of the political aspects of the Gaelic League O’Hegarty’s 
involvement was driven from his culturally inclusive philosophy. Indeed, his cultural 
nationalism transcended the borders of Ireland onto a greater world stage whereby Ireland
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was conceived, as the centre of studying the Celtic notion of identity that O’Hegarty 
believed was implicit in the foundations of the Gaelic League. The following extract from a 
letter to Ernest Blythe, written in 1949, attests to this belief while also revealing the 
enthusiasm O’Hegarty still felt for the enterprise decades following the League’s most 
successful period:
I do agree that we are right to foster cultural nationalism; this country ought to be the 
world centre of Celtic and allied studies. In 1922, Edmund Curtis made a proposal 
for that to Trinity, for a large comprehensive Celtic Faculty, which attracts Celtic 
scholars in Scandinavia and Germany. But they were cold. There are so many things 
we might yet do!64
Matters of cultural importance to which O’Hegarty drew his attention toward were not 
confined to a build up of the Irish nation based solely on the Irish language. A lifelong 
friend of O’Hegarty, Ernest Blythe, a director of the Abbey Theatre (1935-40) managing 
director 1941-67 and again a director from 1967-1972,65 was to concur with the new 
patriotism embodied in the Gaelic League as vital to the life blood of the nation. Linking the 
Gaelic League initiative with the prospects for establishing a national theatre Blythe wrote: 
‘The idea of a national theatre owed much of the support it received to the enthusiasm for 
cultural activity along distinctively Irish lines and to the new glow of patriotic feeling which 
had been evoked by the work of the Gaelic League.’66
The controversies surrounding the idea of a national theatre form the basis for the next 
chapter.
64 Ernest Blythe Papers, P24/1341, dated 20 September.
65 Ernest Blythe Papers, P24/1341, dated 20 September.
66 Ernest Blythe Papers, P24/1265, letter to Mrs. O’Malley, April 1968.
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CHAPTER III 
THE ANGLO-IRISH TRADITION
While the previous chapter examined O’Hegarty’s promotion of the Gaelic League and 
highlighted the dilemma he was placed in regarding the promotion of an Irish cultural 
identity there was to be another aspect to questions of Irish cultural affiliation that were to 
engross Irish nationalists. As discussed O’Hegarty strove to try and create an all-inclusive, 
pluralistic Ireland rich in Gaelic tradition. However literary criticism for a separatist of the 
early twentieth century tended toward the promotion of Irish literature as produced in the 
Gaelic League, this being adjudged of more cultural value over Anglicised literature. In 
early twentieth century Ireland the notion of separating the political from the literary during 
the Anglo-Irish literary revival of the 1890s and early 20th century was to prove an arduous 
task for the Fenian and Executive Council member of Sinn Fein, P.S. O’Hegarty, as the 
categorisation of Anglicised literature took on a distinctly political design.
Given the distinction fastened to the Gaelic League and the Irish language in Ireland, 
literature was frequently categorised into that deemed culturally beneficial to Ireland’s claim 
to independence (the Gaelic League and the Irish language) and literature believed to be 
damaging toward the accomplishment of that aim. For many Gaelic Leaguers and Irish 
Irelanders Anglo-Irish literature, despite its claims of Irish heritage, did not represent Irish 
Ireland and failed to build on the separatist tradition.
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Ireland from the turn of the twentieth century was vexed by issues of culture and identity 
and, in attempting to affirm a distinct characteristic for defining the Irish people, cultural 
nationalists centred upon the work and membership of the Gaelic League as a defining 
principle. In order to examine O’Hegarty’s views on the Anglo-Irish tradition and how he 
included this tradition as a fundamental component of Irish culture and therefore 
demonstrate his liberal nationalist agenda, the following issues are discussed in this chapter. 
Firstly, the chapter sets out to clarify the traditional nationalist view ascribed to the Anglo- 
Irish literary tradition and why it was regarded by many cultural nationalists of O’Hegarty’s 
era as controversial and unworthy of inclusion in the canon of Irish literature. This is 
examined through the reaction of cultural nationalists to the Irish National Theatre begun in 
1897 (and later renamed the Abbey Theatre in 1904) and the controversy surrounding the 
plays associated with the Anglo-Irish literary tradition. A detailed examination of 
O’Hegarty’s views will folllow through his series of articles in the separatist newspaper 
Irish Freedom written in reaction to the views of his fellow cultural nationalists. Then the 
chapter will examine O’Hegarty’s views of the most vigorous defender of the Anglo-Irish 
literary tradition, W.B. Yeats, before concluding with an analysis of O’Hegarty’s views on 
the literature produced in the culturally conservative environment of independent Ireland. 
The identification of literature with nationalism was illustrated in 1897 when O’Hegarty 
made his literary debut in the Shan van Vochti a monthly magazine edited by Alice L. 
Milligan mainly devoted to cultural matters but also containing material relating to 
separatist principles. O’Hegarty’s first printed article was an attempt to trace the provenance 
of the name ‘Sinn Fein’, an appellation he attributed to Douglas Hyde’s translation of the 
Irish poem “waiting for help” in which the following line features: “it is time for every fool
1 Shan van Vocht, March, 1897. (This was a monthly journal.)
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to recognise that there is only one watchword which is worth anything -  Ourselves Alone”. 
For O’Hegarty the Shan van Vocht was a pioneer paper in Ireland.2 
O’Hegarty provided a sterling defence of the Anglo-Irish literary tradition in Ireland3 this 
being the term historically and now widely used within ‘Irish Ireland’ circles to describe 
literature written in the English language claiming an Irish outlook. This was in contrast to 
many of his fellow nationalists, moderates and extremists alike irritated by the claims of the 
Anglo-Irish tradition that they were producing Irish literature. It is necessary at this stage to 
explain why the term Anglo-Irish during this period was a contentious one. R.V. Comerford 
has noted how it became a contested concept:
In 1846, Denis F. McCarthy used it in the introduction to The Poets and Dramatists 
of Ireland to refer to Swift, Burke, Goldsmith and Steme, all of whom he was about 
to claim for Ireland, while acknowledging that they were generally included in the 
English literary pantheon. Anglo-Irish was adopted by D.P Moran of the Leader, in 
1900, to denote all ‘literature concerning Ireland written in English’, in a context in 
which this implied downgrading, literature in Gaelic being the one true kind of Irish 
literature in his ‘Irish Ireland’ perspective....Boyd in his Ireland’s Literary 
Renaissance (1916) uses ‘Anglo-Irish’ and ‘Irish’ interchangeably, always taking the 
former to be confined to that work in English which has an essentially Irish 
character.4
As related in the quotation above D.P. Moran was sternly critical of the new Anglo-Irish 
literature that was being produced alongside the Gaelic Revival. Moran concluded that 
literature written in the English language especially one claiming a thematic Irish sensibility 
was of an inferior bent to literature written in the Irish language. It was only the latter form 
that could justifiably claim Irish heritage and permit the true ‘Gael’ to express the inner 
nature of Ireland. On a different note of criticism which was aimed more specifically at the
2 An Saogal Gaedhealach, February 15, 1919.
3 See below for further extracts form his series of articles in the monthly Irish Republican Brotherhood journal 
Irish Freedom, February to May, 1912.
4 R.V. Comerford, Inventing the Nation: Ireland (London, 2003), pp. 166-7. Comerford states that in some 
cases there was overlapping membership between Anglo-Irish writers and the Gaelic League.
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Irish themes utilised by the literary revival, Arthur Griffith, founder and leader of the Sinn 
Fein movement and editor of the United Irishman (and later) Sinn Fein newspapers, 
supported the idea that literature should be subordinate to the cause of nationalism.5 Griffith 
believed that the Anglo-Irish literary revival if it were claiming a distinctly Irish content 
should seek to present Ireland’s struggle for political emancipation in a positive light which 
his reviews of plays reflected. Griffith consequently became engaged in disagreements with 
representatives of the Anglo-Irish literary tradition. Griffith was eager to portray Ireland as 
the victim of England’s political and economic suppression but stressed that Ireland was not 
broken and was fighting to regain her rightful position as an independent nation in 
partnership with his Sinn Fein movement. For Griffith, Sinn Fein represented the social and 
economic side of the Irish revival in Ireland whose purpose was to force England to take 
one hand out of Ireland’s pocket and the other from her throat.6 Given that the social 
background and ancestry of the new theatre played such a significant part in the realm of art 
and literature the following question must be addressed: how did such controversies 
surrounding the literary productions performed in the Anglo-Irish Theatre emerge and how 
did O’Hegarty tackle these assumptions and attempt to alter his fellow cultural nationalists 
minds toward a more inclusive definition of what counted as Irish literature ?
It was widely believed among cultural nationalists that the Anglo-Irish were open to an 
Albion centred view rather than a Hibernian outlook, i.e., that they were supportive of the 
Anglo-Irish political connection despite W.B. Yeats’s protestations that the plays produced 
at the Abbey Theatre were purely cultural and not subject to political interpretation. 
Moreover, Yeats added, the artist was not responsible for any political interpretation^ of
5 Richard Davis, Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1974), p.13.
6 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.30
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their work even if allegories and symbolic meanings in the plays were drawn in nationalist 
circles.
Given the political turmoil following the fall of Parnell it is not surprising that a theatre 
established by aristocrats - specialising both in epic Celtic myths and de-mythologizing 
portrayals of the peasant in Irish society - were charged with damaging political sensibilities 
in cultural nationalists’ circles.
Suspicions were aroused among cultural nationalists as to where the political loyalties of 
Anglo-Irish artists such as W.B. Yeats and J.M. Synge lay. J.C Beckett has remarked that 
nineteenth century Protestant scholars such as Samuel Ferguson had unleashed a force they 
could not control, one that ultimately led to the downfall of their own tradition.7
R.V. Comerford has offered the following explanation:
For all its success at home and abroad, the right of the new literature to represent 
itself as Irish was not universally conceded. Indeed, three mutually incompatible 
definitions of Irish literature have been in use, and their advocates frequently in 
contention. ‘Irish’ literature in the most comprehensive definition could mean 
literature written by an Irish person, whether in Irish or English, or, defined in the 
narrowest term, it might connote only work in the Irish language. An intermediate 
position applied the term to all work written in Irish, and to writing in English that 
could be deemed to be Irish in character or inspiration. Closely linked to the 
contention about these different definitions was the disputed meaning and use of the 
term ‘Anglo-Irish’ as applied to literature.8
It is possible to place O’Hegarty in the third category outlined above as he was a cultural 
nationalist who, unlike many of his nationalist contemporaries, held a deep appreciation of 
the contribution of Anglo-Irish literature to Irish society. Rather than criticising the social 
background of the Anglo-Irish O’Hegarty’s liberal and pluralistic approach to social and
7 J.C. Beckett, The Anglo-Irish Tradition (London, 1976), p. 103
8 R.V. Comerford, Inventing the Nation: Ireland (London 2003), p. 167
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cultural questions sought to accommodate all classes and creeds under an inclusive and 
united banner of Irish literature.9
O’Hegarty was a liberal voice during the arguments that ensued between the artists and the 
cultural nationalists and he became exasperated with the trenchant and inflexible positions 
the two sides adopted especially within cultural nationalist circles. For O’Hegarty the 
cultural movement which he represented had adopted a particularly illiberal stance that he 
felt lay at odds with the civic nationalism he associated with the separatist tradition. 
O’Hegarty with some prescience identified that the emerging controversies between 
nationalists and the Anglo-Irish writers were to have important repercussions in Irish society 
and the future direction any form of free Ireland might take. (See below.) For O’Hegarty, in 
the field of art and literature, there were important questions of civic liberalism at stake that 
permeated all aspects of national life not least in the potentiality of ethnic antagonisms re- 
emerging between unionists and nationalists.
In attacking, the artistic licence that the Anglo Irish literary revival believed central to 
creative literature cultural nationalists were attempting to steer the Irish imagination into a 
much narrower categorisation of what constituted Irish nationality. 10 O’Hegarty believed 
this view as promoting the rigidity and conservatism that later characterised the Irish Free 
State after Independence was won in 1921. The principle of civic nationalism if it is to 
flourish affirms that all cultures in the nation state must be unafraid to freely express their 
identity and in the case of Ireland this meant for O’Hegarty, that no cultural perspective 
could be deemed as more ‘Irish’ than another.11 O’Hegarty, as an advocate of civic
9 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
10 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
11 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
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nationalism, can be described as requiring that the following criteria be met for its 
successful implementation as defined by Michael Ignatieff:
Civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of all those -  
regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language, or ethnicity -  who subscribe to 
the nation’s political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the 
nation as a community of equal rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment 
to a ‘shared set of political practices and values.12
Therefore the idea of civic nationalism for O’Hegarty must include the prominent position 
of the artist in society no matter the historical antagonisms attributed to their cultural or 
social background by cultural nationalists. While Griffith too championed a civic 
nationalism over an ethnic form his actions during the Abbey Theatre controversies were 
incompatible with O’Hegarty’s advanced liberal and pluralistic idea of the freedoms the 
national artist must enjoy as a fundamental right to free expression. It would be wrong to 
imply that Griffith did not believe in an Ireland of tolerance and equality but in disavowing 
the right of the artists to become an intricate part of the nation through expressing their 
personal vision of Irish life, Griffith, for O’Hegarty, was denying the fundamental civic 
liberty of free speech. Moreover the artists must be free to choose their subject matter and in 
casting their ‘creative imagination’ must not be bound by the cultural nationalists who 
sought to impose parameters within which the artist must work. This featured especially in 
the artists, depiction of the Irish nation and its people.
For O’Hegarty, the implications of Griffith’s views when applied to the notion of artistic 
freedom held ominous connotations regarding censorship particularly when considering the 
nature of art and censorship in any future Ireland that had achieved emancipation. But as 
Tom Garvin has described the ‘Victorian’ prurience of the Irish Catholic majority did not
12 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: journeys into the new nationalism  (London, 1993), pp.2-3.
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originate after the creation of the Free State as much of it was in existence previous to this 
with book-bumings and a backlash against English popular culture in general: ‘The 
ideological foundations of the censorship system of independent Ireland was well laid, and 
by a wide variety of political forces: clergy, clericalists, neo-Fenians, and Gaeilgeoiri all 
supported it for slightly different reasons.’13
In Griffith there was a sophisticated appreciation of art as his reviews of plays indicated. But 
what O’Hegarty was objecting to can be depicted in the following example of Griffith’s idea 
of Irish literature:
When the Irish National Literary Theatre ceases to be national it will also cease to be 
artistic, for nationality is the breadth of art. The artist, who, condemning his nation 
and his age, has wrought for the world and for all time -  who was he and where is 
his grave? The world and time have forgotten him, as he forgot his share of the 
world and his share of time....If the Irish Theatre ceases to reflect Irish life and 
embody Irish aspiration, the world will wag its head away from it.14
In addition, Griffith made the following comments on W.B Yeats, one of the founders of the 
Anglo-Irish Literary revival:
As to his country, Mr. Yeats claimed on Monday night that he had served it, and the 
claim is just. He served it unselfishly in the past. He has ceased to serve it now -  to 
our regret. It is not the nation that has changed toward Mr. Yeats -  it is Mr. Yeats 
who has changed toward the nation.15
For Griffith, ‘national drama meant moulding public sentiment against British rule.’16 
Alternatively the main thrust of the advanced nationalist press for which O’Hegarty was to 
write, particularly Irish Freedom (which ran from 1910-1914 before it was suppressed as it
13 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.102. Garvin also states that ‘even the 
IRB paper, Irish Freedom. sympathised with the general hostility to the English media and that O’Hegarty was 
not enamoured of the corrupting of the Irish soul he saw as perpetrated by English culture, p. 106.
14 United Irishman, 17 October, 1903. Reprinted in Brian Maye, Arthur Griffith (Dublin, 1997), p.286.
15 Reprinted in Brian Maye, Arthur Griffith (Dublin, 1997), p.288.
16 Brian Maye, Arthur Griffith (Dublin, 1997), p.288.
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was deemed seditious during the War effort) featured the Fenian physical force tradition as 
the true spiritual cornerstone of Irish nationhood.17
O’Hegarty, who not only regularly contributed to but sometimes edited Irish Freedom in its 
founding editor Bulmer Hobson’s absence, was a central figure in the basis of this claim 
even if the remit of physical force had fallen greatly out of favour after the debacle of the 
1867 Fenian rising and the majority of remaining Fenians finding more of a political home 
in the constitutional programme of Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the Land League and 
Irish Parliamentarian Party of the 1880s. Fenians found themselves once more in a minority 
after the fall of Parnell and the Irish Party regrouped in 1900 under its new leader John 
Redmond.
Due to English legislation in Ireland, which had stemmed from the agrarian agitation of the 
previous century many of the grievances which had formed the source of the physical force 
idea had been placated most specifically under Conservative Government policy which 
culminated in the Wyndham Act of 1903. Ireland therefore at the turn of the twentieth 
century was not inclined to listen to conspiratorial nationalists such as the IRB who through 
their policy of physical force threatened the modicum of stability that was now more 
representative of Ireland.
The theme struck in the pages of Irish Freedom personified O’Hegarty’s Fenian beliefs in 
the early twentieth century but historically the Fenianism of the 1860s was not notable for 
its promotion of Irish culture through its newspaper the Irish People. The Fenianism 
movement of the 1860s was strictly a military secret society and despite its recreational 
aspects did not extend its remit into cultural activities.
17 O’Hegarty formed a triumvirate with Bulmer Hobson and Terence MacSwiney, mounting a campaign to 
convince doubting republican audiences to reassess the benefits of the new theatre. See Ben Levitas, The 
Theatre of Nation (Oxford, 2002) p. 198.
In contrast, Irish Freedom busied itself in cultural matters and through the dissemination of 
new ideas; it proved a liberally advanced publication for its time. It was a platform through 
which O’Hegarty’s broad and pluralistic separatism was vocalised and therefore permitted 
his questioning of many of the engrained attitudes of early twentieth century Ireland.
Irish Freedom had emerged through the publication and eventual amalgamation of Bulmer 
Hobson and W.P Ryan’s papers, The Peasant and Nation, later renamed Irish Freedom and 
featuring IRB principles adapted to the twentieth century. Irish Freedom proved an 
important channel through which an alternative voice to Arthur Griffith could be aired and 
while a seemingly united front had been created under Cumann na Gaedheal in 1907 
between the more moderate elements of Sinn Fein like John Sweetman, Cumann na 
Gaedheal remained a front for the IRB and therefore tended to be more radical in its outlook 
and separatist policy. The Dungannon Clubs too of which O’Hegarty was secretary in 
London and from which Irish Freedom emerged supported and represented Republican 
principles and the IRB perspective.
Through only the ‘pence contributed by its members’ this ‘loose confederation of 
[Dungannon] clubs’, as Bulmer Hobson described them,18 the IRB enjoyed a relative 
amount of autonomy from Griffith even though that meant the limiting of Irish 
Independence to a shared common parliament with England under equal terms was accepted 
on the condition that it would only be seen as a first step on the road to complete 
independence. Ben Levitas in his recent publication Theatre of Nation commented that:
...in the case of the Clubs and the ‘Peasant’, however, one of the properties they 
used to keep Griffith at bay was a more open cultural mind -  and this would 
continue to have positive implications for the Abbey....The Dungannon clubs,
18 Bulmer Hobson, Ireland Yesterday and Tomorrow (Tralee, 1968), p.21.
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though overtly republican, had a consistently more liberal approach to the arts as a 
matter of practical necessity...19
Therefore it was important as Adrian Frazier has noted below, for O’Hegarty and Hobson to 
maintain an autonomous existence from Griffith’s position in cultural matters given the 
following summary of many of O’Hegarty’s contemporary cultural nationalists:
The Irish cultural nationalists did not call for a secular, rational state where any 
human might find a home. Rather, they aimed to recover an imagined, historical 
nation-state of their own, lost through conquest, just as entitled to pride as the British 
state. But if the future Irish state were to be in language Gaelic, in religion Catholic, 
and in ancestry peasant, the passports to the new Ireland of its prominent writers 
would be cancelled. All were either Protestants or landlords, except for Joyce. Yeats, 
Moore, Augusta Gregory, George Russell, and Edward Martyn saw that home rule 
was inevitable. When that day came, they might be seen as aliens, a criminal class of 
bloodsuckers from the earlier regime. So they first had to invent an Ireland in which 
they could be at home. Writing in the wake of the land war, as power and wealth 
were changing hands, they had to imagine a heroic pagan Ireland, or even an extra- 
Christian folk Ireland; they had to document it as a history, and they had to do it 
fast.20
In the need for generating a workable compromise and establishing unity Griffith was 
entrusted with the responsibility of achieving widespread support for separatist ideals by the 
IRB Supreme Council but O’Hegarty, himself a member of the Council from 1908-1914, 
where he was exiled to Shrewsbury and later Welshpool for refusing to sign the British 
Civil Services required oath of allegiance to the British Monarch during the Great War 
believed Griffiths attitude stood in the way of exciting new cultural projects that could 
broaden Ireland’s cultural standing in Europe. The Anglo-Irish Theatre was a new and 
vibrant artistic milieu that O’Hegarty believed was pushing the boundaries of Ireland’s
19 Ben Levitas, The Theatre of Nation (Oxford, 2002), pp. 139-40. As a relatively small grouping within the 
Sinn Fein remit, the Fenian tradition as exemplified through the Dungannon clubs and their paper Irish 
Freedom was in keeping with the main philosophy of Sinn Fein up to 1917, when the entire agenda regretfully 
changed for O’Hegarty. See chapter VI for O’Hegarty’s view that the achievement of nothing less than a 
‘Republic’ during the Treaty negotiations became a conundrum which Sinn Fein could not solve.
20 Adrian Frazier, ‘The Power of the Moment: Ireland’s Literary Revivals’, in Bullain vol. VI, no.l, p. 12.
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artistic temperament. Therefore he urged that the Anglo-Irish literary revival did assert 
Ireland’s cultural heritage. O’Hegarty believed that cultural nationalists, including Griffith 
(see below), were not fully appreciative of the challenges that were being set by writers such 
as W.B. Yeats and J.M. Synge. These challenges were set by the Anglo-Irish literary 
tradition and called into question the civic and pluralistic notions that for O’Hegarty were 
the main tenets of the separatist tradition to which he identified with.
The Anglo-Irish Theatre began in 1899 following on from the Irish Literary Society in 
1893.21 Its opening plays were Yeats’ the ‘Countess Cathleen’ and Edward Martyn’s the 
‘Heather Field’. The Anglo-Irish Theatre’s raison d’etre was described thus by Lady 
Gregory, founding member of the Irish national literary society with Edward Martyn and 
W.B. Yeats:
We hope to find in Ireland an uncorrupted and imaginative audience trained to listen 
by the passion for oratory, and believe that our desire to bring upon the stage the 
deeper thoughts and emotions of Ireland will ensure for us a tolerant welcome, and 
that freedom to experiment which is not found in the theatres of England and 
without which no new movement in art or literature can succeed.22
Initially there were auspicious omens for a workable relationship between the advanced 
nationalists and the Irish National Literary Theatre to be built upon. Yeats’ play ‘Cathleen ni 
Houlihan’ was particularly warmly received by cultural nationalists for its lyrical skill and 
for its portrayal of the Irish as a brave and gallant race ready to make the necessary 
sacrifices in the fight for Irish independence.
21 Quoted in Lennox Robinson, Ireland’s Abbey Theatre (London, 1951), p.3.
22 Lennox Robinson, Ireland’s Abbey Theatre (London, 1951), p.4.
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The play was to portray the element of Irish nationalism that refused to give in to English 
rule even unto death. It was to lead Yeats later, in his play entitled ‘Easter 1916’ to question 
whether that ‘play of mine sent out certain men the English shot.’
Even Griffith who did not share the same commitment to physical force as a spiritual 
necessity of building nationhood as O’Hegarty could not help be moved by Yeats’s 
imaginative aspirations. Indeed the symbolic nobility of the play seemed to set the aims of 
the national theatre as separatist in tone from its inception. It was also dedicated to William 
Rooney, the death of whom hit Griffith very hard.23
Cultural nationalists recognized in the Irish National Literary Theatre a new and powerful 
propaganda forum led by the genius of W.B. Yeats that held the potential for disseminating 
a positive image for Irish independence. Cultural nationalists were enthusiastic in using the 
theatre as a method to convince the English government that there was a distinct high 
culture in Ireland that could rival England’s. It was a forum through which much of the 
snobbery of English high culture could be challenged in its assumed supremacy. 
Paradoxically, it was also a medium whereby the more cheapened Irish entertainment 
believed to be exported from England could be set in its place as worthless devices to amuse 
the masses. Ultimately there existed a distinctive cultural alternative in Ireland capable of 
producing plays of the highest quality.
Moreover, the ‘propaganda play’ as it was termed could prove inspirational in convincing 
the majority of the population to support Sinn Fein and turn away from the Irish Party’s 
methods of political agitation at Westminster. Or, as O’Hegarty would see it, divert the eyes 
of the population away from England and back toward Ireland as the centre of Ireland’s 
political and cultural interests.
23 Ben Levitas, The Theatre o f Nation (Oxford, 2002), p.37.
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Yet the aims of cultural nationalists were not the motivational factors behind the new 
theatre as described by Lady Gregory above. The latter were seeking to disqualify prejudice 
whether its founders were broadly sympathetic or not toward Irish nationalism. Given this 
‘objective’ position as defined by the theatre’s directors, Griffith was to interpret their 
position in a subjective way claiming plays should be scrutinised in case they could be 
interpreted as damaging to the nationalist campaign for Irish independence. Griffith’s 
interpretation of subsequent plays such as the ‘Countess Kathleen’, Yeats next production in 
the ‘Aisling’ mould24 was that they were immoral and repugnant manifestations of the Irish 
character and therefore damaging in their portrayal of the Irish nation. For Griffith it was 
important to impress upon the English nation that the Irish people were not of the type 
portrayed in this play. Griffith felt it would only deepen a prejudice that the majority of the 
English population arguably believed to be a strong reason for not granting Ireland 
independence.
Griffith’s repugnance increased with J.M. Synge’s play ‘In the Shadow of the Glen’ 
produced in 1904 in which Synge’s depiction of Irish peasant life caused Griffith to object 
to the brand of ‘realism’ that Synge was offering in portrayal of Ireland to the outside world. 
Griffith, who envisioned a bourgeois Ireland built up with protective tariffs believed that 
plays such as Synge’s were damaging to the prospect of an industrial centred and middle 
class Ireland and therefore he considered them ‘thematically repellent.’25 Griffith was a 
particularly significant figure in the audience as:
He came to show himself in favour of what Cardinal Michael Logue had said no 
Catholics should see: a play that presented the Irish as a people eager to sell their 
souls for gold, that said souls came at different prices, and that illustrated as features
24 R.V. Comerford, Ireland: Inventing the Nation (London, 2003), p. 156-158.
25 Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), p.xv-xvi.
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of Irish life some peasants who stole, some who committed sacrilege, and one 
woman hell-bent on fornication.26
While Sinn Fein were not a mass movement as yet nationalists of Griffith’s standing were 
still a vitally important element in the audience. As Adrian Frazier reports: ‘nationalists 
made up the largest part of the crowd, not only officially apolitical nationalists like Douglas 
Hyde, the Gaelic League’s president, but political ones too, like Arthur Griffith, editor of the 
United Irishman and future President of Sinn Fein.’27
For Griffith therefore, it was imperative to steer the poetic drama of the Anglo-Irish Theatre 
toward cultural nationalist approval in an attempt to educate the Irish people into the 
advanced ‘nationalist’ way of thinking. This involved the artist portraying the Irish people 
as ready to govern themselves and not as an irresponsible race unappreciative and unworthy 
of good self-government. That is, as a morally upright nation innocent of the foibles he 
thought synonymous with the influence he saw creeping into the English masses, way of 
life. On one level his seeking to influence the artist was understandable as he did not wish 
the highly influential Abbey Theatre to portray a colonial people with a colonial mentality.
It was against this seeming impasse between the Anglo-Irish literary revival dramatists and 
the cultural nationalists that 0 ’Hegarty‘s attempt at finding a way forward was premised. 
Synge’s ‘The Playboy of the Western World’ had provoked a particularly damning response 
in the cultural nationalist press and it was in response to this and the backbiting which 
ensued between the opposing sides which proved the catalyst for a reaction from O’Hegarty. 
He wanted to step away from the backbiting and feuding which occurred in the pages of
26 Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), p.2.
27 Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), p.2.
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Sinn Fein’s United Irishman and the theatre journal Samhein. after their enraged reactions to 
‘In the Shadow of the Glen” and its criticisms some nine years ago.28 
In the pages of Irish Freedom. February, 1912, O’Hegarty began a series of articles entitled 
‘Art and the Nation’ that were to cause a stir among the fairly liberal readership of Irish 
Freedom. The impact was such that the paper felt compelled to print a leader entitled ‘Our 
Contributors and Ourselves’ which emphasised that the articles were the work of O’Hegarty 
alone and did not represent the collective views of the paper:
Some of our friends have written to us rather wrathfully on the supposition that the 
articles of our contributor P.S. O’Heigeartaigh, on the “Playboy,” and the art 
question generally, represent the views of this paper. In this as in other things 
however, Padraic represents, and claims to represent himself alone. Indeed he made 
that clear in the articles themselves. The “Playboy” is a question upon which there is 
difference of opinion among nationalists. Many good nationalists hold the same 
views substantially as Padraic does on the art question, and we printed his article as 
giving one side of the question, the other side of which had already been given in our 
columns. But we are not officially responsible for either view. We believe in 
freedom of opinion on all Irish matters.
A separatist contemporary of O’Hegarty’s and fellow enthusiast of the theatre, Ernest 
Blythe, writing in hindsight on the Anglo-Irish literary Revival believed that: ‘the sharp and 
sometimes unfair criticism of the theatre which came from those who dubbed themselves 
Irish-Irelanders must be understood as faultfinding in a passing family quarrel.’29 But for 
O’Hegarty the arguments between cultural nationalists and the Abbey dramatists stretched 
far beyond whether the ‘Playboy of the Western World’ was an acceptable one in theme and 
content. Indeed it became a test case for what was a much broader issue that needed to be
28 Irish Freedom, February, 1912. Similarly an article written by ‘F.A.’ in the Republic, February 14, 1907, felt 
that Synge had handled the controversies with dignity but that Yeats was at the heart of stirring up the 
nationalists motives. That: Mr. ‘Yeats was rather pleased by the storm he has brewed. It affords an opportunity 
for parallels irresistible to the literary mind; and the fact that Moliere and Ibsen provoked the anger of their 
audiences is felt to link Mr. Synge to the great masters and rank the Abbey Theatre amongst the immortal 
temples of dramatic art.
29 Ernest Blythe Papers, University College Dublin, P24.
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addressed with some urgency. The litmus test was the need for respecting other’s opinions 
and views and not seeking to condemn other perspectives in order to achieve cultural 
hegemony. At stake was the permitted toleration of liberal art and literature in Irish society. 
Despite the controversial opinions offered by O’Hegarty in his articles, he was urgently 
appealing to the nation to support and respect its artistic talent.
As an intellectual Irish citizen O’Hegarty was profoundly affected by the intensity of the 
ongoing debate between the cultural nationalists and the artists of the Anglo-Irish literary 
tradition not least as it was causing a severe breach in relations between the two and 
dividing opinion in Irish society. The arguments he was to formulate were not designed to 
attack either the artists, or the cultural nationalists’, respective positions.
The hostile reception of the audience after the first showing of the ‘Playboy of the Western 
World’ was in reaction to the cultural nationalists, interpretation of the Irish people being 
depicted as fundamentally immoral in character. O’Hegarty’s articles were more 
immediately prompted by the Abbey Theatre’s recent production of ‘The Playboy of the 
Western World’ during the company’s recent tour of America. The organising of 
disruptions had been commonplace in its production in Ireland and here too in America 
audience disruption had been used as a tactic for demonstrating disapproval to the play’s 
theme and content. For O’Hegarty the play was to have ‘raised once more in many minds 
that old question which lies at the root of all the Playboy trouble of the function of art, its 
relation to life, to the imagination, and to the nation generally.’30
The series of articles were a balanced and pluralistic response on the subject of ‘art and the 
nation’ during this period. O’Hegarty was not intimidated by political and cultural
30 Irish Freedom , February, 1912.
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heavyweights who wielded highly respected opinions such as Arthur Griffith31 and W.B. 
Yeats, and he stated that both these individuals had succumbed to using highly emotive
0 9
thought and language. In respect of the erudite criticisms of plays among cultural 
nationalists, Griffith and D.P. Moran (who represented a more ethnical idea of cultural 
nationalism based on the Catholics people as the only real people who could claim Irish 
citizenship), were aware of what constituted a good or bad example of dramatic theatre in 
their sophisticated commentaries. However, for O’Hegarty their conservative ideas of how 
these themes should be portrayed were in danger of setting an irreversible precedent that 
could prove damaging to the long term of Irish culture.
The conflict between the Abbey and the cultural nationalists at this stage had already begun 
to inflict damage on both sides and the arguments increasingly consisted of slights and bitter 
reproaches rather than healthy or rigorous debate. The intrinsic qualities of the plays were 
being unfairly sacrificed. W.B. Yeats as principle spokesman for the Abbey Theatre in 
defending its choice of productions and who accompanied his frustration at cultural 
nationalists with severe rebukes became increasingly called upon to defend the plays of J. M 
Synge that were being produced at the Abbey. In this respect O’Hegarty argued in the same 
vein as Yeats that a play should be determined good or bad wholly on its merits or 
detractive elements. Of foremost importance also, O’Hegarty reminded cultural nationalists, 
was to remember that the Irish theatre was indeed just that, an Irish one, and should be 
advertised and lauded for that very reason as a matter of cultural pride.33 
For O’Hegarty then, the issue contained much more than the choice of production of plays 
and the right to allow or deny their expression on the Irish stage. Whether or not an
31 For an example of how O’Hegarty was to stand up to Griffith see Chapter IV and the controversies 
surrounding the launch of Griffith’s daily paper Sinn Fein.
32 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
33 Irish Freedom, March, 1912.
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audience left the Abbey Theatre with damaged sensibilities or not, the artist must be 
allowed to express his view of the world as he saw it.34 Implicit throughout O’Hegarty’s 
articles was the opportunity to widen the cultural horizons of the average reader and to 
ensure that the maxim that Irish Freedom sought to impart to its readers, that, as an 
essentially dissident publication, it was willing to permit a wide variety of opinions to be 
freely expressed. O’Hegarty asserted that the current controversy should represent a fair 
hearing for the artist in Irish society in the present and in the future:
Whatever expressions one may give to the pros., and cons., of the “Playboy” 
controversy, that controversy ultimately carries with it the pros., and cons., not alone 
of dramatic art, but of all art, and it is an essential to the nation which we are striving 
for that the artist shall get at least fair play as it is that our children shall get an Irish 
education.
For O’Hegarty the Abbey productions represented the progressive state of the Irish cultural 
nation and one that should not be truncated or halted by cultural nationalists lack of 
appreciation of the talent on show at the Abbey Theatre. In line with his idea of helping 
rejuvenate the Irish nation, O’Hegarty asserted the merits of the Abbey Theatre, especially 
when taken as a whole, as a body of work, right across its broad sweep and interpretation of 
Irish life. It produced:
Irish national work, good work and conscientious work, when taken as a whole and 
sincere expressions of literature of Irishmen who are attempting the artist’s business 
of expressing himself, and his views on life, on morality, on love, on religion, on 
anything and everything, when taken severally according to the various writers.35
For O’Hegarty, if the literary revival was to fulfil its potential then it was essential to 
generate debate over the issues involved, rather than to stifle free speech, or dismiss the
34 Irish Freedom, March, 1912.
35 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
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artists, plays or restrict the artists, material to a set criteria decided upon by the conventional 
standards of cultural nationalists:
...it maybe that the majority of the supporters of this paper, that is to say, the 
majority of nationalists, believe in cramping and crippling any attempt on the part of 
the artist to chose his materials outside certain recognised and accepted types.. .36
Such a view reflected Yeats’s assertion that the artist must be given free reign to ensure that 
the creative process was allowed to work to its maximum potential. Previously Yeats had 
argued in Samhein in response to Griffith’s criticisms over his literary play the ‘Countess 
Cathleen’ that:
...if some external necessity had forced me to write nothing but drama with an 
obvious patriotic intention, instead of letting my work shape itself under the causal 
impulses of dreams and daily thoughts, I would have lost, in short time, the power to 
write movingly upon any theme.37
In 0 ’Hegarty‘s view Yeats was making a very important point and in defending Yeats 
O’Hegarty stated categorically that he (O’Hegarty) was a loyal nationalist of impeccable 
pedigree who none the less found himself in a minority of cultural nationalists. Moreover 
one who was ‘not less intelligent, not less patriotic, with not less capacity for judgement, 
and with a not less honourable record of work done for the nation whose attitude these 
articles and notes do not represent.’38
The theme of the artist’s right to intellectual freedom was continued in the second of his 
articles entitled ‘The General Question’, in which, the idea of Ireland’s captivity under 
English colonial rule was related to the rights inherent to every individual within the nation.
36 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
37 Samhein 1903, quoted in the Irish Literary Supplement, Fall, 1990.
38 Irish Freedom, February, 1912.
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O’Hegarty remarked that ‘any conception of nationality which begins by denying freedom 
of expression to its freest and best souls, its artists, is bound to fall shorter of perfectibility 
than a more liberal conception.’39
Inherent within O’Hegarty’s concept of nationalism was the liberalisation of the nation’s 
artists with the alternative amounting to a degradation of the capacity of the nation to 
engage in a mature reflection on its position on the world stage, as a producer of great art 
and literature. This was compatible with O’Hegarty’s concept of the nation at one with, and 
comfortable with, its culture and identity. Moreover, O’Hegarty saw the arguments between 
the nationalists and the artists as ignoring the mutual benefits that a harmonious relationship 
could bring to the objectives outlined above. O’Hegarty was to challenge the prejudices of 
his fellow cultural nationalists and advance a conflation of the two sides, nationalist and 
artist, as working together for the general good or as referred to in the previous chapter, the 
‘cultural uplift’ of the Irish nation. He considered both as vital elements for the intellectual 
advancement of the Irish nation.
These articles form an important insight into O’Hegarty’s advanced liberal and pluralistic 
views on the Anglo-Irish literary revival as a test case for the Ireland he wished to encourage 
and see developing. The power behind the articles is based on their broad-minded logical 
reasoning which is used to refute the more narrow minded views expounded by cultural 
nationalists and, as will be demonstrated, the reaction to these views from the Anglo Irish 
camp (most explicitly through W.B. Yeats). O’Hegarty’s refused to become embroiled in 
the heated and reactionary side of the debate. He saw it as an argument, which while both 
sides claimed to be standing up for Ireland and securing its future as a respectable nation
39 Irish Freedom, March, 1912.
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state was actually damaging the nation through its lack of tolerance and shortsighted 
appraisal of the cultural development of the nation.
Regarding his criticisms of the Anglo Irish camp O’Hegarty emphasised that the artist was 
obliged to use whatever materials to which they were drawn. However, he was to criticise 
Yeats (see below for his criticism of Yeats as a businessman) for his knee-jerk reaction in 
disapproving and discouraging of plays he deemed were written with a political or 
nationalist agenda. For O’Hegarty this was tantamount to the same stifling of creativity to 
which Yeats had accused the cultural nationalists. Yeats could not advocate the freedom of 
the artist to choose whatever material he or she chose as essential to the creative process 
while at the same time restricting the choice of material, in this case from the political 
realm, as this too stifled the creative impulse. O’Hegarty dealt with this issue in the 
following way:
The artists, on the other hand, have barred what they term the propagandist play, 
meaning by that a play which deals with Irish international politics and has an Irish 
bias. Now that is as erroneous as the barring of the nationalists. It is the artist’s 
business to express that portion of Ireland’s soul as well as the other portions, and it 
is quite as legitimate material for the artist...let us have done with the theory that 
because a play propagates something political it is bad art; it will only be bad art if 
the workmanship is bad. The right of the artist to choose his material out of political 
life is as sacred as any other right, and he ought to fight for it instead of fighting 
against it.40
The above quotation is an important one therefore in understanding the cultural pluralism 
O’Hegarty advocated. It contains his thought regarding the nature of the role of the artist in 
society. For O’Hegarty, nationalists who desired the Irish Theatre to conform to their own 
interpretation of the Irish ethnic character were paving the way toward the everyday 
practices of arbitrary censorship. This then, despite O’Hegarty’s general affiliation with the
40 Irish Freedom, March, 1912.
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work of cultural nationalists, was the issue at hand and an issue worth defending above the 
political point-scoring of nationalists and the Anglo- Irish contingency. O’Hegarty believed 
that the policy of cultural nationalists would hinder free expression and if these views were 
to become commonplace they could even lead to the artist becoming an ostracised figure in 
the community. O’Hegarty was in no doubt that this would encumber the quality and 
breadth of the plays produced as the artist instead of concentrating on the excellence of his 
work would be continually mindful of the overall effect the social and political implications 
the plays were having upon the audience, that is, if they made it through the process of 
censorship onto the stage. This, in effect, was the driving force behind O’Hegarty’s 
comment concerning the distinction between good and bad workmanship whereby plays 
could be judged solely on their nationalist imagery and propagandist value rather than their 
dramatic or imaginative effect. The issues regarding the defence of the Anglo-Irish literary 
revival from D.P. Moran were more fundamental in tone than issues of propaganda. Moran 
conspicuously and continually chided Griffith for denying that the Sinn Fein movement 
actually stood for creating a fundamentally Catholics orientated and middle class Ireland. 
For O’Hegarty Moran’s vision was an abhorrent prospect. Moran’s criticisms of Sinn Fein 
denied that this movement really stood for the inclusive ideology they proclaimed as 
inherited from Thomas Davis’s and the Young Irelanders, transcendent vision of a pluralist 
Irish society. In Moran’s view, after centuries of oppression the time was ripe for the 
Catholics majority of Ireland to assert their numerical superiority and wrest the final 
vestiges of power from the ascendant minority. A major part of his crusade was aimed at 
‘shoneenism’ or ’West Britonism’, and this formed his anti-Anglo-Irish stance particularly 
regarding the Anglo-Irish literary revival. Moran’s conviction that any form of literature
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claiming Irish heritage but not written in the Irish language, was, by definition, of inferior 
worth. This was a degenerate view in the eyes of O’Hegarty.
Moran was to prove rigid in matters he did not consider as contributory to his notion of 
‘Irish Irelandism’ as he held to an ‘exclusive’ definition of nationalism when compared to 
pluralist conceptions such as those held by O’Hegarty and other key nationalists such as 
Douglas Hyde. As Donal McCartney has expressed:
.. .for Moran the Abbey was the ‘Pegeen Mikes’, and he poured scorn on the young 
men in cloaks with long hair and pale faces who ‘hear lake water lapping even when 
stirring their punch’. Yeats’ ‘Celtic Note’, said Moran, was one of the most glaring 
frauds that the credulous Irish people ever swallowed....It seemed that Yeats by his 
very success was enchanting people faery-like away from what to Moran was the 
real world of Gaelic literature. It was Moran’s thesis that literature in English by 
Irishmen, however much it might be influenced by Gaelic themes, could never be 
other than English literature. The Anglo-Irish literature which Hyde welcomed as a 
half-way house was to Moran’s way of thinking too often a terminus -  the 
destination to be aimed at by aspiring young literary men under Yeats’s influence.41
An example of Moran’s rejection of what O’Hegarty considered the literary revival as 
capable of ‘doing good work for Ireland’ consisted in Moran’s questioning of Yeats’s 
background and the motives behind the Anglo-Irish literary revival. Moran commented:
.. .a number of writers then arose, headed by Mr. W.B. Yeats, who, for the purposes 
they set themselves to accomplish, lacked any attribute of genius but 
perseverance...a muddled land which mistook politics for nationality, and English 
literature for Irish.. .was offered the services of a few mystics.. .42
As he did with Yeats (see below) O’Hegarty was to write an obituary notice for D.P. Moran 
in Dublin Magazine (1936) in which he was critical toward Moran’s pedigree as a 
journalist. In this article O’Hegarty stated that Moran’s form of thinking had peaked in
41 Donal McCartney, ‘Hyde, D.P. Moran, and Irish Ireland’ in F.X. Martin, (Ed), Leaders and Men of the 
Easter Rising (London, 1967), p.50.
42 Yeats Annual, No. 12 That accusing eye : Yeats and his Irish readers, Warwick Gould and Edna Longley, 
(Eds), p.50.
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1905.43 This was the time that O’Hegarty believed Ireland was still in ferment and open to 
new ideas that ran contrary to sectarian notions of hegemony of which Moran was noted. 
Naturally, at this time, given his faith in the Sinn Fein creed O’Hegarty believed that the 
Sinn Fein programme was the way forward, not least, as it attempted to provide a space for 
all the traditions on the island rather than offering a narrow focus on Catholic power. For 
O’Hegarty, Moran’s views were not progressive doctrines that looked to further the 
nationalist cause in a constructive way. Admittedly though, Moran’s paper The Leader had 
commanded a wide audience competing successfully with Griffith’s United Irishman, as a 
powerful voice of Irish Ireland opinion. O’Hegarty saw Moran’s failing as emanating from 
his negative ideology toward other nationalist movements and vented through his editorials 
entitled Moran’s Collar’. It has been stated that ‘generally speaking the demise of Moran 
and the success of alternative forms of separatism were hybrid natures in contrast to 
Moran’s purist conception’.44
It was Moran’s insistence on Catholics as the singular example of the true Gael that piqued 
O’Hegarty and ran through O’Hegarty’s literary criticisms as a false claim in relation to the 
art and literature question.
In an article entitled ‘The Pale and the Gael’ Moran blamed the Young Irelanders for the 
demise of the Gaelic language in Ireland. He stated categorically that: ‘the worst thing they 
did.. .was that they brought into life a mongrel thing which they called Irish literature in the 
English language.’45 Yet for O’Hegarty it seemed beyond Moran‘s ken to realize that by 
cultivating art in its broadest sense this could prove to be a useful component in working for
43 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1937.
44 Yeats Annual, No. 12 That accusing eye: Yeats and his Irish readers, Warwick Gould and Edna Longley 
(Eds), p.69.
45 Yeats Annual, No. 12 That accusing eye: Yeats and his Irish readers, Warwick Gould and Edna Longley 
(Eds), p.50.
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the Irish nationalist cause. Literature in the English language had provided an outlet for 
disseminating the ideas of Ireland’s claim to nationhood and could continue to do so. The 
following view espoused by Ben Levitas depicts how the Anglo-Irish Theatre managed to 
survive the hostility aimed at it by the cultural nationalists:
...the existence of anti-clerical republicanism, of class based concerns of the left, 
and of liberal Catholics opinion, would continue to protect even the most ascendancy 
of dramas from being conclusively categorised according to Moran’s notion of the 
battle of two civilizations.46
O’Hegarty, as a Fenian in the twentieth century and armed with his intellectual framework 
of liberalism and pluralism, was able to incorporate the notion that both views were false 
and much like his attempt to bridge the divide between the dramatists and Griffith’s 
criticisms believed that a conflation of the different elements was the best route forward. 
This was a view that permeated all his journalistic writings as he saw each movement as 
working in its own way for the good of Ireland. Consequently O’Hegarty could not have 
slurred the English race in the tone of Moran’s ‘West Britonism’, and he, as an emigrant 
like Moran, would also have been stung by the Victorian view of the emigrated Irishman in 
the cities of England. However the Anglo-Irish revival did not represent this side of 
England, it was an Irish development and its successes would be credited as Irish as a result. 
Given O’Hegarty’s view he felt a need to defend Yeats from attack from his critics. Moran 
in his attacks on the Abbey Theatre had made frequent references to Yeats claiming that he 
represented the worst excesses of betraying the Gael and representing the Pale’s growing 
encroachment on Irish culture. For Moran, Yeats’s poetic abilities lacked, along with every 
other Anglo-Irish writer an earthiness and realism that characterised truly Irish poets. These 
criticisms abounded even if the power of the Protestant ascendancy in real terms had been
46 Ben Levitas, The Theatre of Nation (Oxford, 2002), p.32.
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receding from the time of O’Connell and the granting of Catholics Emancipation in 1829 
and the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869. In O’Hegarty’s view, for all his 
varied motives, Yeats was an Irish cultural poet who was producing the greatest artistry of 
the period and who most definitely possessed an Irish earthiness and realism in his poetry. 
This praise however is not to say that O’Hegarty did not ever criticise Yeats for his actions. 
Yeats’s genius was not reason enough to excuse him permanently for all his actions and 
decisions during his tenure as the leading light in the Abbey Theatre. O’Hegarty like other 
nationalists was particularly suspicious of the role Annie Homiman was playing in the 
Abbey Theatre as its owner and patron with Yeats as her main benefactor. Homiman was 
insistent that the Abbey Theatre resolutely stuck to an anti-nationalist agenda, and 
O’Hegarty saw Yeats during this period as reneging his roots and ideology for financial 
motivations rather than the strict pursuit of great art. (This was a debatable point as it was 
necessary to keep the rich patron on side for the survival of the Abbey Theatre.)47 
On a more practical level the accessibility of the Irish theatre to the masses was a serious 
matter for O’Hegarty who felt that Yeats tended to bow under pressure from Homiman to 
conform to her vision of the Abbey. In creating a ‘class’ based Abbey Theatre the danger 
was that Yeats would once again become charged with not representing the Irish people as a 
whole but merely representing a narrow percentage who could afford to see the plays at the 
Abbey Theatre. However from a financial perspective and in defence of Yeats, Homiman 
was the sole patron and Yeats as the centrepiece of the Abbey had to juggle with reflecting 
the Irish political situation while maintaining her dictum of ‘no politics.’48
47 See Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), p.24.
48 Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), p.77.
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O’Hegarty’s criticisms of Yeats though were deserved to a point. The Irish National Theatre 
society’s tour of London was an ideal arena to show off the Irish genius for playwrighting. 
O’Hegarty, a resident in London was perfectly placed to review the proceedings. Writing in 
the United Irishman again under the pseudonym ‘Sarsfield’ on the 16 December 1905, he 
deeply criticised the exclusivity of the English tour in not making provisions for the 
ordinary people of London to see the vivid products of the Irish imagination. Frazier states 
how it was interesting to note how ‘Sarsfield’ -  a self-appointed journalistic tribune of the 
people -  rose up to face down the English patron and her poet. “The Abbey street theatre in 
London” article picked Homiman’s letter to pieces in the columns of the United Irishman.49 
Despite such minor criticisms O’Hegarty’s appreciation of great literature was too broad to 
discount Anglo-Irish literature from inclusion in the Irish literary canon. Yeats particularly 
was singled out as of quintessentially Irish stock. Rather than basing himself in London as 
previous literati had he had sought to establish a centre of literary excellence in Ireland. In 
The Anglo-Irish Theatrical Imagination Thomas Kilroy has commented:
The Anglo-Irish playwrights before Yeats had turned to London and English society. 
The Anglo-Irish playwrights of Yeats’ theatrical movement, like Synge, turned to 
Ireland for their material, and their new Theatre was, of course, located in Dublin.
Yet all belong to the one culture, and this is at least as important as their differing 
choice of theatrical location and subject matter. The fact that they are separated by a 
choice of subject matter simply points to the fact that one group inhabited an 
imperial theatre, the other a theatre which was initially part of that movement 
towards national self expression yet which sought to cast off that same imperialism.50
For O’Hegarty, in deciding upon Ireland as their base, the revivalists were patriotic and 
worthy of high praise. He was to comment in his obituary of Yeats in Dublin Magazine in 
1939: ‘he conceived, launched, and sustained the national dramatic movement, which,
49Adrian Frazier, Behind the Scenes (London, 1990), pp. 170-171.
50 Thomas Kilroy, The Anglo-Irish Theatrical Imagination (New York, 1997), p.68.
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fortunately is still with us, which has meant, and means, so much to us, and which has 
brought to Ireland a world reputation’.51 O’Hegarty described also the first occasion he had 
seen Mr. Yeats’s name. It was:
...in connection with the ’98 Centenary Celebrations, 41 years ago. He was then 
President of the Ninety-eight Commemoration Association of Great Britain, a 
delegate to various conventions and meetings here during the centenary period, and a 
speaker at various public meetings.52
Yeats chaired the first dinner of the 1798 Centennial Association of Great Britain and 
France as President of the Executive for Great Britain and France53 and had addressed 
political meetings at Phoenix Park and Stephen’s Green in March and August 1898.54 While 
Yeats later became disillusioned with the separatist ideal55 his literary impact on O’Hegarty 
remained unbroken. In the following personal anecdote O’Hegarty related how Yeats’s 
poetry coloured and influenced his appreciation of Anglo-Irish literature in 1903:
.. .there were still horse trams, and one was just passing me. On top I saw a familiar 
black soft hat, and just then the wearer caught sight of me and shouted “Hegarty, I’m 
coming down.” It was Seamus Connolly, with a book in his hand, risking his limbs 
by jumping off between stopping places. He was all excited. Listen, said he, just 
listen, and he put his back to the railings and read out to me 
One that is ever kind said yesterday 
Your well beloved’s hair has threads of grey 
And little shadows come about her eyes
51 Dublin Magazine July-September, 1939. O’Hegarty continued that the ’98 centennial celebrations had 
mobilised enormous hopes among nationalists. Moreover, as the celebrations tailed off during the autumn, 
expectations of political crisis rose... In November 1898 it was possible even for moderate nationalists such as 
William Redmond to assume that history would repeat itself and that 1898 would see a French invasion of 
Ireland.’
52 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1939.
53 Yeats Annual, No. 12 That accusing eye: Yeats and his Irish readers, Warwick Gould and Edna Longley 
(Eds), p.xvii.
54 Yeats Annual, No. 12 That accusing eye: Yeats and his Irish readers, Warwick Gould and Edna Longley 
(Eds), p.65.
55 Yeats became less enthusiastic toward the Fenian notion of a military strike if the time was ripe, but as 
O’Hegarty argued, this was not to say that he was not involved in the struggle throughout Ireland's search for 
independence.
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We felt that Yeats and Russell were Ireland in an intimate sense in which Shaw and 
Moore were not.56
O’Hegarty, as with other cultural nationalists, was mesmerised by the message of romantic 
nationalism that was allegorically implied in Yeats’s play ‘Cathleen ni Houlihan.’ 
O’Hegarty related how it would be difficult for ‘Ireland in the coming times’ to appreciate 
its impact on the fight for independence. O'Hegarty drew particular attention to how it was a 
‘sort of sacrament’ from which ‘the spirit of Ireland spoke to us, and we listened....It is a 
play of the captivity.’
This can be contrasted with O’Hegarty’s appreciation of Thomas Moore, whom he 
described as a poet of the captivity in A History of Ireland under the Union. O’Hegarty 
described Thomas Moore’s poetical past heritage as:
Coming out from underground in the Nineteenth Century, Ireland became articulate 
in literature in Thomas Moore, her first national expression in English. Moore was a 
poet of his time, and therefore a poet of the captivity.. .to be patriotic he had to go to 
the past, and to be nationalist he had to go to the East. But he was first and last, in 
spite of drawing rooms, an Irishman, and a patriotic Irishman, who served Ireland as 
best he could with his own particular gifts, and who was accepted by the Ireland of 
his day as her Tom Moore, her national poet, her loved poet.57
O’Hegarty believed that Yeats ‘...was always on the national side’ and in seeking to build 
up the spiritual aspects of the Irish nation he passed the test of patriotism and provided a 
vital element in advanced nationalist thought.
56 Dublin Magazine July-September, 1939.
57 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.627.
Mary M. Macken, writing in the year of Yeats’ death also agreed with O’Hegarty’s 
assertion, ‘That Yeats’ ambition from the beginning was to be a national poet is evident to 
all who know the story of his life and writings.’58
O’Hegarty was convinced that Yeats had embarked on a long term project in which all the 
traditions in Ireland could and would appreciate eventually:
Revolutions are not made in a week, or a year, or ten years. Nor are they made by 
rude or unlettered mobs. There has to be spiritual preparation, spiritual sustenance, 
spiritual background. Mr. Yeats in a memorable poem claimed to be “one with 
Davis, Mangan and Ferguson”, and his work was one with theirs.... Even poems 
which were not national poems at all became national and had their revolutionary 
influence, because the whole man and his whole poetry were national in the broad 
sense, and his poetry was fulfilling one of the best tasks of poetry, it was speaking 
out of the people and to the people, filling them with pride and 
determination... re volutions are not made in a week, or a year or ten years. Nor are 
they made by rude and unlettered mobs.. .59
Yeats’s provision of doing good work for Ireland and of aggrandising her standing in the 
world became an essential test of Yeats’patriotism for O’Hegarty. But one not confined to 
accepting the nationalist ideology as the only true path to patriotic endeavour. This can be 
seen in his appreciation of the poet and novelist Emily Lawless. In a review of her life’s 
work O’Hegarty writing under the pseudonym ‘Sarsfield’ stated:
In these books she never gets into sympathy with the people and she is always 
unconsciously perhaps, analysing them with a jaundiced mind, seeing in them no 
virtues, nothing save weaknesses and faults....But when she goes into poetry the 
barrier between her imagination and Ireland, which is evident in all her prose, is 
broken and she has given us things which in their own line are unsurpassed by any 
poet we have.60
58 Mary M. Macken, ‘John O’Leary, W B Yeats, and the Contemporary Club‘, in Studies, 28 March, 1939, 
p,136.
59 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1939.
60 Irish Freedom, March, 1912.
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O’Hegarty was responsive to all traditions on the island and it did not matter if the poet or 
writer in question was of Anglo-Irish stock such as Emily Lawless. What remained 
paramount for O’Hegarty was that a positive contribution was being made by the artist and 
that the poets and writers of Ireland were helping to build the literary standing of Ireland in 
the world. As the above quote suggests O’Hegarty highlights how those such as Emily 
Lawless were perfectly capable of finding a voice that connected with all of Ireland and in 
these endeavours, the Anglo-Irish writers were furthering Ireland’s claim to independence 
through their contribution to the existing intellectual tradition in Ireland.
To discount good Irish literature as un-Irish therefore was tantamount to heresy for 
O’Hegarty and this view was affirmed in his immediate denunciation of Daniel Corkery’s 
Svnge and Anglo Irish Literature (1931) on its publication, as a work which no less revived 
during the 1930s the rigidly nationalistic and sectarian view of Anglo-Irish literature which 
had marked the beginning of the 20th century. Corkery’s publication had even gone as far 
as dismissing the Anglo-Irish writers’ contribution to the European literary tradition as a 
negligible one. Corkery’s view during the 1930s and 1940s was to prove a highly influential 
one as it seemed to establish this opus as a hindrance to the national development that had 
failed to emerge post-independence.
In O’Hegarty’s broad and pluralistic appreciation of literature Corkery’s conclusions about 
the exclusivity of Irish literature as being consistent only within a ‘Catholics and rural 
focus’61 was to provoke a strong reactionary condemnation. O’Hegarty wrote in forceful 
terms that: ‘The theory is wrong headed and damnable. It is carrying bigotry and intolerance 
into literature.. .it is prejudiced and, in the real sense, ignorant.’62
61 P.S. O'Hegarty, Centenary Tribute, article published in the Irish Times, 4 January, 1980.
62 P.S. O'Hegarty, Centenary Tribute article published in the Irish Times, 4 January, 1980.
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In a similar vein, O’Hegarty meted out the same treatment to Aodh de Blacam’s Corkeryite 
A First Book of Irish literature in which he stated, “This business of trying to cramp 
literature within arbitrary limits, at first getting a theory and then cutting up facts to fit it, is 
merely a part of the fanatical narrowness which is poisoning social and international 
relations all over the world.’63
After the achievement of Irish independence in 1921, O’Hegarty, who had retired from 
political agitation became a regular columnist in The Bell and Dublin Magazine, two of the 
most culturally advanced journals of their day. The Bell in particular, which was edited by 
Sean O’Faolain, the noted libertarian critic of independent Ireland was distinguished for its 
informative and topical outlook.
Both publications despite the Free State, later the ‘Irish Republic’s, strict commitment 
against immoral literature were willing to openly criticise the strict censorship that reigned 
supreme in Ireland until the lifting of the Censorship Act in 1967. (There was also a 
Censorship of Films Act in 1923.) These Acts seemed to form the natural culmination of 
O’Hegarty’s warnings proffered in pre-independent Ireland in his series of articles entitled, 
and referred to earlier in this chapter, ‘Art and the Nation.’
As the scholar Terence Brown has conveyed in his chapter entitled ‘Introduction to the 
provincialism and censorship that dominated post-independent Ireland’: ‘Literary activity in 
the Irish Free State and in the Republic of Ireland (established in 1949) was affected by the 
deep social conservatism that marked the newly independent state and by the narrowly 
defined nationalism that was its ideological support.’64
63 Dublin Magazine, January/-March, 1935.
64 Terence Brown, ‘Introduction to the provincialism and censorship that dominated post-independent Ireland’ 
in Seamus Deane (Ed) The Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing, V o l.ll, p.89.
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A prime example of the conservationism and ‘narrowly defined nationalism’ that the Free 
State became noted for was the negative reaction evoked by Sean O’Casey’s65 play, ‘The 
Plough and the Stars’, which opened at the Abbey Theatre in 1926. O’Casey had dared to 
cast doubt on the singular vision of how independence was won and the unquestionable 
patriotism embodied in the Easter Rising and the sacrifice of the men of 1916. O’Casey’s 
characters displayed differing reactions to Pearce’s stirring graveside oration at O’Donovan 
Rossa’s funeral in 1915. Not all the characters were affected by the sterling patriotism 
which it was meant to suggest. Indeed the reaction of the audience at the Abbey Theatre to 
O’Casey’s play prompted the following response from Yeats:
You have disgraced yourselves again. Is this to be an ever-recurring celebration of 
the arrival of Irish genius? Synge first and then O’Casey. Dublin has once more 
rocked the cradle of genius. From such a scene in this theatre went forth the fame of 
Synge. Equally the fame of O’Casey is bom here tonight. This is his apotheosis.66
O’Hegarty too, like Yeats, greatly admired O'Casey’s work. Taken on merit as a contributor 
to the Irish literary canon O’Hegarty considered O’Casey a remarkable playwright who 
deserved to be judged solely on artistic grounds. This was the argument he used in 
defending Yeats’s (later) plays and Synge’s. Indeed O’Hegarty in his defence of such plays 
seemed to be highly respectful of those which were prolific in their ability to question the 
assumptions of audiences. The lack of appreciation of this trait from other cultural 
nationalists for O’Hegarty displayed an ignorance that permeated Ireland when it came to 
great literature. Plays that were reviled without question or reason other than prejudice was 
exactly the situation that O’Hegarty most dreaded as his articles written in Irish Freedom in
65 Quoted in Lady Gregory’s Journals, April 15, 1923: O’Casey said of the Abbey: “All the thought in Ireland 
for years past has come through the Abbey. You have no idea what an education it has been to the country.”
66 Irish Times, 12 February, 1926.
1911 demonstrated. It seemed there was no improvement in tolerance to great works of art. 
Irish independence had not brought with it the broad minded and intellectual audiences 
O’Hegarty wished to see in the Abbey Theatre. O’Hegarty’s overview of O’Casey’s three 
major plays to date written in 1927, is worth quoting at length as it was to contain a deep 
understanding of O’Casey’s objectives for writing plays and the Ireland he wished to convey 
to the audience:
Sean O’Casey, in his plays, is dealing not so much with men and women as with his 
epoch. He had been known for a great many years as a man in the Irish Movement, 
to use a vague but well-understood term; but as a dramatist he came only after 
Ireland had known three terrible and changing things - the Insurrection in 1916, the 
Black-and-Tan War, and the Civil War. And he attempts to show the reactions 
which these three things had upon the common people of the City of Dublin, the 
heart and centre of the whole business....
Mr O’Casey brought in the people who wanted to see plays, who were in the habit of 
going for that purpose to what is miscalled the commercial theatre, and who did not 
particularly want Irish plays.. ..There is no reason why he should not go on, and give 
us in the end, judging by his beginning, a very considerable addition to the world’s 
dramatic literature.67
At the beginning of this review of O’Casey’s work O’Hegarty considered Oscar Wilde and 
George Bernard Shaw ‘Irishmen both’, as the first to liberate drama from its ‘rigid rules of 
construction’, that it need not be propagandist or ‘fixed and immutable in its form....It can 
be a discussion, a tract, a morality, anything; it can just tell a story.’68 O’Hegarty’s far- 
reaching ability to consider the artist as an important medium through which any number of 
meanings could be interpreted, or even as a social critic representing the position that no 
artist should feel compelled to delimit their work toward representing an ideal, in this case, 
of the acceptable Catholics and nationalistic norms of independent Ireland was an
67 Reprinted in Ronald Ayling, Sean O ’Casey: Modem Judgements, (1969), pp.60-67.
68 Reprinted in Ronald Ayling, Sean O ’Casey: Modem Judgements, (1969), pp.60-67.
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especially rare and intellectual position to adopt. This ability to appreciate art in its objective 
form was commented upon by Cian O’Hegarty in a centenary tribute to his grandfather P.S.:
His great virtue was the originality and self-reliance of his judgement. Nobody had 
ever taught him what he should think about literature; he came fresh to what he read, 
judged it in relation to his own rich experience of life, and because he had a shrewd 
eye and broad sympathies, his judgements have stood the test of time.69
Perhaps the nadir of the literary controversy for O’Hegarty was the attitude adopted toward 
James Joyce’s masterwork Ulysses. O’Hegarty was to hail Joyce’s work an instant 
masterpiece in defiance of the literary authorities in Ireland’s denouncement of it as 
immoral literature. It must have been particularly galling for a lover of great literature and 
avid collector of books such as O’Hegarty to witness how Joyce, due to the controversial 
content of Ulvsses felt unable to attend a literary conference in Dublin for fear of 
assassination.
O’Hegarty was willing to take a brave stand during the 1930s in holding copies of the book 
in his capacity as a bookseller. O’Hegarty’s friendly correspondences with Quentin Keynes 
the American publisher during the 1930s were vividly indicative of O’Hegarty’s passion for 
the free dissemination of literature with O’Hegarty providing Keynes with copies of 
Ulvsses. (It was banned in America until the 1950s.)70
O’Hegarty could never conform to the narrow views of his fellow cultural nationalists and 
dismiss literature that did not kowtow to the Irish cultural ‘type’ as un-hish. O’Hegarty was 
iconoclastic in refusing to accept nationalist orthodoxies.
69 Centenary Tribute to P.S. O’Hegarty, by Cian O’Hegarty, published in the Irish Times, 4 January, 1980.
70 There is a letter addressed to O’Hegarty from Keynes thanking him for the copies of Ulysses O’Hegarty 
supplied. This letter is contained in the uncatalogued section of the P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection at the Spencer 
Library, Kansas University.
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As a testimony to this in an obituary of O’Hegarty in The Irish Book Lover. July, 1956, for 
which O’Hegarty was a frequent contributor ‘Colm’ was moved to write:
His first and greatest passion was books about Ireland, and books by Irish authors, 
both in Gaelic and in English. No man I ever met knew so much, and his orderly 
trained mind could sort out the facts and marshal them in a lucid and interesting way.
He read French easily and spoke it with fair fluency, so it was natural he should 
collect illustrated editions of French classics, Shakespeare’s early editions interested 
him, and he had many Spenser rarities also.
The English language had provided an outlet for some of the most accomplished Irish 
writers who in turn had helped put Ireland on the literary map. O’Hegarty’s deep 
appreciation of literature as a positive force transcended the puritanical attitude of many of 
his contemporaries and those who believed only writing in Irish was acceptable and that 
Anglo-Irish writers must conform to Ireland’s nationalist aspirations as delineated by them. 
In this respect he was ahead of his time. It would be fitting to quote his epithet in Irish 
Freedom 1914: ‘it takes all sorts to make a nation, the literary sort as well as the political 
sort...’71
It remained a shame that O’Hegarty did not live to see the lifting of the Literature 
Censorship Act in 1967, but O’Hegarty would have considered it more of a cultural travesty 
that it was enacted in the first place. He was to write:
It is not the fact that those Irishmen who have written English literature have written 
stuff which is distinct, with qualities which English literature as a whole has not got? 
While Englishmen who have lived here have imbibed something which changed and 
strengthened them. There is an Irish soil, and Irish climate, and an Irish atmosphere, 
which are a potent moulder, not alone of men’s bodies, but of their minds.72
71 Irish Freedom, February, 1914.
72 Dublin Magazine, January-March, 1932.
As with the role of the Catholics Church in Irish politics O’Hegarty sought a separation of 
the two spheres, in this case, of the political from the artistic. O’Hegarty was to envisage a 
situation where the Gaelic League and the Abbey Theatre could work together and form a 
modem Irish literary tradition. What marked O’Hegarty’s views as liberal and pluralistic 
and ahead of their time was his interest in the artists, work as measured by artistic standards 
rather than the political connotations ascribed to the Anglo-Irish literary revival by many of 
his fellow cultural nationalists.
Ultimately O’Hegarty was a brave individual who was genuinely dedicated to his vision of a 
pluralist Ireland.
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CHAPTER IV
THE VICTORY OF SINN FEIN
Sinn Fein, in its pre-1916 days, was a simple, straight-forward, and essentially moral 
movement. It was a movement composed, in the main, of people with high ideals, 
who worked very hard in it and neither received nor expected anything in return. It 
was ascetic and clean, and its personnel corresponded to its ideals. Its material was 
good, and its influence was all good.. ..When it swept the country, it swept into itself 
a great deal of bad material, drunkards and crooks and morally unsuitable people of 
all sorts. These people percolated it, and affected even though they did not control it. 
They had a bad effect upon it, and through it upon the people as a whole: and, that 
lowering of its morale was contributed also by the failure of the civil side of the 
movement to exercise control over the military side. The Victory of Sinn Fein: how 
it won it and how it used it (Dublin, 1924), p.54.
The above quotation from the Victory of Sinn Fein. O’Hegarty’s eyewitness account of 
the rise of the Sinn Fein movement from the 1916 Easter Rising to the end of the Irish 
Civil War in 1922, summarises O’Hegarty’s belief that Sinn Fein experienced two 
defining epochs during its two decades of existence. This chapter is therefore structured 
into, how, in O’Hegarty’s view, the period between 1902 and 1916 was the most 
productive for Sinn Fein as the policies of self reliance and cultural and economic 
regeneration for Ireland were put to the Irish people with an energy and patriotism that 
confirmed the movement as separatist in principle. This period is examined through 
O’Hegarty’s reading of the Sinn Fein movement up until the Easter Rising with examples 
demonstrating why he felt this way.
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The second epoch O’Hegarty identifies with the Sinn Fein movement will form the 
majority of this chapter and focusing on an event which challenges the above view of 
O’Hegarty in his disagreement with Arthur Griffith over the possibility of Sinn Fein 
becoming a more mainstream movement in joining with William O’Brien’s All for 
Ireland movement. It will also deal with the 1918 election victory of Sinn Fein, where it 
was transformed from a broadly based movement, into adopting firstly the characteristics 
of a political party despite the setting up of an Irish parliament (an Dail) in opposition to 
the Westminster parliament; and secondly an autonomous military wing which became 
the active force in opposition to the British military authorities in the war of 
independence. This second part of the chapter includes reference to O’Hegarty’s 
knowledge and disagreement with the need for a Rising as well as his younger brother 
Sean, who did not take place in the Rising (as he was meant to) but was to become a 
fierce military commander of the West Cork Brigade during the Anglo/Irish War, and is 
included here to highlight how the mix of constitutionalism and physical force following 
the 1916 Easter Rising and the 1917 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis which elected de Valera as the 
new Sinn Fein president, proved incapable, in O’Hegarty’s view, of securing a lid on the 
use of violent methods after the Rising.
From its beginnings in 1902, the Sinn Fein movement reflected the constitutional policy 
foi gaining Irish independence of its founder and president Arthur Griffith. Yet it 
appealed to O’Hegarty’s Fenian principles as its stated aim was the securing of Irish 
independence. Therefore Sinn Fein also represented the separatist objectives of the IRB or 
Feiian tradition, as O’Hegarty believed that at the heart of every separatist movement the 
spirit of the IRB laid at its core. Writing in the pages of the IRB sponsored paper The 
Republic in 1907, O’Hegarty declared that ‘Sinn Fein took its place in the separatist
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canon as part of an unbroken line of separatist continuity dating from 1798 to the 
present...’ and in relation to the IRB, the GAA and the Gaelic League in which the 
separatist spirit was perpetuated, that: ‘...The Sinn Fein party is that portion of the 
movement which inherits the spirit of the men of ’98, ’48 and 67.” O’Hegarty contended 
that the Sinn Fein movement during Arthur Griffith’s presidency until 1917 developed a 
‘revolutionary aim sought through an evolutionary method’. The revolutionary aim was to 
foster the separation of Ireland from England, and the evolutionary aspect enshrined in 
Griffith’s ‘Hungarian policy’, later re-named the ‘Sinn Fein policy’. The policy advocated 
a system of peaceful non-co-operation with the British Government, whereby the Irish 
people through withdrawing their compliance would disable the British authority’s ability 
to run the country effectively. The Sinn Fein policy aimed at rendering the country 
ungovernable in the traditional way it had been since the 1801 Act of Union. It also 
advocated abstentionism (see below), which Sinn Fein on being elected as the major party 
in 1918 put into practice. This involved the setting up of a de facto Irish government ‘an 
Dail’ to which the elected Sinn Fein candidates ministers attended as an ‘underground’ 
authority thus depriving Westminster of the majority of Irish MPs and its legitimate 
authority.
O’Hegarty believed the issue of abstention offered the Irish people a stark choice as the 
policy refused to recognise the legitimacy of the British Government to rule in Ireland 
through its pledging not to send any of Sinn Fein’s elected members to the House of 
Commons. It was not debate at Westminster that would settle the Irish question but action 
taken by the Irish people themselves. Writing in An Saoghal Gaedhealach. one month 
prior to the Irish elections, in 1918, through which Sinn Fein won its historic victory,
1 The Republic, March 7, 1907.
O’Hegarty emphasised how the Irish people had a stark choice of opting for the old 
parliamentarian methods of the now discredited Irish party who had increasingly become 
isolated following their policies on conscription and 1916, or the radical Sinn Fein 
movement who stood for ’ourselves alone’ which looked to the Irish nation itself, its 
language and culture and which the future of the spiritual Irish nation depended. It was 
whether:
...she will continue to recognise English authority in Ireland by continuing to send 
representatives to the Parliament under whose authority England governs Ireland, or 
whether she will withdraw her representatives from that Parliament and take her 
stand upon her own right to govern herself; whether she will herself lay down her 
freedom or allow England to delimit them. But the real question at issue goes much 
deeper than that, and at bottom it is a question of tradition, of whose tradition 
Ireland is to follow, the old Irish tradition, or the Anglo-Irish tradition.
The Irish parliamentary party, with its dependence upon England, represents the 
Anglo-Irish tradition, while Sinn Fein with its dependence upon Ireland, represents 
the old Irish tradition. The one is strongly influenced by the Irish language, Ireland’s 
link with her historic past, the other is purely English speaking and English 
thinking.2
Another feature of the Sinn Fein policy that appealed to O’Hegarty was its stress on the 
de-Anglicisation of Ireland through the teaching of Irish history, literature, and its unique 
language, music and art, as described in Chapter Two. In this respect, Sinn Fein stood for 
and made a positive contribution to Irish culture. This facet of Sinn Fein, as discussed in 
previous chapters, had their limitations, but in O’Hegarty’s view, they contributed to the 
constructive programme of establishing Ireland’s separation from England. The support 
of Irish Ireland’s cultural wing was a significant contribution to O’Hegarty’s view of Sinn 
Fein as a movement consisting of all the traditions and cultures in Ireland rather than a
2 An Saoghal Gaedhealach, November 30, 1918.
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political party representing the narrower interests of social class, political affiliation or 
religious creed.
Sinn Fein during its first epoch covered a broad remit for the rejuvenation of Ireland 
while asserting Ireland’s claim as a nation. In advocating Griffith’s ‘1782’ dual monarchy 
policy, it achieved a workable compromise and a united nationalist/separatist front, 
attracting both moderate and extremist nationalists alike into its ranks. It was highly 
successful in this enterprise as a majority of clubs and societies who professed to share 
the basic principles of achieving Irish independence agreed to unite in 1907 under the 
umbrella organisation, Cumann na Gaedheal. O’Hegarty as a physical force separatist 
represented the more extremist elements within this alliance but, nonetheless, welcomed 
Sinn Fein’s broad alliance, which permitted all shades of nationalist opinion a forum for 
free debate and counsel.
O’Hegarty believed that the Sinn Fein members, who had been involved in the movement 
from its inception, possessed a real understanding of the guiding principles of the 
movement: the core principles being, self-reliance and the resurgence of Ireland’s culture 
and economy. The original members were also committed to advancing Ireland’s national 
independence by cultivating a fraternal spirit among all Irish men. The following passage 
written by O’Hegarty firmly asserted this view in a tone, construed as O’Hegarty 
distancing himself and Griffith from the ‘new’ Sinn Fein he saw emerging, post 1917:
I had better say, first, why I regard myself as a contemporary whose opinion it is 
worthwhile setting down -  why I think that that opinion will be of interest to that 
unborn generation to whom this book is dedicated. I belong to that small minority of 
people who founded the modem separatist movement, and fostered it, and educated 
it, and slaved for it, and beggared themselves for it.... The Sinn Fein movement was 
essentially a constructive, educational, intellectual movement. Its philosophy was the 
philosophy of Thomas Davis. Its sustaining force was love for Ireland and desire to
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serve her. Its ideals were pure, and its workers were utterly unselfish and utterly 
unpaid.3
Major components of this alliance were the Dungannon Clubs of which O’Hegarty was 
secretary in London. Even though the clubs, which ran form 1905 until the outbreak of 
the Great War and were also located in Dublin, and Belfast, were IRB funded, and 
members such as O’Hegarty were pro-physical force, they still attracted a wide 
membership, most notably Robert Lynd the celebrated essayist who was pro Irish 
independence but repulsed by the use of physical force in order to realise this aim. The 
reason why moderates and extremists alike could work together and campaign for Irish 
independence was that the three most prominent IRB members, Tom Clarke, Sean 
MacDermott, Bulmer Hobson, Denis McCullogh and P.S.O’Hegarty, while physical force 
men, were cognisant that the prospect of a military victory over the British was an 
unrealistic prospect at the present time. Furthermore, the Dungannon Clubs agreed to 
accept on principle Griffith’s 1782 constitution as a morally justifiable alternative to 
parliamentarianism or physical force for asserting Ireland’s independence. This being 
illustrated in the recording of the minutes of the Dungannon Clubs first meeting in 
Belfast, taken by Bulmer Hobson (and written down in his notebook), specifying the 
clubs’ object as synonymous with the core of the Sinn Fein programme, i.e. ‘to restore the 
constitution of 1782.’ Additionally, the Dungannon Clubs promoted the Irish language 
and culture and encouraged Irish industry in the same language as Griffith. Another 
common theme that bound the different elements within the Dungannon Clubs was
3 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.163.
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stipulated in its creed: ‘That the membership of the club be open to Irishmen of every 
creed or class as we believe that the interests of every creed, class or party are involved.’4 
Recognising that the IRB policy of physical force was not the will of the majority of the 
Irish people and in the interests of maintaining a united front, the IRB agreed to put 
physical force on hold until the opportunity arose where it would prove the decisive 
policy to adopt. Richard P. Davis in his biography of Arthur Griffith captured this view of 
physical force in his terming of this period as the years of ‘non-violent Sinn Fein’5 as 
opposed to the later militarisation of the movement, following the 1916 Easter Rising. 
However, the IRB having reorganised under the influence of Hobson, McCullogh and 
O’Hegarty, in 1907, still maintained that at some point in the future, physical force would 
be needed to oust the English Government from Ireland. In this respect it might appear a 
paradoxical situation for O’Hegarty’s liberal pluralist nationalism to co-exist alongside 
his support for the use of physical force as a required weapon in the hands of nationalists, 
even when legitimised through the will of the Irish people. O’Hegarty’s identification 
with physical force seems to sit uneasily with his pluralist nationalism as the latter is 
normally associated with the support of constitutionalism as the legitimising principle, 
and most effective method, for engendering political change within the existing political 
system. However, a major cause for the rejuvenation of the IRB and the creation of Sinn 
Fein, in the first decade of the twentieth century, had been in response to the continued 
impotency of the Irish Party’s campaign as a permanent minority within the British two 
party system. For O’Hegarty, the Fenian movement had long recognised that it was futile 
to campaign for the enactment of Irish nationalist demands, despite these demands falling
4 Bulmer Hobson Papers, National Library of Ireland, 13/162-1371.
5 Richard P. Davis, Arthur Griffith (Anvil Books, 1974), p.4.
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far short of Irish national independence, as this undermined the legitimacy of the political 
system and the foundation upon which its authority in Ireland derived. The legitimacy 
behind the use of physical force therefore, originated from the flawed and ineffective 
deployment of strictly constitutional means.
Given the scom upon which parliamentarianism was held amongst separatist circles, the 
alternative policy of invoking a united and determined physical force effort against the 
English forces in Ireland was postulated as an effective means of ensuring that the focus 
of attention was drawn toward Ireland rather than the debating chamber of Westminster. 
For the IRB, the United Irishmen rebellion of 1798 had demonstrated the spiritual effect 
that an uprising in the name of the Irish people could engender, in that, the notion of 
physical force entered the canon of nationalist means of resistance to colonial rule. 
Subsequent uprisings in 1803, 1848, 1867 and 1916 were carried out by fringe elements 
in the nationalist movement and physical force, even when carried out by a small 
secretive cabal within the IRB in the name of the people and with little chance of success, 
was held as a means of awakening the Irish people from their parliamentarian slumber, 
and believed to be saving ‘Ireland’s soul’.6 In supporting physical force whether as a 
gesture or as an uprising on a national scale (which for O’Hegarty was the preferred 
manifestation of the right to use physical force), the moral high ground was retained by 
the nationalist rebels through their right to revolt against the enforced captivity of their 
nation. The moral aspect was very important to O’Hegarty’s definition of the right to use 
physical force and in maintaining its relevancy to the gaining of Irish independence. As he 
related in A History of Ireland under the Union and in a series of articles for the Republic
6 P.S. O'Hegarty, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.453.
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in 1907, the central doctrine to which the policy of physical force was founded emanated 
from the agrarian radical, James Fintan Lalor’s ’moral insurrection.’7 
O’Hegarty’s backing of Sinn Fein was recognition of a long term commitment to gaining 
Ireland’s independence without giving up on the IRB principle of physical force to which 
he was strongly committed. He could also take faith in the fact that the leader of Sinn 
Fein, Arthur Griffith was not anti-physical force in principle,8 seeing the Irish Volunteers 
in 1913 as invoking the disciplined physical and mental toughness of the nation’s citizens 
who were proud to make the necessary sacrifices for their country.
As a committed Fenian, physical force was central to O’Hegarty’s world view despite its 
impracticality at the present time:
...and while in conversation Parliamentarians generally admitted that the 
Parliamentarian policy was a compromise and indefensible as such, they vigorously 
defended it on the ground that it was the only alternative to insurrection, which was 
impracticable: and Separatists, while maintaining that insurrection was the natural 
and inevitable culmination of any national policy, and that all plans and preparations 
should have it in view as the ultimate plan, yet could not well contest the argument 
that in the then state of the country insurrection was impracticable.9
For O’Hegarty the constitutionalism of Sinn Fein was a radically different policy to that 
of the ‘compromising’, ‘indefensible’ policy of the Irish Party. The Irish Party was 
corrupting the Irish nation into believing their best interests lay at Westminster rather than 
in their own government in Ireland. The Irish Party therefore was indirectly responsible 
for the cultural and economic damage that the historic Irish nation had endured.
In attending parliamentary sessions at Westminster the Irish Party downgraded the Irish 
people to a mere secondary political concern of the British Government. Furthermore
7 P.S. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), pp.360-6.
8 Virginia Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced Nationalist Press (New York, 1985), p.83.
9 P.S. O'Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.17.
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parliamentarianism engrained the colonial mentality increasing Ireland’s reliance on 
England and ran contrary to Irish self-sufficiency as preached by Sinn Fein. Moreover in 
the House of Commons the Irish Party were in a permanent minority compared with the 
English Whig and Unionist parties. Even when the Irish Party briefly held the balance of 
power as in 1912, they were subject to the vagaries of the Liberal Party who, despite their 
reputation as being favourable toward Irish Home Rule, did not elevate Home Rule above 
their particular party interests. Therefore, O’Hegarty concluded, from its infancy 
‘parliamentarianism was dishonourable, as well as being ineffective’10 
O’Hegarty associated ineffectiveness with the Irish Party and that only the ‘Sinn Fein 
policy’, would ensure that the Anglicised conception of Ireland as being a constitutional 
part of the United Kingdom, as stipulated under the 1801 Act of Union, would become an 
unlawful assumption. In effect, that Sinn Fein’s ‘idealism’ would remain unsullied by the 
seductions of status and power which O’Hegarty believed to feature as a major motivation 
for Irish Party MPs in justifying and retaining their presence at Westminster.
O’Hegarty could further justify his support of Sinn Fein on the fact that the IRB as a 
whole, were willing to lend their support to Griffith and his Dual Monarchy policy:
...the IRB never quarrelled with Griffith, but always worked with him and 
recognised him for what he was, the greatest separatist force in the country. As a 
matter of fact, Nationality, which was established during the war and edited by 
Griffith, was financed by the IRB.11
Denis McCullough, the veteran IRB man amongst the new generation and co-founder of 
the Dungannon clubs with Bulmer Hobson, agreed with O’Hegarty’s conviction that the 
IRB held Griffith in high regard:
10 An Saogal Gaedhealach, November 3,1918.
11 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 134.
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...the IRB had the utmost confidence in Griffith and his strong nationalism, his 
courage and his integrity. He was a member of the organisation, shared our 
sentiments, and...regarded himself as travelling the same road only suggesting that 
“passive resistance” to British rule offered better chances of success than an armed 
rising...no question of incompatibility between Griffith’s Hungarian Policy and 
the frank Republicanism of the IRB ever existed.. .the IRB trusted in Griffith’s 
bona-fides [sic] as a separatist, and any difference could only have arisen, if there 
was any difference, over some personal or temporary issue....the IRB in my time 
was not wedded or pledged to action in arms only. It was prepared to back and 
support any man 'or movement that had separation from England as its final 
objective. I think it could be truly said that that was Griffith’s final objective.12
O’Hegarty, then a member of the IRB Supreme Council before his deportation in 1914, 
contributed to the United Irishman, the Sinn Fein weekly, edited by Griffith. Similarly his 
articles in The Republic from 1907, funded by the IRB, frequently contained litanies 
denoting how Sinn Fein’s credentials were steeped in the separatist tradition. A series of 
these articles entitled ‘Fenianism in practice: An Irish Ireland philosophy’ (quoted in 
previous chapters), demonstrated how Fenianism underpinned Sinn Fein guidelines. The 
importance of these articles was emphasised by Hobson in his memoir Ireland: Yesterday 
and Tomorrow, as they helped establish a bridgehead between exponents of the Fenian 
‘physical force’ tradition and the moderates of Griffith’s camp: ‘P.S. O’Hegarty wrote a 
series of articles called “Fenianism in Practice” which was a definite and important 
contribution to the philosophy of the Sinn Fein movement.’13 O’Hegarty justified the 
partnership between Fenianism and Sinn Fein by emphasising their common goal of Irish 
independence.14
It was crucial for O’Hegarty to emphasise the working relationship between Sinn Fein 
and the IRB and the IRB’s policy toward physical force in the period following the Easter
12 Sheridan Gilley, in D.G. Boyce, (Ed), The Revolution in Ireland 1879-1923 (London, 1988), p.39.
13 Bulmer Hobson, Ireland: Yesterday and Tomorrow (Belfast, 1968), p.37.
14 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f  Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.90.
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Rising in 1916 to show that the support of physical force in principle did not mean that it 
should be adopted as the main policy as demonstrated through the Anglo-Irish War.15 
Similarly, the distinctions he made between the Irish Party and Sinn Fein were significant 
in the pre-1916 period and following the rapid growth of Sinn Fein during 1917 and the 
Sinn Fein election victory in 1918, when Sinn Fein began to imitate and take on many of 
the characteristics associated with the Irish Party.16
The British Government’s decision to execute the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising acted 
as the stimulus for the change, which occurred in Sinn Fein policy. This reaction and the 
mistaken assumption of the British Government and presses to attribute the Rising as the 
work of Sinn Fein resulted in nationalist Ireland adopting an empathy with the Sinn Fein 
movement.17 O’Hegarty stressed how the Rising was part of a deliberate policy, organised 
and arranged by a secret cabal within the IRB Supreme Council and had been decided 
upon from 1914.18 The swelling of support for Sinn Fein that stemmed from the English 
Government’s military reaction to it as a movement directing much of the civil unrest and
potential for violence that this period marked was further increased during Sinn Fein’s
1917 Ard Fheis. As the scholar Charles Townsend asserts 1917 marked a watershed in 
Sinn Fein’s history as it was to successfully establish itself into a coherent political 
movement, with its military and constitutional sides for the first time working together.’19 
Both events however held ominous consequences for O’Hegarty’s view of the Sinn Fein 
movement. For O’Hegarty these events resulted in a rupture of the Sinn Fein ethos, whose 
original policies were lost amid its expanding membership and the equally growing
15 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1919), p.54.
16 Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation (Dublin, 1999), p. 179.
17 Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation (Dublin, 1999), p. 179.
18 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.15.
19 Charles Townshend, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (London, 1999), p.89.
millitarism that followed the 1916 Rising and the Ard Fheis meeting which resulted in the 
electing of a new Sinn Fein President, Eamonn de Valera.20 O’Hegarty believed that from 
this point onwards there was a lessening of Sinn Fein’s moral rectitude as its standing as a 
movement rather than a party, answerable to the entire population of Ireland, became 
sidelined as the concerns of Sinn Fein’s politicised members grew.21 This for 0 ‘Hegarty 
ensured that Sinn Fein transformed into a politically dogmatic and narrowly focused unit 
as It acquired the status of a mass movement.22
O’Hegarty described how the Sinn Fein election victory of 1918 was met with amazement 
by himself, Griffith and the other early members of Sinn Fein:
To those of us who had been in Sinn Fein from the beginning, it was difficult to 
realise that the election of 1918 was not a dream. It went beyond the wildest dreams 
even the most sanguine of us had ever had. We knew what we were up against, and 
we had no illusions as to the magnitude of the task we had set our hands to...But 
that in our lifetime we would see the whole of Ireland committed -  even the 
businessmen and the strong farmers and the clerics -  committed to the policy of Sinn 
Fein on a separatist basis was never seriously entertained by anybody. [I know that 
there are some now that will tell you that they always expected it, but I know also 
that they are liars: they did not]. Griffith, I know, never expected it.23
O’Hegarty considered the bulk of the ‘new Sinn Feiners’ who flooded into the movement 
during this period as morally deficient in political principles and character, in as much as 
he considered them political opportunists and therefore very far removed from the 
original principled Sinn Fein members who formed its membership during its first decade 
of existence.24
20 This was in place of Griffith who withdrew his nomination. See The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924),
p.20.
21 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), p.54.
22 Sinn Fein capitalised on the abolishment of the property vote for the full democratic franchise winning a 
majority of seats in the General Election of 1918.
23 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.30.
24 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), p.28-29.
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To O’Hegarty’s chagrin, the new Sinn Feiners were individuals hungry for power and 
patronage who had discovered that their political survival depended on their affiliation 
and alignment with Sinn Fein. This was despite a less than knowledgeable grounding in 
Sinn Fein principles. For O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein had never stood for the popularising 
motifs of short term goals. The long term goal of establishing the ‘republic’ was to 
become devoid of its true meaning for O’Hegarty and replaced by a more populist short 
term version which was effectively marketed by Sinn Fein’s new members. In so much as 
the adhesion to principle was concerned, Sinn Fein had become more akin to a political 
party willing to adapt its principles and manifesto to suit the turning tide of popular 
opinion.25 This was the reasoning behind O’Hegarty’s following important observation 
after the 1918 election when Sinn Fein was at the height of its powers and standing 
amongst the majority of the Irish people:
Father O’Flanagan made at the time a remark, in an after victory speech, which 
deserves to be recorded, it was so wise and profound and so utterly lost in the 
emotional enthusiasm of the time. “The people,” said he, “have voted Sinn Fein, 
What we have to do now is to explain to them what Sinn Fein is.26
Retrospectively, in The Victory of Sinn Fein. O’Hegarty lamented that this valuable 
advice went unheeded, and concluded that: ‘It was what we did not do’.27 
Gathering his thoughts of the period 1916-1919 and the future implications for the Sinn 
Fein movement O’Hegarty published a tract entitled Sinn Fein: An Illumination (1919). 
While it was not an embittered and disillusioned verdict of the new Sinn Fein, a view that 
predominated in the Victory of Sinn Fein’.28 it featured major criticisms of Sinn Fein and
25 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), p.29.
26 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), pp.31-32.
27 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), pp.31-32.
28 This book outlined P.S. O’Hegarty’s mainly negative critique of the years following 1916 to the Treaty split.
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the significant changes in personnel and principles it was undergoing. Highly didactic in 
tone, Sinn Fein: An Illumination stressed the original position of Sinn Fein in the light of 
its greatly increased popularity. Moreover, it was written to inform Sinn Fein’s new 
membership that they were now responsible to all the people of Ireland and must act at all 
times with this in mind, due to the electoral mandate they had been given in place of the 
Irish Party. Throughout, O’Hegarty stressed that Sinn Fein had always stood for the 
‘evolutionary pathway’ of abstentionism and the moral force of a nation’s people to, in 
the new rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, self-determination, rather than the 
growing militaristic and revolutionary ideal which had taken control of Sinn Fein. 
Consequently, Sinn Fein: An Illumination, was an intellectual appeal to rediscover the 
original broadmindedness of Sinn Fein in the light of its increasingly narrow and 
belligerent programme. However, this proved a vain attempt, hence the later 
disillusionment typical of, and intrinsic to, the tone of The Victory of Sinn Fein, his 
eponymous polemic written in 1924.
Despite the didactic tone of Sinn Fein: An Illumination, this should not detract from the 
argument as equipping the reader with the means to understand the period and the process 
of change that was so critical to Sinn Fein’s fortunes. At the time of writing Sinn Fein: 
An Illumination. O’Hegarty still believed that Sinn Fein was not beyond salvation and 
could be steered back toward its original mandate that of a peaceful movement capable of 
gradually taking over political power in Ireland based upon its policies of abstentionism 
and non-cooperation with the British Government and its colonial hegemony in Ireland. 
For O’Hegarty, in witnessing the shedding of the ‘1782’ idea and Sinn Fein’s adoption of 
the characteristics associated with political parties, amounted to a slur on the name of
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Sinn Fein. In a review of Sinn Fein: An Illumination, that described O’Hegarty as ‘A 
Candid Friend of Sinn Fein’, ‘E.A.B’ commented:
When a movement attains the dimensions of a nationwide ideal, it usually does so at 
the cost of the original purity of the ideas of its originators. Sinn Fein has been no 
exception to this inevitable process of accretion and dilution, corresponding to the 
varying beliefs and purposes of the ever-increasing volume of its adherents. It is, 
therefore most fortunate that, at the moment of Sinn Fein triumph, a volume should 
be published for the sole purpose of clearly establishing the identity of Sinn Fein.
We have all watched the growth of the Sinn Fein legend, whereby an essentially 
unmilitary organisation received the credit for the armed revolt of 1916. We have 
also heard the innumerable theories of policy and government which have come to 
be accepted as the Sinn Fein political programme, according as they appealed to the 
various classes of Irishmen who have accepted the Sinn Fein idea. Mr. O’Hegarty’s 
task is to bring order into this chaos of ideas.
It is the most valuable service of this volume that it clearly establishes the existence 
of Sinn Fein as a national movement, rather than a political organisation.
This was a major development in the fortunes of Sinn Fein as former parliamentarians in 
a desperate move to recapture their political careers now pledged themselves to Sinn Fein. 
Some discussion therefore concerning the evolutionary path that O’Hegarty underwent 
from his writing of Sinn Fein: An Illumination to The Victory of Sinn Fein is perhaps, apt 
at this stage as it charts the intellectual development O’Hegarty underwent from before 
the outbreak of the Anglo/Irish War to the period following the Irish Civil War and the 
surrender of the ‘republican’ anti-Treatyites. As described Sinn Fein: An Illumination was 
O’Hegarty’s call for a period of reflection on what the Sinn Fein policy had achieved in 
terms of electoral success and it shared with The Victory of Sinn Fein a need to get back 
to the basic ideas which separatism stood for and were contained in the Sinn Fein policy. 
Implicitly, if there were to be modification of the original Sinn Fein programme then it
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was to frame ‘a public policy which should preserve principles and yet be a workable 
alternative to the Parliamentarian policy.’29
It marks Sinn Fein’s transition from minority status to its sudden thrust into the political 
limelight as the representatives of the will of the majority of the Irish people. O’Hegarty 
elaborated that a nationalist movement could only be judged on its effectiveness, hence 
his view of the Irish Party, but equally the principle applied to Sinn Fein.30 
In contrast, the new Sinn Feiners possessed no real knowledge of Sinn Fein and therefore 
had no right to alter its original aspirations and aims. It was the beginning of Sinn Fein 
shamefully sacrificing its long history of morality for short-term political gains.
For O’Hegarty not only was it a pollution of Sinn Fein but a pollution of separatist 
nationalism. Sinn Fein was now involved with ‘electioneering’ and a re-writing of its 
objectives. A new variety of theories claiming to outline the real purpose of Sinn Fein 
was propounded by its new members who for O’Hegarty contained ‘no tradition and no 
philosophy and no experience. They have no conception of the hard work it all involved. 
They knew nothing of the movement until it had become the popular movement, until 
everybody supported it, even the Pulpit and the Press.’31
A distrust of the political process had been commonplace throughout O’Hegarty’s reading 
of the Parliamentary Party and their role in Irish society. What was to occur after 1917 in 
Sinn Fein mirrored the Parliamentary Party’s history in that:
...placemen from Home Rule days and youngsters without influence before 1916 
combined to seek benefits for themselves according to the old attractive quid pro
29 P.S. O’Hegarty: Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p. 18.
30 P.S. O’Hegarty: Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.18.
31 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.165.
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quo -  the chance to win local influence in exchange for vague declarations of fidelity 
to the ‘national cause.32
Consequently, much of the patronage and thirst for power that O’Hegarty saw as typical
of Westminster was merely replicated within Ireland and contradicted his belief of Sinn
Fein as a movement unmoved by material gains. O’Hegarty’s reading of Sinn Fein’s
nationalist project was that it was a spiritual force rather than a material concern.33
However, what O’Hegarty neglected to comment on was that once Sinn Fein had won
majority support, electioneering became necessary in order to gain what was essentially a
political goal, the independence of Ireland. It was vital to recruit and retain new members
to capitalise on the Parliamentary Party’s lack of support in the country. This was
accomplished on the issues that the Irish Party were thought to have failed on, the Easter
Rising, partition and conscription as well as their failure to secure a measure of Home
Rule. Regarding conscription, although fought against by the Irish Party it benefited Sinn
Fein as their propaganda highlighted the Irish Party’s previous support of Irish
recruitment. In reaction to the events occurring post 1916, O’Hegarty believed that
Griffith had given in to too easily to the new Sinn Feiners’ demands for a new
constitution attuned to reflect its revolutionary ethos. Reflecting on this observation,
several decades later in A History of Ireland under the Union. O’Hegarty concluded:
Most of the old leaders would have been content to go on with the old constitution, a 
constitution which was an ideal instrument for the purpose for which it had been 
framed, and which now had a unique opportunity of putting into practice the Sinn 
Fein policy in the only way it could be effectively put into practice, with the support 
of the Irish people behind it.. ..But the new Sinn Feiners would have none of it.. ,34
32 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Lifel913-192:provincial experience of war and revolution (Cork, 
1998), p.283.
33 Republic, March, 1907.
34 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.715.
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Once again, the change in the Sinn Fein constitution was to have serious repercussions for 
the movement. As O’Hegarty relates:
This change was a significant and far-reaching one. The old Sinn Fein aim was “the 
re-establishment of the Independence of Ireland,” and between it and “an 
Independent Irish Republic” there was no difference...the purpose of the Sinn Fein 
Movement, up to 1917, had been to concentrate on independence, and, apart from 
that, not to commit the movement in advance to anything which was a question for 
internal discussion...in the meantime Sinn Fein would not seek support from any 
person, by taking a stand, however popular, upon a matter which was a matter for 
internal settlement.35.
For O’Hegarty, Griffith embodied the cause of Sinn Fein. He frequently spoke of Griffith 
in the following light, as ‘the biggest man we have...and on the constructive side the 
movement would be nowhere without him’.36
Yet in the current revolutionary climate post 1916 figures such as O’Hegarty and Griffith, 
partly because they were not ’out’ in 1916, were viewed as unreflective of the new 
revolutionary breed. There remained a respectful and deferential attitude toward the older 
generation, but it became a facade as the new revolutionary ‘Sinn Feiners’ steered the 
movement further from the founding members’ original objectives.
O’Hegarty was deeply concerned with the erosion of Griffith’s standing within the Sinn 
Fein movement. Griffith was removed from the leadership and replaced by de Valera. 
Consequently, O’Hegarty concluded, along with the departure of Griffith’s constructive 
leadership, the principles and discipline characteristic of early Sinn Fein also receded into 
the background.
35 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union, (London, 1952), p.715-716.
36 Sean O’Luing, quoting P.S. O’Hegarty in F.X. Martin, (Ed.), Leaders and Men o f the Easter Rising 
(Methuen Co. Ltd., 1967), p.59.
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Griffith’s presidential leadership and his characteristic ‘cool-headedness’, therefore, 
became one of the first casualties in the clamour to capitalise on the glamour of being 
associated with the 1916 Easter Rising. Diarmuid Lynch, T.D for South East Cork and a 
future deputy speaker in the Dail, supported O’Hegarty’s assertion that Griffith no longer 
commanded the civil wing of Sinn Fein. This for O’Hegarty marked the demise of the 
strategic force that Sinn Fein looked to for guidance and direction. Lynch remarked how 
the IRB moved against Griffith in favour of de Valera as the new President of Sinn Fein 
in 1917:
The attempted whittling down of the Easter Week position was strenuously opposed 
in the Executive by Collins, Count Plunkett and others. It was the real reason why 
we of the IRB organised opposition to the election of Griffith as President of Sinn 
Fein...37
O’Hegarty stressed that in the revolutionary climate, Griffith’s authority and the views of 
Sinn Feiners, who had not been ‘officially’ out in 1916, were cast aside. ‘He [Griffith] is 
no longer the sole -  or even the chief -  spokesman for the movement, and the fact that 
many of his most important coadjutors differ from him radically on vital questions, 
cannot and should not be concealed.’38
But as O’Hegarty contended later in A History of Ireland under the Union, and The 
Victory of Sinn Fein, these differences were not concealed, instead the old Sinn Fein 
ideas were dismissed and quickly replaced by the doctrinaire and inelastic concept of the 
‘Republic4, or as E.A.B., euphemistically commented, Sinn Fein was subject to ‘the 
unconscious modifications of its friends.’
37 Florrie O’Donoghue to Diarmuid Lynch, University College Dublin, Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, 31/409.
38 P.S. O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin, 1919), p.12.
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Ths led to the most disturbing change in Sinn Fein during this period, its growing 
miltarisation, which claimed legitimacy from the Easter Rising and the separatist 
traution.
Thi events surrounding the lead up to the Easter Rising are interesting to note as 
O’legarty had prior knowledge of the IRB’s plans to stage such a Rising. He was 
inf*rmed by Sean McDermott, a fellow IRB member, who travelled to Welshpool in 
19 5, specifically to enlighten O’Hegarty on current events and to seek his opinion. 
O’legarty had been relocated by British post office officials during the Great War, firstly 
to Shrewsbury, before his transfer to Welshpool. Florrie O’Donoghue has proposed the 
folowing explanation as to why O’Hegarty’s transfer was deemed a necessary security 
masure by these officials:
In August 1914, when he was post-master at Cobh, he was transferred to England on 
survey work. He took it as an ordinary transfer, but it is probable that the authorities 
moved him from Cobh because of his known opinions and associations with the 
Volunteer movement. He was one of the first public officials against which such 
action was taken; late as in the case of his brother Sean, who refused to accept a 
transfer to England was dismissed from the service.39
O’legarty was a member of the IRB Supreme Council at this time but like Bulmer 
Hoson his fellow physical force advocate, not cognisant of the intricate plans for a 
Rimg devised by the self-appointed inner circle within the Supreme Council. O’Hegarty 
reltes how Sean MacDermott broke the news of a Rising to him in The Victory of Sinn 
Fen:
In May, 1915, Sean Mac Dermot called to see me at Welshpool, and gave me a full 
account of the position. He told me they were preparing an insurrection that they had 
established at the beginning a military council to work out plans, that at the first
39 FS. O’Hegarty to Florrie O’Donoghue, University College Dublin, Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, M S31/336.
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meeting of that Council Joe Plunkett produced complete plans for a Dublin 
insurrection, on which it appeared he had been working for years, and that these had 
been adopted practically in their entirety. He told me the plan, and it was identical, 
even to the names of the buildings occupied, with what actually happened. He told 
me also that they were negotiating for German assistance, but would go on in any 
case, and that they contemplated a Dublin insurrection only, an insurrection which 
would make its protest, in the name of the Historic Irish Nation, against the 
Redmond slavishness, and would re-assert Ireland’s claim to Independence.. .40
MacDermott’s visit was closely followed by a visit from his brother Sean. P.S. O’Hegarty 
described what transpired many decades later in a letter to McDarmuid Lynch:
He came to see me in May 1915 in Welshpool [he] preferred to give me a full 
account of everything since I left in August 1914, and he never mentioned that he 
was sent by the council to do that -  at least Mrs. Clarke in a letter to the Sunday 
Independent last year says he was. But I have discovered in the course of years, that 
while what he told me was true as far as it went it was not the whole truth and that he 
said it in such a way as to mislead me. If Mrs. Clarke is right he told me one 
whopper of a lie. When he detailed the plans, they were all Dublin, and just as they 
were carried out...he said, quite definitely, “We are not going to trash the country.”
She says the plans intended the country from the beginning, which I find it difficult 
to accept.41
It would seem from these visits that the IRB had deemed it prudent to inform O’Hegarty 
about the plans for the Rising and not Bulmer Hobson, who only became aware of its 
conception from an overheard conversation. The following statement from Eoin McNeil 
to Diarmuid Lynch confirmed this:
That Bulmer Hobson at the I.V. Executive meeting held on Spy Wednesday (i.e. 
Wednesday of Holy Week) overheard a conversation, which pertained to certain 
operations of a warlike character: that Hobson reported this to MacNeil 
(accompanied by Hobson) called on Pearse at St. Enda’s and put to him a direct 
question as to whether an insurrection was planned; that Pearse answered in the
40 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.16.
41 P.S. O'Hegarty to Diarmuid Lynch, 27/10/50. Lynch’s reply to O’Hegarty affirmed that Mrs. Clarke was 
incorrect and Sean did not lie about the plans regarding the Rising. Lynch confirmed this by asserting that what 
Sean had disclosed to P.S. was all that he would have known up to that date and that O’Hegarty as his brother 
stated was still a member of the Supreme Council in 1915 despite his exile from the South of England. Florrie 
O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, MS 31/409.
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affirmative, that MacNeil then said to Pearse he would do his utmost, short of 
informing the British Government, to stop it; that, accordingly (he MacNeil) during 
the small hours of Good Friday morning took steps to call off the Easter manoeuvres 
ordered by Pearse in his (Pearse’s) capacity of Director of Organisation.42
There are several possible reasons for O’Hegarty being informed of the IRB position 
rather than Hobson, perhaps because it was thought that O’Hegarty would be more 
enthusiastic toward a demonstration of physical force despite both O’Hegarty and 
Hobson’s belief that a Rising should only occur with the full backing of the people and 
with a good chance of success and thus, keeping in line with the revised IRB constitution. 
As O’Hegarty related he was the recognised leader of the South of England separatists.
It may have come as a surprise to the IRB Supreme Council who would have known 
O’Hegarty very well over the six years that he had been within their circle to discover that 
he was implacably opposed to a Rising. They would not have informed him otherwise, 
but as with Hobson’s position, O’Hegarty maintained that a Rising must have sufficient 
chance of success. He should be included therefore in the following evaluation with 
Bulmer Hobson and Eoin MacNeil:
Rational men such as Eoin MacNeil and Bulmer Hobson had, of course, been 
saying this to the visionaries for years past. Pearse and his comrades, with visionary 
shrewdness, had perceived that only a bloody demonstration, however ill-conducted, 
could win over national support for the separatist ideal. But having attracted this 
support, even the visionaries (if any were still living) could have seen little sense in 
repeating the military errors of the rising.43
O’Hegarty’s opposition to the Rising led to speculation that as a result he was thrown out 
of the IRB by Collins for a couple of years. This refers to a letter from Florrie
42 Statement of Eoin MacNeil to Diarmuid Lynch August 15, 1936, Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, University 
College Dublin, MS 31/409 .
43 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-1922: provincial experience of war and revolution (Dublin, 
1998), p.212.
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O’Donoghue written on October 7th’ 1962, to ‘SOM’. This referred to Sean O’Hegarty’s 
belief that Collins’ statement to O’Hegarty that the IRA in the south would not be able to 
hold out for much longer during the guerrilla war was made for P.S.‘s benefit and that 
after the rising P.S. was kept out of the IRB by Collins for two years. Before he ’took him 
into his own circle.’ This Sean says, was in retaliation for P.S. having left Collins out of 
the IRB because Collins was drinking. Sean does not appear to appreciate that there might 
be another reason - when Sean McDermott visited P.S. in England in May 1915, he found 
that P.S. was opposed to a Rising. After that P.S. was dropped from the Supreme Council 
but has never admitted it himself.44
After the impact of 1916 Sinn Fein became increasingly associated with rebellion and a 
sanctioning of violent opposition to British rule in Ireland. For O’Hegarty this was to 
irrevocably damage all the good work that had previously gone in to the movement. Yet, 
as O’Hegarty argued, the point of the proclamation of 1916 was not steeped in the rigid 
form of a ‘Republic’, rather it was “a universal desire for political freedom and not for 
any particular or doctrinaire form of that freedom, a freedom of actuality rather than one 
of forms.”45
On this interpretation the Rising was in line with Sinn Fein’s original aims. Therefore 
O’Hegarty could assert the following and include himself as an adherent of physical 
force:
Whether Ireland of the coming times gives the insurrection praise or blame, it will 
place the responsibility for it where it is due, on the IRB. It was due to it, to the 
teaching and the planning of the young men who controlled it from 1909, and who
44 Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, MS31/248.
45 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.773.
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wrote Irish Freedom (1911-1914), that a physical force separatist wind blew again in 
Ireland.46
The Rising had proved to be the grand gesture in the separatist tradition for O’Hegarty 
and the need for self sacrifice in the name of a larger ideal, had been fulfilled. Therefore 
the guerrilla tactics of the Anglo-Irish war need not have occurred. While O’Hegarty 
recognised the Tan war as ultimately a defensive war, no justification for the ensuing Irish 
Civil War could emanate from the stand of 1916 as argued by many of the Irregulars. 
O’Hegarty’s view was that the Easter Rising had not written a ‘blank cheque’ which only 
permitted negotiation on the premise of an Irish Republic ‘now virtually established’ as 
delineated in the IRB Constitution. O’Hegarty agreed that what the Rising stood for was 
admirable but it could not be read as a strict policy of the goals of separatism in the way 
that, for instance, Cathal Brugha was to justify his violent opposition to the Treaty of 
1921.
Following the Rising, O’Hegarty maintained that the Anglo-Irish War was regrettably 
drifted into and not the purposeful intention of Michael Collins or Richard Mulcahy. The 
autonomy of the Operation Commanders in areas where there was an almost if not total 
lack of central control seems to corroborate this view. David Fitzpatrick writing of this 
period agreed with O’Hegarty’s analysis of the origins of the Anglo-Irish war, of how:
P.S. O’Hegarty’s striking summary is a fairer analysis of the origins of the revolution 
than those which stress the foresight and manipulative skill of Collins, Mulcahy and 
the headquarters staff. In the drift towards guerrilla warfare, headquarters followed 
helplessly some distance behind its more adventurous provincial followers, unable 
either to catch up or stop the drift.47
46 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 17.
47 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life 1913-1921: provincial experience of war and revolution (Dublin, 
1998), p.178.
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This ‘drift’ replaced the centralised control, which Griffith had exercised with the civil 
side of the movement firmly in charge. In place of this former structure, regional power 
blocks formed with territory divided among guerrilla leaders. This change prompted 
O’Hegarty’s lamentation that ‘the gun-man’ and ‘gun-law’ were now perceived as the 
most effective method for exerting pressure on the British Government. A theme that 
Liam de Roiste T.D. for Cork City commented on during 1917:
...the military side of the movement is now actively and aggressively working to 
dominate the civil side and to take control and direction of civil as well as military 
affairs.. ..Every man who is not a Volunteer or in the good graces of the chiefs of the 
Volunteers is to be pushed aside from responsible positions in Sinn Fein.48
The compromise agreed under Cumann na Gaedheal in 1905 between the physical force 
separatists and the 1782 constitutionalists had been emphatically broken. The IRB whose 
membership greatly increased from the rejuvenation of Sinn Fein and its infiltration of the 
Volunteers led to a marked increase in numbers of revolutionary and militaristically 
minded men and women. Within the IRB itself, the revolutionary programme had 
replaced the previous trust in the compromise between moderates and extremists.
In response, O’Hegarty emphasised the original compromise that permitted Sinn Fein to 
function without recourse to violence and the new wave of militaristic thinking:
The Sinn Fein movement, as such did not contemplate an appeal to arms, believing 
that its policy, with the majority of Ireland behind it, would be irresistible on a 
passive resistance basis. It was really composed of two sections - one, led by Mr. 
Griffith, wished to base the movement definitely on the Constitution of 1782 and the 
Renunciation Act of 1783, and the other composed of the Separatists was for 
independence pure and simple. As a compromise, the object of the movement was 
defined as “the re-establishment of the Independence of Ireland,” which satisfied the 
Separatists, with an addendum committing it, as a minimum, to the “King, Lords and
48 K.E. Girvin, unpublished thesis 'The Life and Times of Sean O ’Hegarty’ (M.A. thesis, National University of 
Ireland, Cork, 2003), p.47.
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Commons” solution, which satisfied the others. Both sections were agreed as to the 
general lines of policy.49
Intrinsic to O’Hegarty’s view of this period, was that Sinn Fein no longer represented a 
movement designed to stir up the emotions using propagandist methods. The people 
supported them and they were now a democratically elected movement responsible to all 
of the people of Ireland.50
There was a growing despair as the civil side lost control and the violence escalated. 
Consequently, in The Victory of Sinn Fein’, O’Hegarty described Sinn Fein’s military 
wing as ‘Frankenstein’s monster’.51 The aftermath of the Easter Rising had generated a 
new form of revolutionary support for Sinn Fein, which had led to its erroneous 
identification with the ‘republican’ ideology and the Anglo-Irish guerrilla war.
Post 1916, Sinn Fein was increasingly identified in Ireland as the uncompromising 
exponents of the ’republican’ tradition. Its standing among former parliamentary 
supporters (i.e. the bulk of nationalist Ireland who had become disillusioned with the 
party’s inert reliance on the Liberal Party’s granting of Home Rule) increased as it refused 
to send its MPs to Westminster and set up the Dail in defiance of the British 
Government’s imposing of martial law. This followed the mass arrest of known and 
suspected Sinn Feiners following the 1916 Rising, and ‘under martial law, Ireland was 
governed, not like a country which was quiescent and trustful, attached to the British
49 P.S. O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein: An Illumination (Dublin 1919), p.25.
50 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (1952), p.755. For instance, O’Hegarty deplored Sinn 
Fein’s implementation of the Belfast Boycott as a policy that subverted the Sinn Fein ideal of promoting 
fraternity among all Irishmen. (See Chapter VI of this thesis, ‘Partition’.)
51 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.169.
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connection, as press and public men would imply, as the British pretended to believe, but 
like a country in revolt’.52
Venting his concerns over the growing militarisation of Sinn Fein, O’Hegarty addressed 
two of the most influential personalities in the military wing with whom he was on 
intimate terms, ‘in 1917 my first time home since 1914 I told Collins and my brother we 
should silence the gun now as we no longer needed them -  unless there was an 
essentiality. They laughed at me.’53
In the following passage an example of O’Hegarty’s revulsion toward the insinuation of 
the gun as a major part of the Sinn Fein ethos is revealed. In response to a forthcoming 
IRB military operation (the details are not disclosed), O’Hegarty visited Griffith, who it 
would seem from O’Hegarty’s recollection had resigned himself to the inevitability of 
growing militarism and violence:
Griffith was not fond of me. He never knew when I might do or say something, 
which would place the movement in a different light from that in which he viewed it.
But we were always friendly, and on one occasion when I wrote to him from 
England during my deportation, he surprised me by writing me a letter very 
appreciative of my services to the cause. In the years of the war I saw very little of 
him, but one of the few conversations I did have with him threw, to me, a lot of light 
on his outlook at the time. In May, 1920,1 had to go to Cork, and was asked by Terry 
MacSwiney to leave a few days after I had arrived. He would not at first tell me why; 
but as I refused to budge, he told me of a certain proposal which was probably being 
put into operation in a few days, and for which I would probably be picked up if I 
were in the city when it happened. The proposal seemed to me then to be fiendish 
and indefensible and inadvisable from any point of view, and it still seems to me so.
He said to me that they were only awaiting sanction from Headquarters, and I felt 
easier, saying to him that they would never sanction that. However, in a couple of 
days the messenger arrived back with sanction. I returned to Dublin at once and went 
to Griffith.
I told him what the proposal was, that it had been sanctioned, gave him my opinion 
of it, and added that I assumed he knew nothing of it. He said to me that he had not 
been consulted, that the Dail Cabinet had not, as far as he knew, been consulted, that
52 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.712.
53 Ernest Blythe to P.S. O’Hegarty, 20/9/1949. Ernest Blythe Papers, University College Dublin, P24/1341/4.
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he agreed with me about it, and that he would_see Brugha and stop it, which he did. I 
said to him then: “I don’t know what the relations between the Dail cabinet are and 
the Volunteers, but you are acting-president of Dail and the country will hold you 
responsible for what happens. You ought to see that nothing of this sort is sanctioned 
by anybody without the Dail Cabinet being first consulted. If you don’t control the 
volunteers, they will bring us all down in red ruin.”54
O’Hegarty admitted that he along with many of the Sinn Fein old guard were partly 
responsible for creating the militaristic atmosphere in Ireland during this period “We 
ourselves in our own blindness and folly were responsible for that Frankenstein. We 
taught our young people to rely on the gun and to disregard everything else!”55 
Consequently, the violence associated with the Anglo-Irish war developed into an 
acceptable part of normal life as there was no clear leadership from the Dail.56 However 
as a recent scholar has suggested, the ‘de facto’ Irish government which on being 
suppressed and forced underground by the British government on 10 September 191957 
was not in a strong position to exert restraint or control.
It left the majority of the population who while standing firm and supporting the Irish 
militia were nonetheless relieved by the truce but similarly there were those who had 
grown accustomed to the wielding of power a factor which bred a liking for the anarchy 
of war. O’Hegarty was implying that the civil war was borne out of the psychological 
impact that the gun had on Irish society in the hands of armed, uncontrollable and violent 
men during the Anglo-Irish war; that as ‘the war went on the more fatal its effects.’58 
P.S. O’Hegarty’s brother Sean’s experiences as Commandant of the West Cork IRA, 
provide an insight into the violence and freedom from the Dail’s authority that O’Hegarty
54 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.46.
55 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 169.
56 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 1924), p.167.
57 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.734.
58 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 167.
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despaired of in the physical force side of Sinn Fein. Violence was tacitly accepted during 
this period and given an ambiguous reception by the traditional authorities in Ireland. 
However it was an ambiguity that could trace its origins in the Fenian tradition despite 
P.S.’s belief that violence should not have played a further part after 1916. O’Hegarty 
related how the national press ‘sat on the fence’ and ‘such Churchmen as condemned the 
shootings mixed their ethics with politics and made the case worse.’59 
While P.S. fought for Irish independence on a variety of levels his younger brother Sean, 
fought at the forefront of the guerrilla war against the British forces. Peter Hart’s book 
The IRA and its Enemies has described Sean as fiercely territorial who on succeeding 
Terence MacSwiney as Operation Commander (O/C) earned a fearsome reputation in IRB 
circles60 
Furthermore:
[Sean] O’Hegarty had run his own IRB campaign against the police and against the 
wishes of MacCurtain and many others in Sinn Fein and the volunteers. Where 
MacSwiney saw self-sacrifice and the maintenance of honour at the hearty of the 
struggle, O’Hegarty saw guns and bombs, and enemy targets. The events of August 
removed a militarily ineffective leader, turned him into a national symbol of 
resistance, and replaced him with a ruthless operator.61
However, it would be erroneous to assume that Sean O’Hegarty represented the new 
breed of Sinn Feiner. He was an ‘arch-Fenian’ like his brother P.S. who was involved in 
Sinn Fein from its inception, taught children Irish history, was a Gaelic Leaguer and yet 
contrary to his brother’s reasoning completely justified the use of guerrilla tactics. The 
following description of Sean by Florrie O’Donoghue could equally apply to P.S.:
59 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.55.
60 Peter Hart, The IRA and its Enemies (Oxford, 1998), p.240.
61 Peter Hart, The IRA and its Enemies (Oxford, 1998), p.85.
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...Amongst the truest and most loyal hearted and the best of the patriots who had 
striven through long years of servitude to bring this nation to freedom...he inherited 
the Fenian tradition and lived his life in its tradition. He was someone who helped 
build ‘the foundations on which rested the great national effort of the 1920’s. ‘. . .laid 
the foundations of one of the greatest national movements Ireland has known... ,62
Sean O’Hegarty, however, was to interpret the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty as a sell­
out contrived by the British and Irish politicians. His later adoption of ‘defensive 
neutrality’ was purely out of a fear for the potential of civil war to develop. After the 
Truce was called in 1921, Sean and his IRB brigade rejected the terms of the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty as a sell out of the republican idea they had been fighting to obtain:
At a meeting of the District Board of Cork City held on Dec 12.1 was instructed to 
send you the following:- “That the Boards representing the organisation men in Cork 
City calls for the rejection of the Treaty proposals being submitted to An Dail 
Eireann as being utterly at variance with the principles of the IRB and treason to the 
Republic established in 1916.63
This was from the Supreme Council of the IRB to the Cork District and County Centre 
and the correspondence continued with, “That we consider the statement issued to T.D.’s 
on the question of the treaty proposals was utterly opposed to the spirit of the constitution 
of the IRB.”64
Sean was undoubtedly his own man, a highly respected leader of armed men who 
occupied a position of power, but one who was willing to give the Treaty a chance. As 
previously stated, Sean later adopted a position of ‘defensive neutrality’ as with his 
brother P.S. his first concern was for the future of Ireland. He defended his position
62 Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, MS31.
63 Copy of note from Sean O’Hegarty to Cork District Chairman 13/12/21, Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, 
University College Dublin, M S31/334.
64 This forms part of a note from Sean O’Hegarty addressed to the Cork District Chairman. Florrie 
O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, MS31/334, 22/11/22.
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admirably in a letter to Bishop Cohalan in the Cork Examiner November, 28, 1923 
stating:
In June 1922,1 resigned from the IRA, when there broke out a contest which, in my 
judgment, could lead only to ruin -  moral, economic, and political. In his lordship’s 
opinion, I should have thrown my morsel of bitterness into this unnatural and unholy 
struggle on one side or the other.
As Florrie O’Donoghue observed:
In the period of divided counsels on the Treaty issue, he [Sean O’Hegarty] worked 
hard to preserve army unity and to avert the civil war. In this effort he was the only 
army officer, not a member of Dail Eireann, who was ever privileged to address the 
assembly on the issues, which then divided the Army and the country. His appeal led 
to the negotiations.65
Taken together the military side of the movement was not an area in which men like 
O’Hegarty and Griffith could exercise any control. It was unrealistic of O’Hegarty to 
believe that the movement could remain ‘pure and simple’ and free from the individuals 
whom he regarded as undesirable. Sinn Fein had stood for higher ideals than the political 
bargaining at Westminster that the Irish Party represented, hence Sinn Fein’s policy of 
abstentionism from Westminster. This one issue was to remain constant and compatible 
with his Fenian principles. Abstentionism which was to be implemented by the newly 
elected Sinn Fein government, An Dail, through the peaceful non-cooperation of Sinn 
Fein held councils, non-payment of taxes and the setting up of independent courts
65 Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, MS31/334. This resulted in the pact between de 
Valera and Michael Collins, which was aborted soon after its conception. This forms part of a typescript lecture 
of Sean O’Hegarty’s life by Florrie O’Donoghue.
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appointed by the Sinn Fein government looked to achieving ‘The rendering powerless of 
English Government’ which was for O’Hegarty ‘the real Sinn Fein policy...’66 
Despite the magnificent gesture and sign of commitment to the entire nation for 
O’Hegarty that abstentionism represented, the characteristics of the Irish Party were 
adopted and deployed by Sinn Fein, much to O’Hegarty’s disillusionment, in the pursuit 
of winning power.
It must be stated however that while O’Hegarty painted a homogenous picture of Sinn 
Fein during its ‘first and best decade’ and of abstentionism as a perennial and unalterable 
principle of its programme this ignores the fact that there did exist political dissension 
between its physical force and moderate membership. In 1910 when Sinn Fein was at its 
lowest ebb, there was a feeling among the moderates of Sinn Fein, Griffith especially, that 
a compromise regarding the Sinn Fein abstentionist policy might be needed to ensure 
Sinn Fein’s survival. Previous to this schism in Sinn Fein policy, in 1909, O’Hegarty had 
openly defied Arthur Griffith’s proposal to amalgamate the Sinn Fein daily paper, due to 
its dwindling fortunes, with William O’Brien’s All for Ireland League, nationalist paper.67 
O’Hegarty implacably opposed O’Brien’s movement and his belief in the effectiveness of 
parliamentarianism as unrepresentative of Sinn Fein principles in its backing of the All
66 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.33. Advocates of parliamentarianism notably 
Joseph Devlin of the Ancient Order of the Hibernians, were to disagree with O’Hegarty’s belief that the Sinn 
Fein policy of abstentionism was the best one for Ireland. Devlin stated: “...abstention [meant] handing over 
the representation and the administration of Ireland to the Ulster unionists and the old Ascendancy Party; it 
means the breaking off of the union between the British and Irish democracies, which it was the glory of 
Parnell and Davit to bring about, and the estrangement of the sympathy with Ireland’s claim amongst all 
sections of the British people, which was evoked by the policy of Mr. Redmond and the Irish party since the 
outbreak of the war, and it means the throwing away of the weapon which Parnell forged and which all admit to 
be the most powerful and efficient ever designed for its purpose....It is policy of futility, of political lunacy”. 
P.S. O ’Hegarty Collection, Spencer Library, Kansas University, pamphlet entitled ‘Mr. Devlin on the value of 
parliamentary representation’, Belfast, October 13, 1918, Pamphlet, B4824.
67 William O’Brien was a long standing parliamentarian and associate of Tim Healy who opposed the 
Redmonites in the Irish party. Griffith’s Sinn Fein daily paper was a short lived enterprise and ran from 23 
August, 1909, to 21 January, 1910, see V. E. Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the advanced nationalist press 
(New York, 1985), pp.44-5.
for Ireland League, who were opposed to the Sinn Fein policy appealed to a much broader 
base than Sinn Fein in seeking support and not abstentionists. O’Hegarty effectively 
caused a split in the movement as in conjunction with Hobson; he prevented Griffith from 
aligning the Sinn Fein movement with William O’Brien’s All for Ireland League. 
Consequently, the split between the physical force separatists and the moderates in Sinn 
Fein led to the distinctly more militant separatist paper Irish Freedom being established as 
an alternative voice to the moderate majority of Sinn Fein who were contemplating 
removing the policy of abstentionism from what O'Hegarty's considered to be the pillar of 
the Sinn Fein programme.
The new generation of volunteers and IRB men such as Bulmer Hobson and O’Hegarty 
which had emerged as reformers from 1907 had infused the movement with a new 
impetus and purpose, a recognised strategy of the Fenian movement designed to keep the 
movement alive during times of quietude.
The men of 1916, too, had embarked on rejuvenating the movement, seeking to capitalise 
on England’s misfortune as Ireland’s opportunity and subsequent physical force adherents 
took up the challenge in the form of guerrilla warfare as a legitimate pursuit in line with 
the Fenian tradition. Indeed, in 1916, it was Tom Clarke who had helped initiate the 
Rising and his separatist credentials stretched further back than O’Hegarty’s. This 
demonstrated how old and young separatists did not always hold opposed views. 
Similarly it was deep within the Fenian tradition, as O’Hegarty demonstrated in his 
aversion to the Irish Party’s policy, to hold a deep distrust of politicians too, and this 
provides one explanation why the military wing of Sinn Fein felt it better to keep its 
distance from the Dail.
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P.S. O’Hegarty was undoubtedly an idealist but in his hatred of the physical force 
methods used by the new generation of Sinn Feiners in the name of the republic, he saw 
the chance to implement the Sinn Fein policy in full, wasted. O’Hegarty therefore, could 
not justify the means by which Irish freedom was obtained.
This explains his conclusion on 1916 that it: ‘...proved a double edged sword.’ After its 
impact it was possible to have gotten the Ireland they dreamed of but ‘we lost it when we 
took up the gun again...wasted the real Sinn Fein movement.’68
In The Victory of Sinn Fein. O’Hegarty was intent on providing explanations as to why 
Sinn Fein disintegrated into factions over the Treaty. For this, it was necessary to blame 
the mentality of violence that festered during the Anglo-Irish war, and contributed toward 
and fostered the conditions for the later Irish Civil War. Later in A History of Ireland
under the Union, he was more apologetic toward this period.
To understand the acceptable face of physical force for O’Hegarty it is necessary to return 
to the Peter Hart quote above which described how Terence MacSwiney viewed the 
concept of physical force. It was steeped in the nobility of the cause which in turn must be 
reflected in its implementation. For O’Hegarty that was why 1916 was acceptable but the 
violence that followed it unpalatable. To quote MacSwiney in the early decade of Sinn 
Fein: ‘One day the consciousness of the country will be electrified with a great deed or a 
great sacrifice and the multitude will break from lethargy or prejudice.’69 O’Hegarty was 
writing The Victory of Sinn Fein in the knowledge that he would be severely criticised for
his views and wrote the following in his preface to this work:
68 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein’ (Dublin, 1924), pp.161-173.
69 Irish Freedom, March, 1911, Terence MacSwiney’s series of articles were entitled: ‘Principles of Freedom.’
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What this book is, then, is a book recording the impressions which the whole thing 
has made upon a contemporary who has worked hard for Ireland, whose hobby has 
always been the study of history, and who has thereby been accustomed to estimate 
forces and tendencies and to attempt to relate Irish happenings to the general 
principles behind them...The book will be deeply, and perhaps deservedly, 
unpopular. I have had to say things about the Movement, both before the Truce and 
after the Truce, which will not be relished. I have had to write hard things about 
some of my friends directly, and even harder things about others by implication. But 
what I have written I have written because I believe it to be the tmth, and because the 
Cause we all -  those who shot Mick Collins and those who shot -  Cathal Brugha 
alike -  stand for ultimately can be helped only by truth and honesty.70
Yet despite O’Hegarty’s propinquity to the time, and perhaps because of it, The Victory 
of Sinn Fein was a powerful insight into the minds and events of a turbulent period in 
Ireland’s history. It is also notable in bringing to the fore the feelings of the ordinary 
people toward violence and the Treaty, which form the basis of O’Hegarty’s argument 
against the Anglo-Irish war and later the Irish Civil War.
Reacting to the sentiments expressed in The Victory of Sinn Fein. Richard Mulcahy was 
to be quite scathing about the majority of opinions and conclusions that O’Hegarty comes 
to during the crucial years of the period. Mulcahy had held several posts in the 
underground Dail government, including the position of Chief of Staff for the Irish 
Volunteers from March 1918. Later he became a pro-Treatyite like O’Hegarty and was 
instrumental in crushing the anti-Treatyite campaign in his capacity as Minister of 
Defence. His views are therefore pertinent as they depict the complicated relationship that 
existed even among pro-Treatyites and how to evaluate the Anglo-Irish War. In a letter to 
the Most Reverend, Dr. Fogarty, dated 12 January 1925, Mulcahy stated that he had been 
in discussion with O’Hegarty regarding his serious disagreements over the content of The 
Victory of Sinn Fein. Mulcahy continued that he considered it too soon to look back and
70 P.S. O’Hegarty, Preface to The Victory o f  Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.v-vi.
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objectively evaluate a time of confusion and disappointment in any real capacity. The 
Victory of Sinn Fein, he contended:
...painted a picture that suggests that “the greatest achievement of any Irish 
generation” was brought about by “a military terrorism in which a civilian 
government existed merely as a machine for registering military decrees and under 
which every argument, save the gun, was eliminated. In a situation in which the 
political machine became a tool in the hands of the military side of the movement so 
that in the end the whole thing was moulded by men who were incapable of 
regarding democratic government seriously only in so far as it could be manipulated 
or forced to do what the military mind wanted.”71
Mulcahy was resolute in his opinion that O’Hegarty’s view could prove a dangerous one, 
which could result in harmful repercussions for the Irish state in the future. (It has been 
argued that it was applied in the North through the military strategy of the IRA and is still 
apparent in some capacity to this day.) Mulcahy continued: ‘The fact is that his painting 
of the situation is entirely wrong, and the inferences that ordinary people would draw 
from his painting, if anything, more wrong.’72
Mulcahy disagreed with O’Hegarty’s assertion that the Dail did not fully support the 
military activities used by the Irish forces and that O’Hegarty’s statement with regard to 
Griffith’s views on military operations was not representative of his true feelings on the 
matter:
Griffith’s attitude to the military mind was utterly misleading. I was, personally, in 
the most close contact with Griffith and there was a very great sympathy and 
understanding between the two of us -  and O’Hegarty’s whole representation of 
Griffith’s last days are utterly absurd and untrue.
71 Richard Mulcahy Papers, University College Dublin, UCD/AD/P7.
72 Richard Mulcahy Papers, University College Dublin, UCD/AD/P7.
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Mulcahy in his severest criticism of the views put forward in The Victory of Sinn Fein 
noted O’Hegarty’s comment, that after 1916 not a single shot should have been fired:
...it [was] worth mentioning too that O’Hegarty who considere[d] that not a shot 
should have been fired after 1916 was of the opinion in February or March, 1919, 
when we called off the reception for de Valera at Mount St. Bridge after his escape 
from Lincoln, and the release of the other prisoners there, because of a proclamation 
issued and action intended by the British military forces in Dublin. O’Hegarty 
considered our calling off the reception was “the biggest blow that Ireland had ever 
received since O’Connell called off his Clontarf meeting and was, in fact, a much 
bigger blow than that.73
This view of Mulcahy’s was made in reference to the following article written in 1919, in 
which O’Hegarty stated:
Analogy has been drawn between the Sinn Fein executive’s decision to obey the 
proclamation and O’Connell’s similar decision 75 years ago. The cases are, in fact, 
absolutely identical. Precisely the same military preparations were made in each 
case, and in each case the origin of the crisis lay in what was tantamount to a 
challenge to the authority of the British government or what was taken up as a 
challenge. The Sinn Fein case, in fact, was in reality a challenge whereas 
O’Connell’s was not, and he could withdraw form the position with much greater 
show of dignity than we could. We all know the effect, which his back down had on 
the country and on his movement. His prestige and his moral authority was so 
seriously impaired that thenceforward he ceased to be a force of any consequence in 
Ireland.74
O’Hegarty reasoned that to go ahead with the meeting despite the British proclamation 
would have constituted a moral insurrection in the name of the people. O’Hegarty saw 
Sinn Fein’s backing down as a severe ‘set-back’ for these reasons and was troubled over 
the consequences of not facing up to the challenge issued by the British Government. 
That it would appear to the Irish people that Sinn Fein despite its compunction for action 
was ultimately guilty of O’Connell’s foibles and that popular support would dwindle for
73 Richard Mulcahy Papers, University College Dublin, UCD/AD/P7.
74 An Saogheal Gaedhealach, August, 1919.
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Sinn Fein in the same way it did for O’Connell, “The recent proceedings, to a rank and 
filer, look like groping in the dark. If so, an end must be put to it, or the movement will 
grope to its destruction.”
Similarly, as the bluff of utilising force that O’Connell used to threaten the British 
government in previous ‘monster meetings’ had been challenged and confronted by the 
British; they were able to develop a policy designed to purge O’Connell of this threat and 
ultimately his standing among the people. O’Hegarty feared the same would happen to 
Sinn Fein, but as the War of Independence intensified, the IRB constantly pushed at the 
boundaries of limitations in the conflict and disallowed a coherent policy of containment 
to be developed by the British government. O’Hegarty s fears then, were not realised but 
in drawing this historical parallel he was obviously aware of how ‘in the art of following 
up England excels’ and that ‘after Clontarf the government had taken the measure of 
O’ConnelT. From this inference, O’Hegarty surmised: ‘They will at present be engaged in 
estimating ours. Let us take care that they be mistaken. Let us not make the mistake of 
taking it for an isolated instance. It is the first moral victory they have won in Ireland.’75 
O’Hegarty believed that through Sinn Fein’s capitulation the British had stolen a moral 
march on the separatist movement and that this could be interpreted as Sinn Fein 
recognising the illegality of the meeting and therefore recognising the legitimacy of the 
British Government. To stand up to the proclamation would have meant non-recognition 
of what O’Hegarty considered a spurious authority. For O’Hegarty it was still a moral 
fight steeped in passive resistance but there were times when that morality must come 
from force to emphasise Ireland’s right to independence.
75 An Saogheal Gaedhealach, August, 1919.
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Therefore, in the sense of how Mulcahy saw O’Hegarty s comments in The Victory of 
Sinn Fein as hypocritical he is not entirely right. For O’Hegarty ‘the gun’ in the hands of 
a guerrilla fighter did not carry the same moral weight as a popular rising. For O’Hegarty 
there was a moral difference between the two actions.
O’Hegarty realised that to go ahead with the reception in defiance of the British 
proclamation would have amounted to an open defiance of the government and that 
violence, possibly on a grand scale would have ensued. However, in his view this would 
have been justified on a morally secure basis it was a chance for Sinn Fein to redeem 
itself. It was the opportunity for a direct confrontation where the volunteer’s could take on 
the enemy as soldiers of the Irish nation. This was the real purpose of physical force, as a 
disciplined weapon directed from the Dail.
O’Hegarty as a committed Fenian only saw the positive and noble aspects of the Fenian 
tradition and therefore could not attribute the violent guerrilla years of Sinn Fein to the 
implementation of the Fenian programme.
For O’Hegarty the three years following 1916 in which Sinn Fein was remodeled as a 
revolutionary movement proved an unparalleled disaster. That ultimately:
Sinn Fein did not keep its physical force element in its proper place, but allowed it to 
dictate policy and to crowd out the civil side. Before 1916, we had too little physical 
force, and after 1916 we had far too much.
The uses of arms, and the right to insurrect, were maintained as a matter of principle, 
but rather as a means of arousing the nation’s soul than as a policy. I remember 
discussions on it at Supreme Council meetings long before 1916, when we were 
trying to shape things towards some definite goal. And it was agreed then that it was 
our duty to make a forlorn hope insurrection if the time came when such desperate 
measures were necessary in order to recall the nation to self-respect and decency. 
That was the physical force philosophy prior to 1916, and it was sound.
After 1916, there should not have been a shot fired in Ireland, nor a gun bought. 
They were totally unnecessary. We had the Sinn Fein policy, the men who made it, 
the enthusiasm and the support of the people. Without firing a shot we could have
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forced from England anything that we have forced from her by the gun policy, and 
more.76
While these were admirable sentiments they too were unrealistic. Given O’Hegarty’s 
commitment to Fenianism he could not draw a line between old and new, or acceptable 
and unacceptable Fenian policy toward physical force methods. Indeed to this view of the 
noble use of physical force and a natural uprising occurring amongst the Irish people as 
with the beginning of the tradition O’Hegarty attributed to the United Irishmen’s Rising 
of 1798, must be added an important caveat. O’Hegarty ignored to a large extent that the 
1798 rising disintegrated into sectarian warfare between Catholics and Protestants amid 
the massacres that were committed by both sides. Therefore it must be said O’Hegarty 
was quite selective in his attitude to the history of the use of physical force in Ireland.
As with the position of Terence MacSwiney regarding the use of physical force, described 
above, violence, if it were necessary, had to be not just effective but honourable for 
O’Hegarty. In this respect, Sean O’Hegarty adapted to the new situation of guerrilla 
warfare much better than P.S. as he was equally convinced in his conscience, that, in 
adopting the aggressive tactics he did, he was no less than implementing the Fenian code. 
Yet it remained for P.S., that what began with slogans championing ‘the Irish Republic’ 
marked the first appearance of the ‘doctrinaire habit of mind which was to have so baleful 
an influence in 1922, when the fact of independence was crucified in the name of an 
unintelligent and unpatriotic doctrinaire complex.’77
76 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.165-66.
77 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.716.
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CHAPTER V 
THE TREATY
Throughout his separatist career, O’Hegarty enunciated the ideal of an independent Ireland 
in which every Irish inhabitant could share a common notion of citizenship. This ideal 
formed the overriding theme behind his liberal and pluralistic reading of Irish nationalism. 
In seeking to implement these idealised notions, O’Hegarty worked tirelessly toward the 
creation of a united and independent Ireland bent upon re-building its historic national 
characteristics, shorn of the English colonial ties that had shaped Ireland’s development 
from the Act of Union. As previous chapters have illustrated, these ideals suffered as they 
competed against rival political and cultural factions grappling over the future political and 
cultural direction of Ireland from the turn of the twentieth century. The Sinn Fein 
movement, as disclosed in Chapter IV, that O’Hegarty believed best represented the ideals 
he envisioned for the Irish nation, had lost its way in the rush to gain politically from its 
vote-maximising identification with the cabalistic inspired 1916 Easter Rising. Moreover, 
many of the problems O’Hegarty saw as developing from 1916 onwards remained to 
become caveats in what was, for O’Hegarty, the crowning glory of Irish separatism, the 
attainment of Irish independence as enshrined in the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty.
The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed in London by an Irish delegation headed by 
Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith, representing the provisional Irish government (an 
Dail), and the British Government, led by the Prime Minister Lloyd George, in 1921. The 
Treaty signified a major change in Anglo-Irish relations after the Prime Minister called a 
truce, which brought an end to the fighting in the Anglo-Irish War begun in 1919. The 
signing of the Treaty signified an end to the need for nationalist agitation to secure Irish 
independence from England that O’Hegarty traced as running continuous from the 
formation of the United Irishmen, through to O’Connell and the Young Irelanders, the 
Fenian movement during the nineteenth century and finally Sinn Fein in the twentieth. The 
Sinn Fein movement therefore stood over the crowning glory of Irish nationalism’s greatest 
achievement in not just wringing concessions from the English Government but securing 
Irish independence where Ireland took its rightful place among the nations of the world. 
These optimistic views of the Treaty, as espoused by O’Hegarty, which claimed to have 
brought to an end the colonial grievances that had characterised Anglo-Irish relations since 
the 1801 Act of Union, were not unanimously held among prominent and rank and file Sinn 
Feiner’s. Critics stressed that the annexation of Ireland as an extension of the United 
Kingdom’s territorial jurisdiction, had not been sufficiently severed in order for the 
‘Republic’, discussed in the previous chapter, to be fully realised. The terms of the Treaty, 
therefore, were to create a rift in the Sinn Fein movement that culminated in the 1921-22 
Irish Civil War fought between the pro and anti-Treatyite factions. The Civil War has 
largely been implicated in paralysing the cultural and political revolution that Irish 
nationalists, such as O’Hegarty, believed would develop following the expulsion of the 
English Imperialist presence in Ireland. The Treaty therefore, despite it heralded as a 
breakthrough in Anglo-Irish relations by pro-Treatyites, was very much a contested
document, which, as the anti-Treatyites confirmed, was not seen as epitomising the 
culmination of Irish nationalist agitation. Indeed, the emancipation of the Irish people was 
deemed by the anti-Treatyite forces as consisting of far more than what the Treaty conceded 
to Ireland, that is, that the Treaty did not satisfy the conditions upon which a significant 
contingent of Sinn Feiners considered the establishment of a free Irish nation state rested 
upon. In contrast to this, pro-Treatyites, such as O’Hegarty, especially given the hardships 
endured by the Irish people throughout the Anglo-Irish guerrilla war, was optimistic of the 
benefits that permeated the terms negotiated and stipulated in the clauses of the Treaty. Not 
only did it offer renewed hope for a lasting settlement between England and Ireland, which 
recognised Ireland’s ancient right to nationhood, but also it established and permitted the 
grounding upon which Ireland could begin to shape its own political and cultural destiny. 
This chapter is structured so as to incorporate analysis of the three overriding factors that 
deprived O’Hegarty the possibility of the Irish nation putting into place the elements 
essential to implementing his separatist philosophy and therefore acceptable to his liberal 
civic nationalism. Consequently, these final chapters describe the setbacks the new Irish 
State encountered, including the 1922 1923 Irish Civil War, that arose from the split in Sinn 
Fein into pro and anti-Treatyites over the terms agreed for a settlement between the English 
and Irish governments; secondly, the secession of the six counties of Ulster which opted to 
remain a part of the United Kingdom, dealt with separately in the next chapter; and thirdly 
the conservative nature of the Free State government in its institutional and social 
programme, while acknowledging O’Hegarty’s view put forward in The Victory of Sinn 
Fein that it was essential for the pro-Treatyite government, in the face of anarchy, to enforce 
and consolidate the rule of law following the onset of Civil War. Indeed, O’Hegarty praised 
Ireland’s first national government, Cumann na Gaedheal, for this achievement in A History
of Ireland under the Union, but, as will be related in the final section of this chapter, the 
conservative nature of the Irish government dominated over establishing the principles that 
lay behind O’Hegarty’s culturally-based Ireland. Given that, so much of O’Hegarty’s 
original idealism was in retreat given the partition of Ireland and the failure of the new 
southern state to uphold the ideals of a culturally distinct Ireland, this chapter will examine 
whether O'Hegarty could maintain his defence of the opportunities the Treaty gave to 
Ireland to shape its own destiny. This amounted to a freeing of the anglicising influence of 
English government in the Irish Free State, in short, to build on the early work of Sinn Fein 
and the Gaelic League as the desired cultural direction into which the Free State could be 
directed.
O’Hegarty viewed the actions of the anti-Treatyites, in particular de Valera, as having 
turned a disagreement between pro- and anti-Treatyites, over the inclusion of an oath of 
allegiance to the British Crown contained in the Treaty, into a needless and bloody civil 
war. To illustrate this point, to introduce O’Hegarty’s propinquity to events as they 
unfolded, and to introduce de Valera as the force through which this disagreement became a 
point of irreconcilable difference for O’Hegarty, the following ‘Note to Epilogue’, from A 
History of Ireland under the Union is reproduced:
In 1922, for about a fortnight at the end of January and beginning of February, I met 
at lunch at the Wicklow hotel, nearly every day, Sean O’Muirthile and Diarmuid 
O’Hegarty and, sometimes, Michael Collins. Harry Boland was usually lunching 
there at the same time, and if he finished first he sometimes came over and sat with 
us.
He always struck the same note. Isn’t it a pity now that we aren’t all together, and 
why can’t we get together again, and after all there isn’t much between us, and so on. 
O’Muirthile said to me that he always went on like that, and that it didn’t mean 
anything save that he was trying to take a “rise” out of us. But one day, when he was 
in full career, watching us out of the comer of his eye, I interrupted him, and the 
following conversation took place.
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“Look here, Harry, you’re always going on about why aren’t we all together, and 
there’s only a little bit between us, and so on. Now, what is there between us? Let us 
get it out”
“You know well what it is between us?”
“I don’t. So far as I’m concerned there’s nothing between us. I am the same as I was 
six months ago and if you think there’s something better I don’t. Whatever is 
between us is on your side. Out with it.”
“Well there’s the oath.”
“The oath, yes well. What else?”
“There’s nothing else, nothing but the Oath.”
“Are you sure?”
“Yes, there are other things, small things, but they could all be got over. The Oath 
cannot.”
“Well, don’t you know that Mick has been advised by his legal people that the oath 
is not mandatory and that he does not intend to have an Oath in the Constitution.”
“Yes, we’ve heard that, but can we get confirmation of it?”
“What do you mean by confirmation?”
“Can we have an undertaking from Collins?”
“I don’t know, but we can find out.”
It was agreed that O’Muirthile would see Collins and that we would meet Boland 
again on the next day. We did so.
“Well, Harry.” said O’Muirthile, “I am authorised by Collins to give you an 
undertaking, for de Valera, that if he and his crowd will stop their codding and come 
in as a constitutional party and help us to get the best out of the Treaty, there’ll be no 
oath in the Constitution, and he’ll stand or fall by that.”
“And I’m a witness to that undertaking,” said I, “If ever you want one.”
For a brief space Boland looked as if he could not believe his ears. Then he got up, 
his whole face shining, his person just a mass of animation.
“Cheers, boys,” said he, “I’m going to de Valera. We’ll all be together again, in an 
hour’s time.”
We were not of course, de Valera refused to accept the undertaking, as tendered. He 
asked for it in writing, and to be made public at once, which, of course, he knew to 
be impossible, in the circumstances.1
For O’Hegarty, the anti-Treatyites were a spurious movement specifically set up to wreck 
the opportunity offered by the Treaty to capitalise on Ireland’s new won freedom. In sum 
therefore, the anti-Treatyites had abandoned the spirit of Sinn Fein and the purpose of 
separatism and, in casting aside the reasons behind the provenance of these movements, had
1 P.S O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), pp.786-787.
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nullified the right of the Irish people to determine their own democratic future.2 O’Hegarty 
stressed that: ‘had Dail Eireann rejected the Treaty it would not have reflected Irish opinion, 
any more than did Foster’s Parliament when it passed the Union in 1800....’3 Members of 
the Dail who had voted against the Treaty were defying the democratic wishes of the Irish 
people and were responsible for creating the anarchy and bloodshed of the Irish Civil War. 
O’Hegarty justified his acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in the same language and on 
the same separatist principles that characterised his original support of the Sinn Fein 
movement. He wholeheartedly believed that Sinn Fein, and, indeed, the IRB, were 
committed to doing the best they could for Irish independence as representatives of the Irish 
people without their embarking upon a dispute with the potential for damaging the Irish 
nation itself through inflicting further disagreement among the nation’s elected 
representatives.4
In his defence of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, O’Hegarty described his position as that of an 
‘unassociated separatist’5 seeking to avoid the ‘road to ruin’ that the anti-Treatyites seemed 
determined to embark upon. This theme formed the basis for his editorship of The 
Separatist a national, political weekly, bearing Wolfe Tone’s aphorism asserting the aims of 
the United Irishmen, “To break the connection with England....”6 as its motto. O’Hegarty’s 
arguments not only defended the Treaty but also attacked the ‘republican’, or, anti-Treatyite,
2 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence 1916-1922’, in 
Journal of Political Ideologies, October, 2003, Vol.8, no.3, p.543. Kissane has suggested ‘Although the press 
response probably exaggerated and amplified the positive response to the treaty, it became immediately 
apparent that support outside the Sinn Fein Dail greatly exceeded that within.’
3 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein', (Dublin, 1924), p.93.
4 The best source in capturing O’Hegarty’s thoughts on Sinn Fein were the series of articles he wrote in The 
Republic, during 1907 entitled: ‘Fenianism in Practice: An Irish Ireland philosophy’, a major source for 
determining O’Hegarty’s political thought, and alluded to throughout this thesis. The newspaper library located 
at the Belfast Central Library has an almost comprehensive collection of separatist journals and newspapers 
dating from this period.
5 The Separatist, March, 1922.
6 ‘Vincent Veritias’, in The Separatist, March, 1922.
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perspective for their interpretation of themselves as steadfastly upholding the separatist 
position. In addition, The Separatist attacked ‘republicans’ allegations of betrayal aimed at 
supporters of the Treaty, whom, they claimed, had prevented the attainment of the Irish 
Republic, as set down by Patrick Pearse, in his reading of the 1916 proclamation on the day 
of the Easter Rising.
O’Hegarty was singular in arguing from this perspective, and claimed a greater moral 
weight in his arguments for acceptance of the Treaty than those who were arguing against it. 
The chapter will examine why O’Hegarty thought that his opponents were mistaken by 
focusing upon two of the main protagonists; the President of Sinn Fein before his 
resignation in 1921, Eamon de Valera, and the women’s separatist organisation, Cumann na 
mBhan, who made up a significant part of the Sinn Fein movement. As some of the extreme 
exchanges between pro- and anti-Treatyite, supporters were provoked from these sources 
this chapter focuses on the main objections to the Treaty from the ‘republican’ perspective. 
For O’Hegarty, both de Valera and the women of the Sinn Fein movement were to form the 
heart of the ‘pseudo-republicans4, ‘irregulars’, or, ‘anti-democratic’7 forces the terms of 
derision that O’Hegarty used in The Separatist newspaper to describe his opponents.
The embracing of the term republican by these groups proved preposterous for O’Hegarty 
who was withering in his comments regarding their adoption of the republican name:
The ratification of the treaty by Dail Eireann was followed by the formation by Mr 
de Valera and his friends, of themselves into a party, which eventually called itself 
the Republican Party. Its original quarrel with the majority was not on the Republic, 
but on document number 2; but as document number 2 was discovered to be 
incapable of maintaining or extending a party, it was dropped, and the republic 
substituted. Mr. de Valera, however, remained faithful to document no. 2, and has at 
various times declared that he stands by it -  but nobody else does. The particular lie 
upon which the new party was founded, and upon which it still stands, is the lie that
7 The Separatist, May, 1922.
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its members, or rather its founders -  the fifty seven deputies who voted against the 
treaty -  were noble heroes who never agreed to any modification of the demand for 
independence; who never knew, in the period between the truce and the treaty, that 
there was any question of such a modification; and who never faltered in their 
determination to, as the cant has it, “maintain the existing Republic.”8
There were genuinely held concerns over the terms offered in the Anglo-Irish Treaty among 
the ‘republican’ camp. They consisted of the following: that the provisional government 
was merely the continuation of the British presence in Ireland albeit in another guise and 
that it was only under the coercive measures applied by Lloyd George and voiced to the 
plenipotentiaries that had led to the signing of the Treaty and the compromising of the 
separatist ‘idealism’ of the ‘Republic’.
Bill Kissane has put forward the following explanation in response to the concerns 
expressed by ‘republicans’, that
...the Anglo Irish treaty signed on 6 December 1921 gave 26 counties of Ireland a 
generous measure of practical freedom but denied the new state the symbolic apparel 
that might have made it legitimate in the eyes of most republicans...that it was the 
first time Irish nationalists had assented to inclusion in the British Empire.9
It is desirable to point out that O’Hegarty’s separatist arguments in defence of the Treaty do 
not conform exactly to Jeffrey Prager’s recent ‘Republican moralism vs. Nationalist 
pragmatism’10 explanation for the causes of the split over the Treaty in Sinn Fein. Prager’s 
simplified notion for the reasons behind Sinn Fein’s separation into pro and anti Treatyites 
does not do justice to the actual complexity of the respected positions adopted by 
individuals on both sides, as Bill Kissane has argued:
8 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.98.
9 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence, 1916-1922’, in 
Journal of Political Ideologies October 2003, Vol.8, no.3, p.337.
10 Jeffrey Prager, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (Cambridge, 1989), p. 146.
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Although the treaty settlement redefined post-revolutionary Sinn Fein into pro-and 
anti-treaty camps, the simplicity of the prefixes only serves to undermine the 
anomalous and contradictory relations both groups had with the settlement. The 
complex process of bifurcation leading to civil war did not divide and simplify 
inherent ideological contradictions present within revolutionary Sinn Fein, as Jeffrey 
Prager has suggested in his study of post revolutionary democratic politics in Ireland. 
Instead, it remixed them, at least in the case of the supporters of the treaty, into 
smaller but still contradictory component parts of a diverse whole. Furthermore, the 
persistent application of the term ‘republican’ exclusively to those who opposed the 
free state regime serves to ignore the complex and diverse reality of treatyite politics 
before 1924 and obfuscates the reasoning behind the acceptance of the settlement by 
treatyite republicans.11
In the following quotation, Kissane goes on to describe the problematic situation into which 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty was bom:
After 1918 Sinn Fein’s propaganda was directed more at the international than the 
domestic audience, and nearly all the documents suggesting the importance of the 
doctrine did reflect a general tension between its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ variants, 
but ultimately rested on particular arguments about the nature of Irish history. Since 
that history had always provided different models of independence, it was no 
surprise that the movement eventually found itself tom apart over questions of 
identity, progress, and democracy.12
The Treaty, in failing to satisfy many of the symbolic requirements of the ‘republicans’, 
provoked the following response from Austin Stack, a prominent anti-Treatyite, during the 
Treaty debates: ‘I for one cannot accept from England full Canadian powers, three quarters 
Canadian powers, or half Canadian powers. I stand for what is Ireland’s right, full 
independence and nothing short of it.’13
A feature of the republican argument was the characteristic use of separatist, IRB language 
against O’Hegarty’s pro-Treatyite position, and in seeing themselves as the newly
11 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence, 1916-1922’, in 
Journal o f Political Ideologies, October, 2003, p.563.
12 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence, 1916-1922’ in 
Journal of Political Ideologies, October, 2003, pp.327-346.
13 Nicholas Mansergh, Nationalism and Independence (Cork, 1977), p.99.
established minority and vanguard of the separatist movement complete with the authority 
for carrying out military operations against their opponents.14 Implicit within the idea of 
conspiratorial nationalism and the IRB as the ‘guide, the watcher’ (to use O’Hegarty’s 
phrase), was the ambiguous nature of the IRB Constitution of 1858, to which the 
republicans now heralded as supporting their cause. Leon O’Broin has stressed that the 
original Fenian programme was open to various interpretation:
...the individual solemnly swore to give allegiance to the ‘Irish Republic now 
virtually established’, to defend its independence and integrity, and, as before, to 
obey his superior officers in all things not contrary to the laws of morality...The 
‘democratic republic’ has disappeared -  the concern now is with a republic 
simpliciter -  and gone also are the references to secrecy and to the affairs of ‘this 
secret society’. ‘Henceforth’, said Luby, ‘we denied that we were technically a secret 
body. We called ourselves a mere military organisation with, so to speak, a legionary 
oath like [what] all soldiers [take]. He does not say why the word democratic was 
dropped: like ‘secret’ it was perhaps in the circumstances of that time, a dirty 
word.’15
After the vote in the Dail and the narrow ratification of the Treaty over the anti-Treatyites, 
the latter still viewed their position as one of upholding an unassailable and moral tradition 
enshrined in the IRB constitution. This was despite their rejection of the democratic process 
in the Dail and the majority of the country voting in favour of the ratification of the Treaty. 
The following review of The Victory of Sinn Fein taken from a journal supporting the 
‘republican’ position highlighted the animosity directed at O’Hegarty where he was cast as a 
traitor, a trait that became characteristic of the bitterness of the civil war and its aftermath. 
‘Fingan’ wrote that he was appalled at O’Hegarty’s defence of the Treaty and proclaimed
14 The Freeman’s Journal, March, 1923.
15 Leon O’Broin, ‘Revolutionary Nationalism in Ireland: the IRB, 1858-1924’, in T.W. Moody, (Ed.), 
Nationality and the Pursuit o f Independence, papers read before the [12th] Irish Conference of Historians, 
(Belfast, 1978), Vol. XI, p. 100.
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that O’Hegarty had ‘entered the select band, the P.S.’s and the A.E.’s and Y.O.’s and 
Gwynne’s and Figgiss’s who rival each other in traducing the fame of Ireland.’16 
Furthermore in a phrase that would have incensed O’Hegarty in his intention i.e. at belittling 
his life’s work in Sinn Fein, ‘Fingan’ dismissed The Victory of Sinn Fein as a book written 
to ‘please the Imperial Enemy.’17
Before the Civil War, in an article written in 1920, O’Hegarty had appealed for ‘honesty and 
clarity’ among the Dail members when voting for or against the terms offered in the Anglo- 
Irish Treaty. O’Hegarty emphasised that a vote to reject the Treaty based on the premise that 
the ‘republic’ was an attainable objective was to commit a dishonest action and therefore 
brought the separatist position into disrepute. He emphasised that now was the time for Sinn 
Fein through the Dail to exhibit the convictions allied with a resolute and strong 
government and to set aside the rhetoric of the past four years:
There were two courses open to it. The first was to say, “We cannot decide this as a 
Party question; we have to do our best for the people as a whole. The people trusted 
us, and we are their servants...Let us, then, take the responsibility which is properly 
ours; let us ratify this treaty and let us use it in order to enable ourselves at some 
future date, or our successors, to take the final step of separation.”...the second way 
was to say, “This Dail is a war Dail and not a peace Dail...it does not really 
represent the best of Sinn Fein. The people as a whole are entitled to be heard. We 
will go to them and say: we are offered this, which is less than independence, but 
which is more than anybody ten years ago deemed possible of achievement. We ask 
you to pronounce upon It.” .. .It was Sinn Fein’s test and it failed the test. It adopted 
neither of the statesmanlike and sensible courses, which were open to it, and it 
blundered terribly by considering the whole question from a narrow party and 
personal point of view.18
16 Sean Mcentee Papers, (University College Dublin), P67/86.
17 Sean Mcentee Papers, (University College Dublin), P67/86.
18 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.94.
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Here, in continuation of the ‘moral cowardice’19 that O’Hegarty attributed to the decadent 
years of Sinn Fein, members of the Dail, when faced with the reality of the Treaty, claimed 
they had never compromised over their commitment to the republican ideal:
The personal bitterness displayed in the Dail debate, the personal attacks made, the 
attempt to load the responsibility for the situation on this or that group or individual, 
we condemn wholeheartedly. They were all responsible....They are all faced now 
with the wreck of the movement which they led up to six months ago, and upon 
them all is the responsibility of mending that wreck.20
In an optimistic article written before the civil war, O’Hegarty appealed for ‘honesty and 
clarity’ among members of the Dail:
What the leaders on both sides have to do now is to take stock. We have to begin by 
recognising that the separatist movement, as a whole, has suffered a check. As 
against this treaty, the nation, as a whole, would not now fight for a Republic. It 
would prefer a Republic, but it would not fight for it, as it thinks that the Treaty 
gives it something which it can stand on and breathe awhile, pending a fresh effort.
But be that as it may, we are back again where we were years ago, a Separatist 
minority, this time under an Irish government instead of under an English 
government, which makes the position somewhat more difficult....We have to work 
so that [the future] shall be with us again.. ..And let no man say that the Republic is 
dead. Its life is neither in Dail Eireann nor in the IRA, but in the spirit and the will of 
the Irish people. And these, ultimately, we are always sure of.21
The important consideration for O’Hegarty was that akin to Michael Collins and Arthur 
Griffith,22 he believed the Anglo-Irish Treaty was the best result Ireland could have hoped 
for given the strength of the British Empire and the failure of Sinn Fein to gain a hearing at 
the International Peace Conference in 1919.23 This marked a new era in the right to self 
determination for small nations as defined in the American President, Woodrow Wilson’s
19 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.89.
20 New Ireland, 14 January, 1922.
21 New Ireland, January 14th, 1922.
22 Both Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins’s legacies to Ireland are described in O'Hegarty’s The Victory of 
Sinn Fein and A History of Ireland under the Union. See Appendix in this thesis also.
23 Old Ireland, March 10, 1920.
‘Fourteen Points’ but as Sinn Fein were denied a hearing at the Peace Conference the dream 
of attaining the republic now lay defunct. One of the main purposes of Sinn Fein in the run 
up to the Peace Conference had been to apply the force of world opinion on the British 
Government.
It was obvious, after the turning down of Ireland by the Versailles Peace Conference 
and the United States of America, that independence was not feasible. It could not be 
won by physical force to balance England’s physical force, because we had not, nor 
could we possibly develop enough physical force to balance England’s physical 
force. It could not be won by diplomacy and international intrigue, because the only 
Great power which might be expected to support Ireland had definitely turned 
Ireland down and would do nothing to force England to agree to independence; and 
because none of the smaller powers who might have liked to support us dare do it, 
with England stronger than ever she had been....We had no longer an international 
hearing which could be of any use to us, outside of England itself. If independence 
was to come, it could only come by agreement with England. If England lacked the 
will to that agreement, we could not force her to agree - and no other nation was 
likely to.24
As the Irish contingent had failed to influence the Peace Conference in Ireland’s favour, 
England was now free to settle the question internally and on their own terms and those 
opposed to the Treaty in Sinn Fein who still believed that the republic was attainable were 
ideologues unable to deal with the realities that this failure to gain a hearing at the Peace 
Conference represented. O’Hegarty commented: ‘Mr. de Valera knew that, as his every 
action showed...Cathal Brugha knew that - as his acceptance of “external 
association”. . .showed.’25
O’Hegarty also related how Griffith was fully aware of this reality and in a rare criticism 
complained that, like de Valera, made no move to ensure that the Irish people were aware 
that the Republic was beyond the scope of Sinn Fein:
24 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.92.
25 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.92.
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Griffith knew it, and de Valera knew it, and why the one made no attempt to soften 
the violence and the intemperateness of “Republican” propaganda, to prepare the 
people for that settlement short of a Republic, which he knew, must be the most 
favourable outcome we could expect.26
However, Griffith was honest in that he admitted to himself that the Republic was 
unattainable. Griffith did not display the strain of dogmatic idealism that O’Hegarty 
associated with the faction who rejected the Treaty after its democratic sanctioning by the 
Dail and the Irish people. In O’Hegarty’s mind, the republicans either ignored the recent 
circumstances in which the possibility of attaining the Republic was dead or indulged in 
pitiable hypocrisy. For O’Hegarty the first policy was conducted by die-hard republicans, 
and the second by de Valera and the Dail deputies who refused to accept responsibility for 
anything less than the Republic, through their insistence on the settlement proposal that de 
Valera put forward of ‘external association’ with the British Empire as an alternative to the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty. (For explanations of this see Appendix n, which describes the 
conversation that took place between O’Hegarty, and Arthur Griffith regarding de Valera’s 
idea, which Michael Collins dubbed ‘document no.2’.)
As far as O’Hegarty was concerned, the Treaty had marked a revolution in Anglo-Irish 
affairs as it had established Ireland’s right to be no longer considered a British colony. 
Furthermore, the Treaty's ambiguous tone would help establish, in the words of Michael 
Collins, ‘the freedom to achieve freedom’. As Collins stated:
Britain knows well that she can keep world opinion without conceding a Republic.
She believes now, as she believed in July last, that she cannot afford to concede it. 
That it would break up the Commonwealth -  that it would destroy her security and 
prestige if she were to acquiesce in a forcible breaking away, which would show her
26 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.757.
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so-called Empire to be so intolerable, or herself so feeble as to be unable to prevent 
it. But she will acquiesce in the ultimate separation of the units, we amongst them, 
by evolution, which will not expose her and not endanger her.27
Republican idealism had reached its peak when public anger erupted over the execution of 
the leaders of the 1916 Easter Rising and there was widespread sympathy among 
nationalists for the aims of the rebellion. O’Hegarty was acutely aware of the powerful 
symbolic meaning of martyrdom in the separatist tradition. The hagiography of United 
Irishmen such as Wolfe Tone and Robert Emmet in the nationalist tradition now included 
the men of the 1916 Easter Rising. So too, on the death of O’Hegarty’s schoolfellow and 
friend Terence MacSwiney, during his imprisonment in Mountjoy jail, while on hunger 
strike, the canon of nationalist martyrs was extended further with O’Hegarty, for instance, in 
A History of Ireland under the Union describing MacSwiney’s death as a ‘judicial murder’ 
which drew world-attention to the plight of Ireland.28 These views became the justification 
for the anti-Treatyites terming themselves ‘republicans’, the carriers of the uncompromising 
Fenian spirit that sought to gain full independence for Ireland that they were the living 
representatives of the men who had died for Ireland in the name of the ‘republic’. Yet 
O’Hegarty saw himself as an unequivocal and dedicated separatist. It was immensely 
important for him to get this across in his defence of the Treaty that there was no 
compromise in accepting the Treaty and to attack his opponents for daring to suggest 
otherwise. He was emphatic in denying that the Fenian philosophy dictated an inflexible 
attitude toward the ‘republican’ ideal and that separatists could never have dismissed the 
opportunities that the Treaty represented to build an Ireland on the principles of Sinn Fein.
27 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence, 1916-1922’, in 
Journal of Political Ideologies October 2003, Vol.8, no.3, p.338.
28 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.743.
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O’Hegarty emphasised how the Treaty meant a substantial loosening of Ireland’s colonial 
ties to England, and furthermore, the Fenian philosophy was not a doctrinaire one and 
would never have prosecuted a war on its fellow Irish people.
O’Hegarty’s demonisation of de Valera began, when it emerged that de Valera had been 
engaged in these secret negotiations over a possible settlement to the Anglo-Irish war and an 
agreement over the future of Irish independence. While this was a commendable act for 
O’Hegarty, especially given his dismay over the prosecution of the Anglo-Irish War and the 
guerrilla tactics deployed, the correspondence that passed between de Valera and Lloyd 
George, over a period of three months, confirmed that further negotiations toward 
establishing a ‘republic’ was unfeasible ground upon which official discussions could begin. 
At this point de Valera had accepted that the establishment of a republic was out of the 
question. In A History of Ireland under the Union. O’Hegarty disclosed that: ‘The Republic 
itself was a fine objective. But it was plainly unobtainable’.29
In the whole of the correspondence the Irish republic was only mentioned by de 
Valera to assure Lloyd George that we were not asking England to recognise it, as a 
preliminary, either formally or informally; while when the first British terms were 
published the Irish Bulletin attacked them, not because they did not concede Ireland 
independence, but because while offering Dominion status they did not really give 
it.30
O’Hegarty added:
The most average intelligence had only to devote five minutes’ thought to the 
circumstances of the Truce, and the de Valera -  Lloyd George correspondence, to 
see that the negotiations would be on the implicit basis of “No Republic,” and that 
de Valera was merely trying to save face.31
29 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.730.
30 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 190.
31 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.98.
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Negotiations on the status of a future Irish parliament were always going to be a strenuous 
and difficult affair and as the later conflict over the inclusion of the oath of allegiance to the 
English monarch in the Treaty proved, the primacy of terminology proved decisive. 
Naturally, the basis for any possible settlement between the two parties needed to be made 
clear. In this respect Lloyd George had made two items clear to de Valera, that he was ‘Not 
recognising either the Republic or the Dail, that he was not proposing to recognise Ireland 
as a sovereign power, and that he was not prepared to tamper with the six-county Parliament 
without its own consent.’32
In consenting to send the Irish delegates to the London Conference to negotiate with the 
British Government (beginning on 11/10/21), de Valera was confirming that the aim ‘was 
one for reconciling Irish self government with the British system.’33
For O’Hegarty it was an obvious observation to make at this time that the British 
Government were never going to open negotiations on the possibility of granting Ireland 
complete freedom from the British Commonwealth, and that de Valera was certainly aware 
of this but after the signing of the Treaty refused to admit to being aware of this. This 
formed one reason for O’Hegarty’s bitterness after the Treaty, that de Valera maintained a 
posture which he claimed could not be compromised and subsequently tore Sinn Fein apart 
over the definition of ‘Dominion Status’ as a poor relation of ‘External Association’.
For O’Hegarty, de Valera’s responsibilities added to the confusion surrounding the public 
and private instmctions issued to the plenipotentiaries who were to negotiate on behalf of 
the Dail with the English government to agree to a settlement over Ireland’s independent
32 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.747.
33 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.747.
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status.34 However, it was clear to the Dail and to the plenipotentiaries that their scope for 
negotiation was limited as they were attached:
[to] negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland, with the representatives of His 
Majesty George V, a treaty or treaties of settlement, association, and accommodation 
between Ireland and the Commonwealth of Nations known as the British 
Commonwealth.35
While for O’Hegarty, the plenipotentiaries had successfully concluded this remit, but they 
had returned to Ireland not as heroes but as traitors strengthening O’Hegarty’s resentment 
and bitterness toward the moral hypocrisy of the Dail during the ‘Great Talk.’36 Those who 
claimed that to reject the Treaty was to remain true to the republican ideal were denigrating 
the real purpose of Sinn Fein as a movement formed to generate enthusiasm for and if 
possible instigate the best settlement they possibly could for Irish independence. A recent 
scholar in concurrence with 0 ’Hegarty‘s evaluation of this period was also shocked that as 
the country plunged further into chaos at the hands of the braggadocio and power exercised 
by the Volunteers, the Dail became more ‘preoccupied with Oaths and formulae’.37 
O’Hegarty believed that this was the product of de Valera’s rejection of the Treaty. The 
terms upon which the Treaty agreement was reached did not conform to his exact 
requirements and therefore his personal pride had been affronted. Principally, that de Valera 
was guilty of putting his vanity before the concerns and welfare of the Irish people. Quoting 
de Valera in The Separatist as proclaiming: “We know the people of Ireland do not want to 
forswear the independence they have declared,” O’Hegarty, questioned the reasoning behind 
de Valera’s thinking:
34 Robert Barton, who has been described as de Valera’s ‘placeman’ in the negotiations also complained of de 
Valera’s vacillating position during this period. See John Bowman, De Valera (Oxford, 1982), p.3.
35 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.751.
36 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), chapter XVI and here, appendix I.
37 T.P.Coogan, Michael Collins, (London, 1990), p.308.
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If this has any practical meaning, as apart from a propagandist meaning, it means 
that Mr. de Valera knows that the people of Ireland do not want the Treaty. Very 
well. How does he know? There is only one way of finding out whether they do or 
that they don’t...the only support Mr. De Valera has against the will of the people is 
the tyranny of the Anti-Treaty army, and that, therefore, he supports that against 
democracy.38
The ultimate act of betrayal that O’Hegarty charged de Valera with was that he carried a 
band of armed men with him working to hinder the opportunities the Treaty gave to the new 
Irish state. This, for O’Hegarty, shed any separatist credentials de Valera had displayed prior 
to the Treaty negotiations, de Valera through his ill-timed introduction of ‘external 
association’ as a way out of the self termed ‘strait-jacket of the Republic’ transformed 
internal squabbling surrounding mere ‘words and a figurehead’ into the Civil War. 
O’Hegarty didn’t deny that the oath of allegiance was an unpleasant facet of the Treaty for 
separatists to swallow but it was not worth splitting Sinn Fein into two rival factions, i.e. 
pro and anti-Treatyite and setting the conditions for the prosecution of the Irish Civil War. 
O’Hegarty acknowledged that:
The oath is objectionable. It is the real crux. But it is objectionable only because it 
implies association with the British Empire. In itself, it is harmless, and as its 
primary allegiance is to the Irish Free State, it is as weak an oath as could be devised.
But it was obvious from the beginning of the negotiations that an oath of allegiance 
or association would be an end to them. And this is an oath of association far more 
than it is an oath of allegiance.’39
In O’Hegarty’s view, in one stroke de Valera had maimed the newly created Irish state’s 
chances of a smooth transition of power and degraded the sterling work begun by the
38 The Separatist, May 20th, 1922.
39 New Ireland, December 17th, 1921. de Valera’s alternative oath put forward ‘before the Treaty’,
[O’Hegarty’s italics], read: “I,.............., do swear to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of Ireland
and the Treaty of Association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to recognise the King 
of Great Britain as Head of the Associated States.” The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.218.
plenipotentiaries in London in securing the favourable measures obtained in the Treaty. He 
felit that under the circumstances the plenipotentiaries had gotten the best deal they possibly 
coiuld for Ireland:
The treaty set up in Ireland an independent Irish state, with full control over Ireland’s 
territory and resources and international relations, subject to certain verbal 
limitations of no practical consequence, these limitations being, none of them, things 
which were unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances. Lloyd George’s government 
went, in the matter of the treaty, to the utmost limit of concession and, whatever their 
motives, they paid magnificent deference to the susceptibilities of a people naturally 
touchy in what might seem to impinge on their full freedom in every respect. Lloyd 
George himself was never forgiven by the Conservatives for his part in the treaty, 
and it was one of the main causes of his political eclipse. That a nation which had 
just won the greatest war in history should sit down and accept at its face value 
Ireland’s bluff, and give in fact everything which was asked while colouring it 
sufficiently to deceive themselves that something was being withheld, deserves and 
ought to get generous and unrestrained appreciation from Ireland.40
For O’Hegarty, given his standing and position of authority de Valera’s actions amounted to
a treasonous abuse of his power. It was Griffith’s character rather than de Valera’s that
O’Hegarty perceived as a truer reflection of the collective conscience of the Irish people:
Here was power, intellect, and determination, and above all and behind all a sturdy 
commonsense, a commonness in the sense that you felt at once that here was that 
rare thing, a man of the people, bone of their bone, and flesh of their flesh, 
understanding them with all their national instinct and national sureness, their 
decency, and their absence of side, and yet the most powerful and steadfast intellect 
in Ireland.41
Consequently, after de Valera’s resignation and withdrawal from the Dail after being 
defeated on the Treaty vote (an action O’Hegarty saw as denying any other possibility of 
settling differences) the decay of the Irish state set in for O’Hegarty. He condemned de
40 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.773.
41 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein’ (Dublin, 1924), p. 129.
Valera for his private and public face regarding the renewed acts of violence that began to 
be committed by the anti-Treatyite forces.42
The provenance of the civil war therefore had begun with the working of “Mr. De Valera’s 
poison gas” in which:
He had let the bitterness loose. He had let the guns loose. He placed his whole moral 
force at the disposal of the men who were working to prevent a plebiscite, to prevent 
any sort of a vote on the treaty, and who were prepared to go any lengths against it.
He was never afterwards able to call his dogs, the dogs of war, back after loosing 
them.43
In addition ‘the only support Mr. De Valera has against the will of the people is the tyranny 
of the Anti-Treaty army, and that, therefore, he supports that against democracy’.44 
This was the crucial argument for O’Hegarty, for while de Valera publicly disassociated 
himself from the violence of the ‘republicans’ he was the catalyst for their actions and in 
private supported their aims of overthrowing the Free State government. Once again, 
O’Hegarty referred to the duplicity he saw as predominant in de Valera’s actions. He 
attributed de Valera with displaying the characteristics of the political opportunist and one 
who had turned “verbal dialectics into a bitter and searing split.” de Valera had managed to 
gain support for his tenuous position among hard-line republicans by developing the 
following method:
.. .external association..., which was explained to Cathal Brugha, who had recovered 
from his wounds, received in the Insurrection, to have his normal fanaticism 
strengthened to the point where he was prepared to split on the difference in the most 
theoretical fraction of a hair’s breadth, and in another way to Griffith.45
42 The Separatist, May 20th, 1922.
43 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.82.
44 The Separatist, May 20th, 1922.
45 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.717.
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In addition to de Valera’s pivotal role in creating the split, O’Hegarty focused upon the 
women of the Sinn Fein movement, Cumann Na mBhan as prominent in raising the 
tennperature in the Dail and in their recourse to militant language as a reaction to the terms 
of the Treaty.
Firstly, however, it is worth reflecting upon O’Hegarty’s views on women in politics in 
general in order to contextualise his views on their actions from the beginnings of the 
Anglo/Irish War through to the Irish Civil War.
O’ Hegarty’s idea of civic nationalism signalled that men and women were equal citizens 
under the rule of law and this prevented his being discriminatory toward women in a 
political sense as his article entitled ‘The Emancipation of Women’ in Irish Freedom in 
1912, written in support of the suffragette movement and characteristically liberal for its 
time substantiated:
I do not know whether any reader of Freedom thinks that women ought not to be 
emancipated, but if so I should like to know why. I have never yet met an anti- 
Suffragist who could find a cogent reason for his position, or who did not make me 
feel that he was reflecting on his mother or on his wife. A general expression of an 
opinion of the woman’s place is the home -  with the implication that she ought to be 
employed in darning socks and washing dishes while the man smokes a pipe and 
talks about politics and art -  is not a reason for refusing women emancipation. It is 
just a hereditary prejudice. Modem civilization is based upon the subjection of 
women; economic and personal subjection, and out of that subjection have come the 
worst of the social evils which threaten civilization....The demand for emancipation, 
symbolised at present is the demand for the suffrage, is the demand for an 
intellectual awakening, of a moral and physical revolt -  a demand which men ought 
to welcome instead of deprecating.’46
The official Sinn Fein views on the emancipation of women in society and their role in 
politics did contain a message of equality among the sexes but O’Hegarty’s advanced 
liberalist view, related above, and far exceeded the following Sinn Fein position:
46 Irish Freedom , September, 1912.
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Sinn Fein was not actively anti-feminist; in fact, it was a fond tenet recently among 
nationalist women that in the nationalist movement women were treated with an 
equal seriousness and ‘a greater courtesy’ than the men. The Gaelic League was the 
first nationalist society to accept women as members on the same terms as men; and 
in Sinn Fein, women were elected frequently to the executive. Nonetheless, support 
for women’s rights, which at this time centred on getting the vote, was never one of 
Sinn Fein’s priorities.47
O’Hegarty described the women of Sinn Fein as responding irrationally and irresponsibly 
and as representing the worst elements of Republican dogmatism. O’Hegarty’s comments 
contrasted with the traditionally romanticised view of women in Irish history in their 
untiring support for Irish nationalism and their depiction as the inspiration for men’s 
patriotism. During the nineteenth century, ‘Speranza’ (the nationalist pseudonym of Oscar 
Wilde’s mother) for example, had been a strong supporter of John Mitchel’s radical policy 
and movement away from the constitutional policy of the Irish Confederation.48 Speranza 
wrote. “We are constantly hearing that ‘women have no business with politics, this we 
deny.. .active patriotism is a duty bearing equally upon man and woman.. .”49 
However, after the Easter Rising and the execution of its leaders the women of the 
movement became more distrustful of the constitutional side of Sinn Fein (as with all its 
new personnel for O’Hegarty) and campaigned on the ‘Republican’ framework that 
characterised Sinn Fein during these years. For O’Hegarty however the bulk of the women 
of the Sinn Fein movement acted as a group supporting each other’s dogmatic position 
rather than as representatives of Sinn Fein. This was combined with a hysteria and
47 Margaret Ward, Unmanageable Revolutionaries (London, 1983), p.72. O’Hegarty too, acknowledged Sinn 
Fein’s respect for women in its political organisation: Women in politics were no new thing in Ireland. In Sinn 
Fein itself they had always worked side by side with the men, and in the early Sinn Fein days there had been a 
woman’s organisation -Inginidhe na Eireann- founded by Maud Gonne, which had been active and useful. Buts 
its work had been social and constructive...’ P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.56.
48 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p. 142.
49 Brigitte Anton, ’Women of the Nation’ in History Ireland, Volume 1, Autumn, 1993, p.93.
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emotional intensity that followed de Valera’s accusation that those who supported the 
Treaty were ‘traitors’ not only to the Irish Republic but to ‘him.’ O’Hegarty cited the 
following meeting with Cumann na mBhan member, Mary Comerford, as an example of the 
capriciousness he believed he witnessed and came to despise in Sinn Fein during this 
period:
On the morning of the publication of the news of the signature of the treaty, I met 
Mary Comerford, one of the most prominent of Cumann na mBhan workers. “Have 
you seen the paper?” said she. “Yes.” “Do you believe it?” “Of course I believe it; I 
told you weeks ago that something of this sort was coming.” She stopped for a 
moment, shrugged her shoulders, and then turned away. “Ah well, all for the best.
No more war.” In the afternoon, Mr. De Valera’s pronouncement came out, and 
Miss Comerford promptly embraced it. Left to herself, she would have given the 
treaty a trial. So would nearly all those who, as things turned out, rallied to Mr. De 
Valera’s hypocritical cry that he “had been betrayed.”50
The women of Sinn Fein had traditionally held the following position during the Anglo- 
Irish War ‘...each company of the IRA had a branch of Cumann na mBhan attached to 
it....in other words, Cumann na mBhan’s main function was to service the needs of the 
local volunteers.’51 The following passage cited from The Victory of Sinn Fein however 
depicted a more sinister view of their position:
As the war lengthened, it became more brutal, more savage, more hysterical, and 
more unrelievedly black. But its worst effect was on the women. They were the first 
to be thrown off their base, and as the war lengthened, they steadily deteriorated. 
They took to their hearts every catch-cry, every narrowness, and every bitterness, and 
steadily eliminated from themselves every womanly feeling. It organised itself on a 
“military” basis, got itself uniforms, called itself “Commandant” and “Captain,” 
threw overboard construction and devoted itself to destruction. War, and the things 
which war breeds - intolerance, swagger, hardness, unwomanliness - captured the 
women, turned them into unlovely, destructive-minded, arid begetters of violence, 
both physical violence and mental violence.52
50 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.73.
51 Margaret Ward, Unmanageable Revolutionaries (London, 1983), p.72.
52 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), pp.56-58.
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O’Hegarty’s views need not be taken in isolation although the accusations singling out the 
attitudes and actions of the Sinn Fein women were rare. His fellow separatist in the pre and 
post revolutionary period of the twentieth century Batt O’Connor,53 took a similar view 
drawing attention to the romanticised role of the martyr in the irregular’s ideology. 
O’Connor emphasised how the talk of the women consisted of constant references to 
relatives who died for Ireland, relatives who would be distraught at the compromise and 
betrayal engendered by those who signed and ratified the treaty.54 While this was an 
understandable attitude for many of the Sinn Fein women to hold given the loss of their 
husbands and brothers in the name of the separatist cause, O’Connor lamentably noted the 
following observation:
I regret to have to write this about our own brave good women and girls that gave so 
much help in our dark trying days of the terror but they completely lost their heads 
when the president came out and condemned the treaty they at once formed an idea 
that Collins was a traitor or else the President would not take the stand he did and 
now when it has been proved that brave Collins got all that was possible for Ireland 
they (the women) feel the humiliation of their position and the hasty judgement they 
formed.55
In his condemnation of the women of the Sinn Fein movement O’Hegarty did not extend his 
criticisms to all of Sinn Fein’s women members. O’Hegarty made an exception of the 
women for whom he believed did not display hypocritical tendencies in their republican 
beliefs in relation to the Treaty vote. O’Hegarty held some sympathy for Mrs Tom Clarke in
53 Batt O’Connor was a pro-Treatyite like O’Hegarty. O’Connor also knew Michael Collins well acting as his 
driver during the War of Independence and admired his character for similar reasons to O’Hegarty. See 
University College Dublin, Special Archives Department for Batt O’Connor’s letters. See Appendix III for 
O’Hegarty’s sketch of Michael Collins’s character and The Victory of Sinn Fein, Chapter XXVI.
54 Jason Knirck, ‘Afterimage of the revolution: Kevin O'Higgins and the Irish revolution -  1’, in Eire-lreland: 
Journal of Irish Studies, Fall-Winter, 2003. Kevin O'Higgins associated women's political activity with 
republicanism and remained deeply suspicious of both throughout his time in government.
55 Batt O’Connor Papers (University College Dublin), P68.
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adopting her anti-Treatyite position, as he believed her convictions had not wavered over 
her commitment to the ‘republican’ ideals she held from the beginning of her separatist 
career. He commented: ‘Mrs. Clarke was one of the very few deputies who never had, and 
never pretended to have, any illusions as to what the Truce meant, and her vote against the 
Treaty was because she disliked it, and not because of Mr. De Valera’s “betrayal” pose.’56 
The notion of betraying the cause of Irish nationalism in republican ideology held serious 
repercussions particularly from the beginning of the Anglo-Irish War, where traitors were 
shot for their duplicity. Therefore, de Valera’s accusation aimed at the plenipotentiaries of 
betraying the ‘republic’ was unforgivable for O’Hegarty.
Mary MacSwiney, for whom O’Hegarty devoted a chapter in The Victory of Sinn Fein, took 
up the idea of the Irish delegation in London and the ensuing pro-Treatyite supporters as 
committing the ultimate betrayal to the Republican ideology with the greatest of fervour. 
This chapter, quoted from below, formed the most vociferous of O’Hegarty’s railing against 
the women of the Sinn Fein movement. Even in A History of Ireland under the Union where 
he displayed a more temperate view of the reasons for the Anglo-Irish war and the Civil 
War, he maintained two charges against his opponents. He charged de Valera with 
beginning the split in Sinn Fein and charged Mary MacSwiney’s virulent speech launched 
during the Treaty debates as crucial.57
At the time of writing The Victory of Sinn Fein however O’Hegarty was to mimic this form 
of virulent language. This description of Mary MacSwiney as a sea green incorruptible was 
apt as O’Hegarty believed that she was fully aware of her hypocritical stance, that she knew 
full well that the republic was unattainable from the time of de Valera’s secret meetings
56 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (London, 1924), p.103-104.
57 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.779.
with Lloyd George and yet she created a wave of resentment over this issue among the Sinn 
Feiin women, when the fact of the ‘republic’ had never been attainable:
...of all the impostures with which the Party is made up, perhaps the most shameless 
and loathsome (after that of de Valera) is that which Miss Mary MacSwiney has so 
persistently and sedulously foisted on the country -  the imposture of herself as a 
“Sea-green Incorruptible.”58
O’Hegarty described how Mary MacSwiney was aware how:
.. .before the plenipotentiaries were appointed, that the Republic had been thrown 
overboard; she knew, when she was going to the session of the Dail which appointed 
the plenipotentiaries, that she was going to agree to the appointment of 
plenipotentiaries who would not discuss a Republic.59
O’Hegarty in quoting fully their meeting in The Victory of Sinn Fein was emphasising the 
irrational side to Mary MacSwiney’s character from which he attributed some of the blame 
for the occurrence of the civil war in Ireland. On Mary MacSwiney’s return from America, 
where she was campaigning for Sinn Fein, O’Hegarty related how she came to see him and 
the discussion that ensued:
“Well, Mary, you see I was right.” (It was then the beginning of September, 1921, 
and I did not conceive that anybody could possibly then have any doubts about what 
was happening).
“No, I don’t admit that, yet.”
“Why not?”
“Well, I’ve been to see de Valera, and I asked him was he compromising, and he 
assures me that he stands where he always stood.”
“Very well, Mary. Now, leave de Valera out of it and use your own intelligence, de 
Valera spent a week with Lloyd George, in private conclave. Nobody knows what 
they discussed. But do you think they discussed a Republic?”
“Well, no; I don’t.”
“Then what the devil do you mean by pretending that I was not right?”
58 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 106.
59 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.106.
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“I know we won’t get a Republic, but I think we might get some semi-independent 
connexion with England which we could accept.”60
Her claim that she was a: ‘better Republican than Mick Collins or than any of the 
Republicans who were shot by her fellow pseudo-Republicans in the civil war’, was nothing 
short of shameful and dishonourable for O’Hegarty. Her comment directed at Griffith and 
Collins that ‘You are worse than Castlereagh’, and, ‘that those deputies who had broken 
their oath by conspiring to overthrow the republic had forfeited their right to sit in Dail 
Eireann and that the faithful republican deputies, assembling together, would have the 
constitutional right to act as the second Dail.’61
For O’Hegarty, Griffith and Collins were individuals of conviction and commitment who 
had argued and pressed for acceptance of the Anglo-Irish treaty for the good of all of Ireland 
and certainly not for any personal gain. Moreover Mary MacSwiney included in her canon 
of faithful ‘republicans’ her late brother Terence MacSwiney, a close friend of O’Hegarty, 
who had died on hunger strike in 1919. Mary MacSwiney claimed that acceptance of the 
treaty was a disgrace on the memory of her brother. Yet O’Hegarty was convinced that 
Terence would have accepted the Treaty on the same reasoning as he had. In A History of 
Ireland under the Union, he described how in:
1906, the liberals had been returned to power, and in 1907 they introduced a Bill for 
the setting up of an Irish council bill which should co-ordinate and control eight of 
the most important government boards in Ireland....many people thought that this 
measure should be allowed to pass - amongst them were P.H. Pearse and Terence 
MacSwiney, who were both of the opinion that since it gave Ireland control of 
education it ought not be actively opposed.62
60 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.107.
61 Mary MacSwiney, September 1922, quoted in Dorothy Macadle, The Irish Republic (London, 1968), p.711.
62 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.656.
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O’Hegarty believed this was a trait present only in the new breed of Sinn Feiner or the 
hypocrite who claimed they had never believed they would be accepting anything less than 
a republic. These people were beyond comprehending the momentous achievement the 
Treaty represented for those who had beggared and slaved for Irish independence. The 
women of Sinn Fein in casting aside restraint at this time intensified the disunity and 
distrust that now pre-dominated the Sinn Fein movement. O’Hegarty was genuinely 
appalled by the hard line republican attitude of the women and chastised their support of 
continuing the gun policy of Sinn Fein. These women were no longer belligerent or fighting 
out of necessity in the defence of their country against the English invader yet their 
experiences as war mongerers and commandants stayed with them to the detriment of 
Ireland. O’Hegarty was critical of the fact that they assumed like de Valera that they knew 
the true mind of the Irish nation even after the Irish people had democratically voted in 
favour of the Treaty.
For O’Hegarty the presence of the inflexible doctrinaire mind exhibited in the women of 
the Sinn Fein movement was an unforgivable trait. Much of his disillusionment was turned 
toward the irrationality of the period and as with de Valera, O’Hegarty singled out the 
women as the villains through whom he could vent his anger, hence the language he used 
in The Victory of Sinn Fein was sometimes shocking and offensive. For O’Hegarty de 
Valera and the women of Sinn Fein were cognisant that their words and deeds were 
injurious toward Ireland‘s future but refused to face up to their responsibilities.
No longer could it be demonstrated for O’Hegarty that:
our deep rooted belief that there was something in us finer than, more spiritual than, 
anything in any other people, was sheer illusion, and that we were really an 
uncivilised people with savage instincts. O’Hegarty commented how: the “Island of
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Saints and Scholars” is burst like Humpty Dumpty, and we do not quite know yet
what we are going to get in its place.63
It was the lack of vision at the time of the Treaty displayed by those on the anti-Treatyite 
side that frustrated O’Hegarty. They had short-sightedly focused on a form of words that 
O’Hegarty saw as nominal. The major reason for accepting the Treaty for O’Hegarty could 
be summarised in the following assertion written in 1922, ‘Douglas Hyde spoke of “de- 
anglicising Ireland.” Well we have seen it: We have seen England and her civilization 
swinging out of Ireland.64
For O’Hegarty, in his separatist arguments in favour of the Treaty, the Fenian spirit 
remained but they needed to be placed in a new context to reflect the very real prospect of 
Ireland achieving independence. In the light of such an incredible achievement the IRB, 
like Sinn Fein, were no longer motivated by propaganda and conspiracy: instead, their 
objective was to permit the Treaty the chance to move toward full self-government for 
Ireland. For O’Hegarty, it was incredulous to think that those who rejected the Treaty had 
failed to see the magnitude of their generation’s accomplishment. Moreover, the goal had 
been reached democratically and the people including the ‘Underground Nation’ had voted 
for the Treaty. This vote had taken into account the unnecessary use of violence and 
therefore the militaristic aims of the republicans were not implemented in the name of 
those people. O’Hegarty emphasised the significance of this and was correct in identifying 
the mood of the country as tired of war and eager to accept the benefits of the Treaty.65 On a 
more practical note too, it was disclosed to O’Hegarty by Michael Collins that the IRB
63 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 126.
64 The Separatist, March, 1922.
65 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.93.
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were incapable of continuing the guerrilla war against the English forces. O’Hegarty, years 
later reflecting on this period, in a letter to Florrie O’Donoghue remarked on:
Notes on certain things, which had not been written down, and of which, I imagine, 
nobody but myself has now any cognisance. On the Saturday week after the Treaty 
was signed, MC [Michael Collins] summoned a meeting of the IRB circle...of 
which I was a member.. .he regarded his first duty.. .to the IRB and cared nothing for 
any other opinion. He said that in June 1921, the total number of men in Active 
Service Units all over Ireland.. .was 1617...and they could not hope to operate much 
longer...dealing with his own appointment as a plenipotentiary, he said: - “I did not 
want to go over. I told de Valera that I was not the person to go, that he would get a 
better settlement if he left me at home as a sort of dark horse.. .and he would be able 
to say, at a crisis, we cannot accept that. Collins and the IRB would not accept it.” 
Collins wanted to play the IRB as a last card. But the charge which has been so 
freely made that the Treaty was forced on the Dail by the IRB is without foundation.
It was not the IRB, but the others, who tried to force things from the beginning. 
Immediately the Treaty was signed, Brugha and Mellowes got a car from Tony 
Woods of Donnybrook, driven by his son, with which they visited every Volunteer 
(or IRA) - 1 always think of them as Volunteers the IRA sort of stinking in my ears) 
Corps in Ireland, exhorting and pledging them to maintain the existing Republic. 
And in Cork, Brugha asked my brother, [Sean], then Commandant of No.l Cork 
Brigade, to kidnap the Cork pro-Treaty deputies just before the final vote, so that 
their votes could not be recorded.66
For O’Hegarty the Treaty marked more than any home rule bill ever could have as it carried 
within it a far wider achievement as it ‘planted the seeds which the sturdy root, blossomed, 
and destroyed the British Empire of history.’67 That ‘the oath and the other things were put 
in the Treaty, not because they have or were meant to have any practical relation to Irish 
government, but because it was necessary to put in the Treaty certain things to save 
England’s face.’68
While O’Hegarty desired to see the cultural nationalism of the Gaelic League and the 
economic policies of Sinn Fein take root in the Irish Free State he recognised that the Irish
66 P.S. O’Hegarty to Florrie O’Donoghue, Florrie O ’Donoghue Papers, University College Dublin, 
MS31/333(1).
67 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London 1952), p.750.
68 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.101.
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Government’s policies were dictated by the need to establish the rule of law and secure the 
safety of its citizens during the Civil War. The opportunities the Treaty offered for invoking 
the vision of the Gaelic League of which O’Hegarty was an avid aficionado; of uniting the 
island’s traditions and in creating a pluralistic environment in which the Irish character and 
culture could thrive were admittedly denied their fullest expression. However, O’Hegarty 
was disillusioned with the ‘republican’ actions and not with the Cumann na Gaedheal 
government. As he commented in 1919, ‘my bent was naturally towards political revolution 
rather than social revolution.’69
However, the idea of civic virtue existing in the Free State was not entirely lost for 
O’Hegarty and its gradual build up in Irish society was augmented by the rise of a young 
professional middle class who were keen to consolidate, administer and wield the new 
independent powers of the Irish Free State. As Tom Garvin has commented:
the Sinn Fein leadership drew many of its members from this kind of well-educated 
and idealistic lower middle-class whose opportunities for political leadership was 
severely limited under the old Redmondite, parliamentary dispensation. The 
revolution which most of them sought was a national not a social revolution.70
Yet O’Hegarty displayed no bitterness toward the conservative political and social 
framework, which took as its institutional structure in shaping the Free State the previous 
British regime. It emerged that:
The new southern Irish state bore all the familiar landmarks of the old British 
Ireland: parliamentary institutions, the common law, a settled system of landholding, 
a trade union movement that, in its bargaining and moderate style, was brother to 
trade unions across the water.71
69 An Saogal Gaedhealach, February 15, 1919.
70 Tom Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987), p.71.
71 D.G Boyce, The Revolution in Ireland, Introduction, (Basingstoke, 1988), p. 19.
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Roy Foster, in commenting on this aspect of the Free State’s lack of revolutionary vision 
after the Irish Civil War, emphasised: ‘In this arena, exalted leaders first fought out a brutal 
duel over a form of words, and then constructed a new state around preoccupations that 
resolutely ignored even the vague social and economic desiderata once outlined for 
Pearse’s republic.’72
Yet there were many differing interpretations of what the revolution in Ireland would 
consist of. There were those within the Irish Free State Government, such as Richard 
Mulcahy and Ernest Blythe, who were, like O'Hegarty, for ‘Gaelicising’ Ireland. Similarly 
there were those, such as Kevin O’Higgins, who, Patrick Maume has described as 
belonging to the recently formed ‘Catholic Clongowian elite’73 from the turn of the century 
who were for continuing within the boundaries of the previous British model of 
government as it offered the best method for social advancement. Consequently, as Bill 
Kissane has recently argued:
...from the very outset there existed within Treatyite Sinn Fein two divergent and 
competing interpretations of the treaty settlement: firstly, a progressive nationalist- 
republican interpretation which expected, once the free state was established, the 
continuation of the revolution towards the realisation of an isolated Gaelic republic; 
and secondly, a conservative-consolidationist interpretation which hoped to develop 
the treaty and the free state to full autonomy by constitutional means.74
In contrast to his many critics who depicted him as a ‘counter-revolutionist’ O’Hegarty 
praised Kevin O’Higgins for his managerial style of government and the ability to take the 
harsh decisions that were needed to restore peace to Ireland. Moreover, O’Hegarty attributed 
the gradual build-up of civic virtue within the Free State as attributable to O’Higgins’s
72 Roy Foster, Modem Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1988), p.515.
73 Patrick Maume, The Long Gestation, (Dublin, 1999), Introduction.
74 Bill Kissane, ‘The Doctrine of Self Determination and the Irish move to Independence, 1916-1922’, in 
Journal of Political Ideologies October 2003, p.327.
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policies in that freedom re-emerged as paramount over the violence that had suppressed it.75 
The following depiction of O’Higgins by a recent scholar complies with O’Hegarty’s notion 
that civic virtue in Ireland owed a lot to O’Higgins contribution during this early period:
Certainly, O'Higgins's focus on self-determination and self-government was part of 
the Sinn Fein tradition, and to describe him as a counter-revolutionary masks the 
deep changes that he sought to make in Irish political culture, falsely disconnect him 
from the Irish revolution that brought him to power. O’Higgins’s own vision of the 
revolution centred on self-determination, which he saw as its greatest fruit. For 
O'Higgins Irish self-government would have to be accompanied by a change in the 
Irish political mentality whereby the Irish people would assume responsibility for 
their own affairs and accept that the Dail was the proper place to settle those affairs. 
Britain could no longer be blamed for all of Ireland's problems, nor could every 
violation of law be seen as heroic and politicised. Ireland, according to O'Higgins, 
needed to develop a sense of civic virtue, understanding the fact that rights and 
responsibilities flowed both ways between state and people. This was the heart of 
Kevin O'Higgins's revolution.76
In both The Victory of Sinn Fein and A History of Ireland under the Union. O’Hegarty 
praised the securing of civil society and the re-establishment of law and order in Ireland 
that rid Ireland of the violence that had become associated with political disagreement in 
recent years and for allowing the peaceful transition between the two main parties, handing 
over of power that characterised representative democracy.
The focus of O’Hegarty’s disillusionment was reserved for those who expected that their 
particular interpretation of social revolution would be implemented immediately after an 
Irish Government assumed power:
Everywhere people started to form associations “to safeguard our interests”; 
everywhere groups and individuals began to push; nowhere was there any 
consideration for the country, any disposition to give the new government a chance 
to survey the situation. I suppose it was natural. I suppose that, as government has
75 The Separatist, April, 1922.
76 John Knirck, ‘Afterimage of the revolution: Kevin O'Higgins and the Irish revolution -  1’, in Eire-Ireland: 
Journal o f Irish Studies, Fall-Winter, 2003.
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been for generations a thing apart from the people in Ireland -  an enemy, a thing 
which had the machinery for finding money from somewhere -  it was too much to 
expect that people would now recognise that this was their government, no longer an 
alien government, and that it could only find money out of their own pockets. I 
suppose that it was natural, seeing that for more than a century there has been no talk 
in Ireland of anything but the people’s rights, that now they should forget that people 
have any duties. But it was none the less bitter to see in all Ireland no trace of that 
decency, selflessness, and idealism, in which the movement had been conceived and 
for many years carried on.77
O’Hegarty in his ‘Dedicatory Preface’ in A History of Ireland under the Union addressed to 
Bulmer Hobson and Robert Lynd wrote of how the Treaty had ultimately proved a success. 
Not least in overcoming the divisions of civil war and had marked the beginning of a free 
Ireland that took on its own individual political, social and cultural characteristics. So too, 
O’Hegarty argued, the Treaty had also ushered in the beginning of the end of the British 
Empire and that free peoples everywhere had benefited from the Irish example that the 
separatist movement had set:
Ireland is no longer in captivity. What was still a dream in 1904 has become a 
reality. Arthur O’Shaughnessy held that “three, with a new song’s measure, can 
trample an Empire down.” Griffith did it with a couple of pamphlets, for the Treaty 
of 1921 was the beginning of the end of the British Empire. It has found not alone 
another name but another nature.78
Ultimately, O’Hegarty was not willing to sacrifice the democratic will of the Irish people 
over what he saw as the minor issue of ‘mere words and a figurehead.’ He was unwilling to 
work against what he saw as the best possible outcome of the historic enmity that had 
existed between England and Ireland, as contained in the Treaty, given the prevailing 
circumstances. In adhering to this belief, O’Hegarty was resolute and it serves as testimony
77 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p. 178.
78 P.S. O’Hegarty, ‘Dedicatory Preface’, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952),.
206
to an individual for whom the right of the Irish people to control their own political and 
cultural destiny was of paramount importance.
Written in 1924, The Victory of Sinn Fein was largely a work designed to reveal exactly 
where Sinn Fein had erred in fostering the conditions, which led to the bitter Irish Civil 
War. However, amid these scathing commentaries there lies also an optimism based upon 
the recognition that the Treaty marked a triumph of the Irish nationalist spirit in overcoming 
overwhelmingly adversarial odds, and consequently that: ‘there [was] no gesture in history 
quite so magnificent, quite so proud and nothing that has happened can take away from it.’79 
O’Hegarty was one of the first separatists to attempt to break the general conspiracy of 
silence in Ireland about this crucial period in which the independent Irish Free State 
emerged. The controversial and honest natures of these views are further confirmed by the 
reaction and commentary they elicited from his fellow pro-Treatyite Richard Mulcahy and 
quoted from in the previous chapter.80 In writing The Victory of Sinn Fein O'Hegarty was 
questioning what had gone wrong with the idealism and the pact of unity that had formed 
the original purpose and vision behind the Sinn Fein movement. Yet in attempting this re- 
evaluation, the arguments O’Hegarty formulated in defence of the Treaty and to refute the 
positions adopted by his opponents merely indicated the depth of his disillusionment. The 
Victory of Sinn Fein therefore failed to acknowledge the real concerns of the republican 
position over Ireland’s ‘Dominion Status’ and that this was unable to satisfy a large part of 
those members of Sinn Fein who felt that acceptance of the Treaty amounted to a betrayal of 
the historic Irish right to nationhood.
79 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.34.
80 Richard Mulcahy believed that it was much too soon to offer commentary on Ireland’s recent turbulent 
history especially concerning the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ULSTER QUESTION
.. .territory is often described as the body of the national organism and the language 
as its soul. In the ideology of almost every nation, therefore, its historical territory is 
looked upon almost as a living personality which cannot be partitioned without 
destroying it altogether.
Frederick Hertz, ‘Nationality in History and Politics’, in John Bowman, De Valera 
and the Ulster Question. (London, 1944), pp. 150-1.
During the Treaty debates, one night, at the close of the day’s proceedings I walked 
back with Michael Collins and Sean O’Muirthile and Joseph McGrath to where, 
each night, he and his friends compared notes about the day’s debate and considered 
whether anything could be done to convince waverers. After a while everybody 
departed save myself and O’Muirthile and Collins. I passed the remark: “It’s an 
astonishing thing to me that in the attack on the Treaty practically nothing is said 
about Partition which is the one real blot on it.” O’Muirthile looked up in surprise, 
and said: “Before they signed, Griffith and Collins got a personal undertaking from 
Smith and Churchill that if Ulster opted out they would get only four counties and 
that they would make a four-county government possible.” I looked up at Collins, 
and he grinned and said: “That’s right.”
There was no reason why this should have been invented for my benefit, I had 
declared for the Treaty on the morning of its announcement, and I had never 
wavered. Nor was I criticising the Treaty, but wondering why the opposition 
neglected what seemed to me their most telling point.
P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), ‘Notes on 
Foregoing Chapter, The Boundary Commission’, p.754.
As has been argued throughout this thesis O’Hegarty was deeply influenced by Fenian 
principles and offered separatist-based solutions to the problem of establishing an Irish 
cultural tradition in which Protestant, Catholic and dissenter could find a common heritage.
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Yet the very language through which O’Hegarty defended the right of the ‘Underground 
Nation’ to fight for Irish independence, its language and culture proved problematic for 
moderate nationalists and most particularly for the purposes of this chapter, Ulster Unionists 
to identify with. The cultural bonds O’Hegarty forwarded as containing the potential for 
unifying all the traditions on the island were refuted by Ulster Unionists, who, as their 
collective name suggests, believed their cultural bonds and political security had already 
been established under the constitution of the United Kingdom, and that the idea of an 
original shared culture that existed previous to the 1801 Act of Union with Irish nationalists, 
was dismissed with the same irritation as the separatist programme of reversing the 
Anglicised culture of Ireland. Yet despite the inherent problems of fostering a cultural 
homogeneity in Ireland, it is important to remember that O’Hegarty was an individual who 
exemplified civic virtues over an ethnic idea of nationalism that he believed flourished at 
the heart of the separatist tradition he represented. His message of unity under the rule of 
law in which all citizens were of equal value to the nation was a liberal and pluralistic idea 
that he sought to instil in all of Ireland’s citizens. It is useful at this juncture to provide a 
formal definition of 0 ’Hegarty‘s civic nationalism in tackling the most fundamental test of 
this principle, i.e. the accommodation of an Ulster Unionist population, mainly Protestant in 
religious belief, who opted to remain a part of the United Kingdom rather than become a 
minority under a majority nationalist government. This chapter therefore concentrates on 
Ulster Unionist resistance to O’Hegarty’s vision of Ireland after the formation of the U.V.F., 
in 1912, (see below) where the north east became the foremost resilience to any form of 
Irish Home Rule or government, no matter how moderate in powers.
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The problem O’Hegarty’s faced was how to imbue a civic form of national identity in 
Ireland between Irish nationalists and the Unionist population of the north east who formed 
a majority in the province of Ulster but were a minority group across Ireland.
The following definition of civic nationalism complies with O’Hegarty’s vision of a shared 
sense of Irishness (as opposed to Anglicisation) that existed prior to the Act of Union in 
1801. For O’Hegarty the notion of what it meant to be an Irish citizen stretched across all 
religious and ethnic boundaries in Ireland; a description of ethnic nationalism by a recent 
scholar depicts the form of nationalism he wanted to avoid:
...group identity composed of commitments to the nation’s political creed. Race, 
religion, gender, language, and ethnicity are not relevant in defining a citizen’s rights 
and inclusion within the polity. Shared beliefs in the country’s principles and values 
embedded in the rule of law is the organising basis for political order, and citizens 
are understood to be equal and rights-bearing individuals. Ethnic nationalism, in 
contrast, maintains that individual rights and participation within the polity as 
inherited -  based on ethnic or racial or religious ties.1
Given these interpretations of civic and ethnic nationalism, this chapter questions whether 
O’Hegarty’s idealised conception of the Separatist tradition as a model capable of 
stimulating civic nationalism and therefore for offering solutions to the ethnic antagonisms 
that had dominated Irish politics from the 1801 Act of Union, or, contrary to this aim, did it 
act as a major obstacle? This chapter will also measure how far O’Hegarty’s separatist 
principles could accept the partition of Ireland and whether his deep commitment to the 
Fenian philosophy was unable to address the Ulster Unionist’s concerns over their minority 
status in an Irish parliament; and that ultimately unionists were estranged from his notion of 
a cultural unity existing between nationalists and unionists. In order to carry out these 
objectives the chapter will be set out in the following way. Firstly, it begins by setting out
1 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations (Oxford, 1986), p.7.
210
O’Hegarty’s historical reasons for the conflict existing between the Irish and anglicising 
forces particularly the historic importance of Ulster in this struggle. Then, the period in 
which O’Hegarty lived and the question of the treatment of Ulster will be examined up until 
the 1920 Government of Ireland Act was implemented which effectively created the 
separate province of Ulster. At this point the chapter sets out and determines O’Hegarty’s 
views on the Irish Volunteers and the UVF who represented the public (as opposed to the 
secretive IRB), armed and militant wings of Irish nationalism and Ulster resistance and the 
role of the Irish Party and its leader John Redmond during the Great War whereby, the 
notion of partition became a viable option in attempts to solve the Ulster crisis.
O’Hegarty’s journalistic writings in this chapter feature upon a nationalist group called the 
Ancient Order of Hibernians whose focal point of support was located in the north east of 
Ireland amongst the Ulster Unionist population’s stronghold. Writing with passion and 
commitment O’Hegarty focused on their particular brand of Irish nationalism which 
O’Hegarty found to be abhorrent to his civic nationalism and guilty of propounding ethnic 
hatreds. These criticisms aimed at fellow nationalists are continued in this chapter through 
O’Hegarty’s important comments concerning Sinn Fein and the ‘crime of the Ulster 
Boycott’ in which Sinn Fein boycotted firstly, Ulster Protestant owned Ulster firms and 
industries, and then all of Ireland’s Protestant manufacturers. O’Hegarty argued 
convincingly this was a short-sighted and ill thought out policy that only served to further 
deepen hatreds that were already self-evident between the north and south of Ireland. These 
important issues are discussed further between O’Hegarty and Ernest Blythe, through their 
private correspondences written in 1949, which marked a sufficient period of time to reflect 
on their separatist careers during this era of high tension, a factor that adds considerable 
interest to the thoughts and reflections on the Ulster question contained in these letters.
The previous chapter demonstrated that O’Hegarty did not interpret separatism as doctrinal 
or dogmatic in its principles and was flexible enough to allow Ireland the chance to 
capitalise on her new won freedom through the Anglo-Irish Treaty. But the notion of 
partition completely subverted his beliefs about the essential unity of Ireland and was the 
ultimate test of his commitment to the Treaty. O’Hegarty believed that civic virtue lay at the 
heart of the spiritual Irish nation and this theme was advanced throughout O’Hegarty’s 
historical references to Ireland, but had been severely disrupted by the Act of Union through 
which England adjudged that it would serve their best interests to appoint the ‘Garrison 
nation’, or the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, as their political allies. In 0 ’Hegarty‘s view 
the creation of an official Church of Ireland, (disestablished under Gladstone in 1869), that 
represented a minority of the population was a politically inspired decision rather than one 
based upon religious principle.2
O’Hegarty maintained that the ‘Underground Nation’ through mass movements and 
nationalist agitation fought back to regain the illegal and immoral occupation of the Irish 
nation by the English nation. But through the pursuit of Catholic emancipation in 1829 and 
then for the Repeal of the Union in 1840, a gulf was created between the nationalist 
majority and the Protestant ascendancy. The constitutional nationalist demands throughout 
the nineteenth century were for the creation of a devolved Irish parliament, or as O’Hegarty 
and the Fenians maintained as the right of the Irish nation, complete independence from 
England. These demands for at least some form of national independence for Ireland 
contrasted with the majority of Protestants who wished to strengthen the union with 
England and maintain their privileged position and majority status within the United 
Kingdom, as the guardians of British policy in Ireland. As Patrick Buckland has stressed,
2 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f  Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.461.
Two prominent Irish nationalists of the twentieth century, Eamonn de Valera and Michael 
Collins were drawn to this notion of an independent pastoral Ireland, based on their own 
idealised childhood experiences and how their ‘independent’ Ireland would resemble this 
model. They envisaged a self-sufficient agriculturally-based economy in Ireland and 
challenged the view that the modem industrial British state was the measure by which a 
nation was deemed a success or a failure. This vision was not incongruent with the majority 
of the island’s existing rural based economy but it was insensitive to the modem industrial 
economy of the north east in which a substantial Protestant population lived and prospered 
on the British economic model. Indeed it was partly due to this rural vision of how Ireland 
would develop under Catholic majoritarian rule that fostered organised opposition to an 
Irish parliament among northern Protestants. It was an example of how Ulster Unionists 
feared their minority status in an independent Irish parliament would lead to their cultural 
and economic demise and leave them powerless to resist the imposition of this vision from 
becoming a primary objective of the majority. Ulster Unionist’s were fearful of the threat an 
Irish parliament presented to their established way of life.
Yet within Sinn Fein there were economic theories that seemed to address Ulster Unionists’ 
fears over the erosion of their way of life that any future Irish parliament presented. 
Separatist propaganda, most formidably espoused by Arthur Griffith, looked toward a 
modem thriving industrial economy not just in the north east but developed right across 
Ireland. However those nationalists who believed in the agricultural vision of Ireland and 
those of Griffith’s camp generally subscribed to the following view: that the English 
industrial model should not become a feature of any economic design adopted in an 
independent Ireland. Indeed Griffith argued once independence had been gained that Ireland 
should develop its industries on a specifically Irish model consisting of protective tariffs,
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rather than emulating a ‘Welshified harp strumming Birmingham manufacture.’6 Through 
journals and pamphleteering, disseminated among the Irish population, e.g. his Tracts for 
the Times,7 Griffith propagandised the economic degradation and over-taxation that 
England had historically subjected Ireland.. Yet again, this view was contrastable with 
Ulster Unionists’ interpretation of how industry in Ireland had benefited substantially from 
Britain’s economic policy in Ireland. As Buckland has demonstrated:
.. .whereas nationalists maintained that the union was mining Ireland, Irish Unionists 
retorted that the British connection had assisted the economic and social 
development of all classes and creeds in Ireland, particularly by legislation on behalf 
of Catholics, by Land Acts and by social security measures. Agriculture flourished in 
the south and industry in the north-east, where Belfast had established itself as the 
world‘s major linen centre and Harland and Woolf were producing, by the 
nineteenth century, some of the largest ships in the world.8
As a separatist committed to Ireland’s independence, O’Hegarty too, traced the provenance 
of Ireland’s political, cultural and economic ills to British policy in Ireland. To take one 
example, his attitude toward the 1903 Wyndham Act proves illuminating. The Wyndham 
Act was generally considered a benign measure that removed centuries of grievances 
between tenant farmers and the ascendancy over the historical ownership of land, the hatred 
of ‘absentee landlordism’ and ‘rack-rentism’. Indeed, the main source of nationalist strength 
during the nineteenth century had been drawn from this sector of the Irish population. 
Moreover the unfairness of the antiquated landlord/tenant relationship in Ireland was widely
6 V.E. Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced Nationalist Press (New York, 1985), p.79.
7 Arthur Griffith, Tracts fo r the Times, No.4. Griffith’s pamphlet emphasised England’s historical and 
contemporary over-taxation of Ireland and her use in feeding England for her wars. Also, the idea of England 
being more concerned for her economy then in ending the Great Famine, a view most famously espoused by 
John Mitchel.
8 Patrick Buckland, ‘Irish Unionism in the New Ireland’, in Boyce (Ed.), The Revolution in Ireland 1879-1923, 
(Basingstoke, 1988), p.72.
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believed by nationalists to have prolonged the ‘Great Famine’ of 1845-1849 which still 
resonated deeply in the Irish nationalist consciousness.
The political and economic ascendancy of the English garrison in Ireland served to underlie 
this assertion for nationalists and justified nationalism’s morally unassailable demands for 
self-government. The historical iniquities associated with unionism therefore far 
outweighed legislation such as the 1903 Wyndham Act which, while welcomed, particularly 
among the ‘grazer’ tenant farmers’ who profited substantially from government loans, was 
viewed merely as a policy that sought to redress the historical wrong of the ’plantations’. 
The Unionist government under Salisbury who initiated and oversaw the implementation of 
this act, believed they were ‘killing home rule with kindness’, but for a majority of 
nationalists it represented an apology for the past, a debt that could only be fully re-paid 
with Irish independence.
O’Hegarty too blamed, (in Mitchelian-fashion), England and her ‘garrison in Ireland’ for the
causes of the famine9 but he did not suggest, as other nationalists did, that land was the focal
point of nationalism. Instead he concluded that any positive aspects attributed to the
Wyndham Act were overshadowed by its underlying objective i.e. to draw attention away
from Ireland’s right to independence. By this, O’Hegarty divined that the English
Government had granted these measures in order to divide the loyalties of those who
benefited from the scheme. In bolstering the prosperity of tenant farmers the English
Government increased this group’s conservatism and lessened their judgement over the real
issue, the goal of Irish independence. Thus, in moderating the tenant farmers idea of
nationhood the English Government was advancing the indifferent attitude toward
9 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union, Chapter XXV. O’Hegarty blamed the inactivity of 
O’Connell and the Young Irelanders who led appeals to the British government for more help but refused to 
breach O’Connell’s code outlawing physical force. In O’Hegarty’s view the Famine represented a moral 
justification for physical force.
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independence that O’Hegarty associated with the Irish Party and Home Rulers in general. 
O’Hegarty believed that matters such as land and economic prosperity were issues that 
would be better addressed under an Irish government. As much of O’Hegarty’s propaganda 
was aimed at stirring up passionate debate within Ireland he concluded that to support the 
Wyndham Act was to take an anti-nationalist position. This was in contrast to O’Hegarty’s 
view of Parnell whom he saw as manoeuvring the Land League from a sectional interest and 
developing it into a national movement.10
O’Hegarty believed that the goal of Irish independence was nobler than any individual gain 
or that it could be influenced by the interests of a particular class, in this case the tenant 
farmers, and therefore the belief that it was a magnanimous gesture on behalf of the English 
Government should be dismissed. Ultimately, O’Hegarty concluded that ‘class warfare 
would play England’s game’.11 In an article addressing the rise of the Labour Party in 
Ireland but nonetheless tackling the theme of class warfare as a divisive element in Irish 
nationalism, O’Hegarty wrote:
I am not a believer in Capitalism. Neither am I a believer in Bolshevism, in 
international democracy, in the Red Flag, in the brotherhood of man, or in the 
Millennium. I believe in the organisation of society on a basis of Co-operation and 
profit-sharing: but I am not prepared to commit Sinn Fein to that even. Sinn Fein’s 
business is to unite Ireland politically, not to disunite her by embarking upon a social 
policy which is nothing as yet but a couple of phrases and as regards its merits and 
demerits are canvassed. The one and only loyalty which we can demand from our 
people is loyalty to Ireland: once we stretch that to cover loyalty to any particular 
conception of social or economic construction we make ourselves at once a class and 
not a people.12
10 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.498.
11 An Saoghal Gaedhealach,, August 2, 1919.
12 An Saoghal Gaedhealach,, August 2, 1919.
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The objections to ‘England’s political games’ which for O’Hegarty reflected the sum of 
English policy in Ireland, received their final verification in England’s determination to 
maintain a foothold in Ireland’s most industrial and most economically productive province, 
Ulster. For O’Hegarty it was a longstanding feature of British policy to foster division 
among Protestant and Catholic in Ireland to protect and support their economic interests. 
O’Hegarty determined that this policy had resulted in the creation of Ulster Unionism and 
the belief of the Protestant population in the province that maintaining the union with Great 
Britain was vital to securing their stake in Irish society. As a consequence Ulster Unionists 
objected to Home Rule not for religious reasons or an ethnical differentiation from 
nationalists, their objections, were in fact, the product of a ‘false consciousness’, i.e., an 
artificially induced tie that had been forged and perpetuated from the Act of Union by 
successive English governments. This contention formed the basis for O’Hegarty’s article 
dealing with England’s creation of the ‘Ulster question’ entitled ‘England’s last ditch in 
Ireland*. O’Hegarty declared that: ‘Generation after generation England has given up 
something or seemed to give it up. But she has always forged new bonds.’13 
The foundation upon which these new bonds were formed culminated in the 1920 
Government of Ireland Act which stipulated the following:
the 1920 act, repealing that of 1914, established in the north full machinery for a 
local legislature on the Westminster model, devolved from but subordinate to the 
mother parliament, and applying to the defined area of the parliamentary counties of 
Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone, and the 
parliamentary boroughs Belfast and Londonderry.14
13 Editorial on the ‘Ulster issue’ in The Irish World, September 6,1919.
14 David Harkness, Northern Ireland Since 1920 (Dublin, 1983), p.4.
O’Hegarty believed that the reason for the implementation of partition was fundamentally 
political in origin, set as it was independent of any negotiated settlement between the 
English and Irish governments over the future of Ireland. For O’Hegarty, the enactment of 
the above legislation violated his nationalist principles as it established partition and 
destroyed the geographical integrity of the Irish nation:
One of the fundamental principles of intellectual nationalism in the nineteenth 
century had been the unity and oneness of Ireland. The Northern Irishmen, whose 
forefathers had been United Irishmen, almost to a man, were looked upon as being 
erring Irishmen, but as Irishmen. Sinn Fein had accepted that principle also, and all 
its early work and plans were based upon the oneness of Ireland. But now, when 
Sinn Fein represented the Irish majority, and swayed it more absolutely than it had 
been swayed since O’Connell had swayed it, it amazed those who had been working 
in it since the beginning by throwing overboard the fundamental principle of the 
union of all Irishmen, and declaring that the Ulster Irishman was a foreigner. It was 
no longer, clearly, a movement, but a political party. The policy of dividing Irishmen 
was always one of England’s main reliances in holding Ireland, and right up to the 
end she pursued it. In all the preoccupation of the war, her statesmen and her makers 
of public opinion never forgot that in 1914 the Irish Parliamentary Party had 
accepted the principle of partition, and that in 1916 a Convention of the nationalists 
of Ulster had accepted it.15
O’Hegarty held English intercession in Ireland accountable for the perceived existence of 
two cultural and political traditions, nationalist and unionist. And that the latter, being the 
product of English invention was a doctrine falsely adhered to due to the fact that the 
English nation could claim no grounding or justification for their presence in Ireland other 
than the artificial imposition of its customs and laws on the historic Irish nation ‘The 
progress of Anglicisation in the nineteenth century was really the progress of the artificial 
State. The history of Ireland in that century was really the history of its adoption of the 
Colonial Nationalist tradition.’16
15 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (London, 1924), p.49.
16 An Saoghal Gaedhealach, November 30th, 1918.
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Writing this in 1918, O’Hegarty turned to Ulster’s traditional role of resisting the English 
invader and its determination to eventually expel the English presence in Ireland, a topic 
most specifically tackled in his account of England’s invasion and occupation of Ireland, 
entitled The Indestructible Nation. O’Hegarty contrasted the assimilated peoples of previous 
invasions acceptance of Irish laws and customs and the federal structure of the Irish nation, 
with the English nation‘s attempt to impose its feudal system. The Irish were unsuited to 
this re-structuring of society and this formed part of the natural resistance of the Irish people 
in adopting the English cultural outlook. Later from the nineteenth century, the resistance of 
the Irish nation evolved into his ‘Underground Nation’ thesis as a holistic term for the 
separatist spirit he believed fuelled the nationalist cause. This formed the vanguard of a 
national people submerged, yet maintaining a sense of unity, thus providing the theoretical 
form to the ideal of an independent Irish nation.
Before the nineteenth century, Ulster represented the indestructible spirit of the Irish nation. 
The figure who embodied Ulster resistance was the ‘defender’ of Ulster, Hugh O’Neil who, 
in O’Hegarty’s view, represented the tradition of the Ulster people as quintessentially Irish 
in outlook and therefore opposed to England’s spurious claim to Ireland. Hence, to partition 
Ireland was to divide O’Neil’s province from his country.17
Implicit therefore within O’Hegarty’s separatist narrative, was the cultural heritage shared 
by the Ulster inhabitants with the rest of Ireland as defenders of Ireland’s right to liberty and 
independence. But while O’Hegarty, in rebutting the partition idea, (first proposed in the 
nineteenth century but taken up with real purpose by Lloyd George in 1913), selected 
instances in history before the mass settling of the plantations and the infusion of English
17 See O’Hegarty’s, The Indestructible Nation (Dublin, 1918), for his praise of O’Neil as a stalwart defender of 
the Irish nation against the incursions of Queen Elizabeth I during the sixteenth century.
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culture in the nineteenth century, such arguments detailing the essential unity of Ireland 
failed to address the issues pertinent to the ‘Ulster question’ of his time.58 So too, in 
Ireland’s more recent history, separatists commonly used the principles of unity behind the 
1798 rebellion as a primary argument against the partitioning of Ireland. In contemplating 
the Ulster question in 1919, Eaman De Blaghd, himself an Ulster Protestant, wrote:
...the present almost unanimous adherence to Unionism on the part of the 
Protestants of Ulster does not date very far back. In 1798, when they received in 
battle their national baptism of blood and fire, at least half of them must have been 
on the side of Irish independence. Their relapse from the faith of freedom was, 
moreover, slow and gradual.19
Indeed, in their resolve to explain the Ulster Unionists ‘relapse from the faith of freedom’, 
separatists turned inward for explanations citing the dilution of Irish nationalism from the 
call for the repeal of the union to the measure of home rule as weakening the resolve of 
nationalists and unionists:
...the prime reason why the Protestant Irishmen did not remain true to Ireland was 
that Ireland as a whole began to abandon the essentials of nationality, and even the 
political ideals of nationality (witness the descent from Repeal to Home Rule and 
from Home Rule to partition).20
Yet again such explanations failed to explain how during the twentieth century, unionists in 
their revulsion to the political implications of Home Rule employed the IRB’s physical 
force idea as a legitimate means to defend one’s nationality. This resulted in the Ulster 
Unionists Council’s (formed in 1905) decision in January 1913, to form an armed militia,
18 O’Hegarty’s identification of Hugh O’Neil with the tradition of Ulster resistance does not take account of the
fact that O’Neil took care to identify his resistance to English power with the Catholic Church. This marked the
beginning of the ’Catholic-separatist’ myth, strengthened by Peter Lombard’s treatise that portrayed O’Neil’s 
rebellion as a war of religion. Moody has stated that it was, ‘but only in part.’ T.W. Moody, ‘Irish History and 
Irish Mythology’, in Ciaran Brady (Ed.), Interpreting Irish History (Blackrock, 1994), p.72.
19 An Saoghal Gaedhealach March 15, 1918.
20 An Saoghal Gaedhealach March 15, 1918.
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the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), who pledged to defend Ireland from attempts by 
nationalists and the English Government to enforce Home Rule upon Ulster.21 The 
resistance to Home Rule to which both northern and southern Protestants objected, now 
became centralised in the most densely populated Protestant province, Ulster.22 
Under Sir Edward Carson’s,23 leadership, opposition to Home Rule intensified with the 
signing of the Ulster Solemn Covenant which pledged to use: ‘all means...necessary to 
defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland’.24 The IRB, 
specifically under Bulmer Hobson and Denis McCullogh, intent on capitalising on the 
opportunity afforded by the arming of Ulster and their defiance of the British Government, 
set about creating a nationalist equivalent, which resulted in the formation of the Irish 
Volunteers in 1913.25 O’Hegarty related that the idea behind creating such a force had been 
discussed within the IRB Supreme Council for many years but now the ‘Ulster Volunteer 
Force made it more difficult [for the English government] to suppress a southern force
21 The Orange lodge of County Tyrone had taken it upon its own initiative in 1911 to parade and drill. A.T.Q. 
Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 1967), p.69, has suggested that almost by accident the anti-home rule 
political leaders were made aware of an effective means of resisting home rule.
22 Southern Unionists who were scattered across Ireland were more susceptible to reprisals and had placed their 
faith in English constitutionalism. Patrick Buckland, ‘Irish Unionism in the New Ireland’, in D.G. Boyce (Ed.), 
The Revolution in Ireland 1878-1923 (Basingstoke, 1988), pp.87-89.
23 In the matter of believing Home Rule to be the first step in the dismemberment of the Empire, Carson was in 
agreement with Bonar Law who believed in ‘things stronger than parliamentary majorities’, and could ‘imagine 
no length of resistance’ the Unionists could go, in which the overwhelming majority of the British people 
would not support them. See D.G. Boyce, ‘British conservative opinion, the Ulster question, and the partition 
of Ireland, 1912-21’, in Irish Historical Studies, Vol.17, p.91. Also A.T.Q Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 
1967), p.81. ‘Carson was not at any time the leader of the Southern Unionists. He was the leader of the Irish 
Unionist Party in the commons, but all its members, except for Carson and Campbell, came from northern 
constituencies.’
24 A.T.Q Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 1967), pp.62-66. 218,206 men signed the covenant. This 
ultimatum included the threat of using armed resistance against the Liberal Government for their placing of 
Home Rule on the statute book in 1912.
25 Along with J.J. Ginger O’Connell, Hobson was second only to Eoin MacNeil in the hierarchy of the Irish 
Volunteers in Easter 1916. See Des Gunning, ‘Bulmer Hobson, ‘the most dangerous man in Ireland’, History- 
lreland, Vol. 10, Spring, 2002.
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which would be sponsored by unsuspecting people. And that was how Eoin MacNeil and 
Larry Kettle and other unsuspecting people started the Irish Volunteers.’26 
The IRB had not created the Irish Volunteers as a counterweight to any physical threat from 
the UVF, the Irish Volunteers were armed and prepared to assert Ireland’s right to 
independence rather than instigate a clash with the UVF. O’Hegarty described his 
experience as a member of the Irish Volunteers:
I was not able to get to the early drills at Cork which he attended, but I remember the 
first route march, when about 60 or 70 of us marched out from the Com Market, 
while a crowd half amused, half ashamed of itself, watched us as we went, the first 
manifestation to Cork of the newest and sternest Ireland.27
Separatists, O’Hegarty and Hobson among them, viewed the Ulster Volunteer Force, as a 
positive force in Ireland, especially in their militant defiance of England‘s right to dictate 
policy in Ireland. For O’Hegarty the U.V.F. was exhibiting the right to resist the English 
Government in the name of liberty. The U.V.F.’s function for O’Hegarty, who elided over 
the reason for their arming, had brought to Ireland the vigour and manhood that lay behind 
the Fenian message of moral insurrection (as related in Chapter IV), on an organised and 
grand scale. But while the IRB resolved to implement an armed insurrection (see Chapter 
V), the U.V.F.’s threat to use force was treated by O’Hegarty and many of his fellow 
separatists as nothing more than a bluff on the part of the Ulster Unionists. The Irish Party 
too, most conspicuously, its leader John Redmond, viewed Ulster‘s resistance as ‘a gigantic
26 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), pp.14-15. Moreover this reaction toward the 
U.V.F., lay in contrast to the Liberal Governments. Asquith, in consultation with George V, stated that he did 
not fear the ‘Ulster bluff, but privately he was seriously alarmed at the potential for civil war to breakout in 
Ireland. A.T.Q. Stewart, The Ulster Crisis (London, 1967), p.80.
27 Terence MacSwiney Papers University College Dublin It features ‘Recollections of Terence MacSwiney’ by 
P.S. [O’Hegarty] signed from ‘a lifelong friend’, P4C/105.
game of bluff and blackmail’.28 But this combined attitude of separatists and Irish party 
members ignored the strength of the Ulster Unionists’ conviction to resist incorporation into 
an Irish parliament, even one that Griffith referred to contemptuously as ‘if this is freedom, 
then the lexicographers have deceived us.’29 
Consequently, the Ulster Unionists planned for the setting up of:
.. .a provisional government, to take over the province of Ulster the moment a home 
rule act came into operation; they made plans for financial and economic 
administration; they raised, trained and equipped 100,000 men to guard the border 
and prevent internal disturbance.30
However from the beginning of the Great War the remit of the U.V.F. and the Irish 
Volunteers were dramatically altered marking a major turning point in Anglo-Irish relations 
and the relationship between the Ulster Unionists and the nationalist majority. O’Hegarty 
concluded in The Victory of Sinn Fein’, that before the Great War the:
Ulster majority had...no more love for England or the English than the Irish 
majority....Yet the spirit into which the Unionists supported Britain confirmed they 
‘...had taken a side in which it believed, and it fought on that side; and when the 
casualty lists came and it suffered, it began to think itself different from the Irish 
majority.31
O’Hegarty continued:
Figures [had]...been quoted to show that the other three provinces contributed as 
large a proportion of their population to the British armies as did Ulster.. .but these 
figures are beside the point. In the one case the contribution was made publicly and 
with general acclamation and approval; and in the other it was made secretly almost, 
and in the face of general apathy where there was not active disapproval. That it was 
the spirit, the viewpoint, which made the difference, and not the respective 
contributions of man-power.32
28 J.C. Beckett, Confrontations: Studies in Irish History (London, 1972), p. 166.
29 V.E Glandon, Arthur Griffith and the Advanced Nationalist Press (New York, 1985), p.81.
30 J.C. Beckett, Confrontations: Studies in Irish History (London, 1972), p. 166.
31 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.50.
32 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.50.
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Regarding the political issues surrounding Ulster resistance O’Hegarty stressed that the Irish 
Party had made no concerted effort during this period, or previously since Redmond’s 
leadership to convince or conciliate the mainly Protestant majority in the north east that they 
(the Irish Party), were representing the interests of all traditions in Ireland. The Irish Party in 
their focusing on discrediting their fellow Protestant Irishmen in the eyes of the British 
representatives and the British public had: ‘...made no serious effort to carry on any 
propaganda in the area which is the stronghold of unionism; nor did they even trouble to 
assert Ireland‘s claim to it, as they might have done, by periodic electoral contests4.33 
This too for O’Hegarty functioned as playing ‘England’s game‘ of fostering division in 
Ireland as through their actions the Irish Party were indirectly responsible for the furthering 
of bitterness and sectarian grievances (see below for O’Hegarty’s opinion of the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians (AOH), under Joseph Devlin), in the province. O’Hegarty specified 
how just prior to the Great War the folly of the Irish Party’s policy was laid bare: ‘When 
Redmond in 1913 sat down at the conference and accepted partition...the conference broke 
down.. .not on partition, but on the area to be excluded” -  he made partition inevitable.’34 
From as early as 1913 the Irish Party had accepted that Ulster was nationally beyond the 
pale and this proved for O’Hegarty that the debating of Irish independence at Westminster 
by the Irish Party strengthened England‘s determination to keep its grip on Ireland. Yet 
Redmond had no desire to see partition implemented in Ireland anymore than O’Hegarty 
and as Mansergh has stated the issue even at this early stage was not whether Ireland should
33 An Saoghal Gaedhealach, March, 1915.
34 Ernest Blythe Papers University College Dublin, P24/1341.
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be partitioned but how it was to be implemented.35 In considering the Irish Party’s position 
later in 1914 and 1916 Mansergh emphasised that:
The negotiations were about the same problems and the same solutions -  about the 
exclusion of six counties on a short term or a long term basis. Common to both was 
what had in effect been determined by 1914 -  though Redmond to his cost had failed 
to understand this -  namely that Ireland should be divided.36
On balance, therefore, it was not really just of O’Hegarty to accuse Redmond of ineptitude 
and of folding over the question of partition, as his hands were tied and Ulster resistance 
seemed an insurmountable obstacle to try and overcome using nationalist arguments for 
self-government. Redmond therefore had opted for the best possible outcome given the 
narrow room for manoeuvre, and it has been well documented that Lloyd George, in order 
to get agreement for partition as a solution to the Irish question, said one thing to Redmond, 
the temporary exclusion of Ulster, and another to Carson, that the exclusion of Ulster was to 
be on a permanent basis. Yet to paraphrase Joseph Devlin (see below) who was based in the 
heartland of the six county areas earmarked for exclusion:
...the difference...between temporary and permanent exclusion was, politically as 
distinct from psychologically, minimal or even non-existent, since what the Ulster 
Unionists had obtained and enjoyed they would assuredly not have abandoned after a 
period of years.37
Building on his framework that the Irish Party were partly responsible for partition, 
O’Hegarty believed Redmond's professions of loyalty to the British Empire and his pledge 
that Ireland would wholeheartedly support the ‘British war’, (as outlined in his speech at
35 Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Government of Ireland Act’, in Diana Mansergh, (Ed.), Nationalism and 
Independence (Cork, 1977), p.72.
36 Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Government of Ireland Act’, in Diana Mansergh, (Ed.), Nationalism and 
Independence (Cork, 1977), p. 13.
37 Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The Government of Ireland Act’ in Diana Mansergh, (Ed.), Nationalism and 
Independence (Cork, 1977), p.72.
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Woodenbridge), suited his ‘Hibemo-British’ outlook, and bolstered England’s assertion, 
that contrary to the separatist perspective, Ireland was loyally bound to the Empire.
In contrast O’Hegarty argued that this was England’s war and the Irish people were under 
no obligation to ally themselves with Imperial concerns and furthermore, to do so countered 
the separatist maxim that Ireland must use England’s difficulties to further the cause of 
Ireland‘s independence. Redmond, for his part, reasoned that if Ireland contributed to the 
war effort on the same basis that the Ulster Unionists embraced the call to arms, then Home 
Rule (now delayed until the end of the war) would be granted for this display of loyalty 
toward the Empire. But this display of loyalty too only confirmed for O’Hegarty that the 
Irish Party had accepted England’s assertion that their presence in Ireland was justified. 
Furthermore, the English Government could now view themselves as intermediaries 
defending a minority of the Irish population from the potential excesses of Irish nationalist 
government.
In turning his attention toward the six counties of Northern Ireland that had been set aside 
by the English Government for special consideration, O’Hegarty viewed the Ancient Order 
of Hibernians (AOH), the powerful Catholic interest group led by Joseph Devlin that had 
grown out of the Irish Party, as reinforcing sectarian conflict in the province. In Irish 
Freedom. March, 1914, for instance, O’Hegarty described the AOH as ‘pitiful degenerates’, 
who exalted ‘factionism’ and ‘sectarianism’. He criticised:
.. .the men who revived, strengthened and manipulated the AOH’s as those at whose 
door lies the responsibility for Carsonism.. .and the only force of any material weight 
behind Carsonism is religious bigotry. The enemy of Ireland is not the Irish Unionist 
nor the Irish Protestant but the Englishman, who manipulates and uses both 
Protestant and Unionist and also Nationalist faction-fighter.38
38 The ‘English providence’ he referred to was the return to power of the Liberal Party, a party whose 
commitment to Home Rule from Gladstone’s conversion in 1886 was considered by O’Hegarty as a deception.
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O’Hegarty believed that Hibemianism should be confined ‘...to its proper function of a 
benefit society and [to] keep it out of national politics...Hibemianism has postponed Irish 
unity for at least another generation....’ But given the political representation and security 
the AOH provided for Ulster Catholics O’Hegarty was unable to explain how this would be 
done. He was willing to acknowledge some of the fears of unionists of an Irish government 
but put this down to the presence of the AOH in Ulster rather than any other nationalist 
source such as the rhetoric of Sinn Fein. In 1919, O’Hegarty wrote:
That is not to say that there are not honest bigots, honest Unionists in Ulster. There 
actually are people who believe that an independent Ireland would expropriate them 
as ruthlessly as the native Irish were expropriated at the plantation: there actually are 
people who believe that the Catholics would cut their throats were it not for 
England: but these people are not found amongst the leaders, but amongst the rank 
and file. The leaders know better, and were it not for Nationalist unwisdom the rank 
and file would have known better long ere this. The present strength of the anti-Irish 
Ulster feeling would not have been possible were it not for the revival of the AOH.39
O’Hegarty was aware that the AOH were responding to the feeling of isolation in the North 
east among Catholics and nationalists (the two overlapped almost completely as did 
Unionist with Protestant) in which they were the minority population amongst the Protestant 
majority during a period of high political tension. But O’Hegarty did not highlight the fact 
that the leader of the AOH, Joseph Devlin, was acting pragmatically in the heated and 
violent atmosphere of Ulster. He was seeking the best position for Catholics in, what 
appeared before the end of the Great War, a united Ireland complete with a Home Rule 
parliament. Instead, O’Hegarty concentrated on the AOH as a sectarian group whose
The two prior readings of the bill under Gladstone in 1886 and 1893 passed through the Houses of Parliament 
only to be thrown out by the House of Lords. O’Hegarty believed that the Liberals made so much of the Home 
Rule issue that they only served to inflame Ulster: ‘If the Liberal Government had not heated up the debate in 
1911 there would have been no trouble.’
39 Article entitled ‘Notes on Current Events’An Saoghal Gaedhealach , February 15, 1919.
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presence across Ireland, not just in the north east had impaired his notion of generating a 
civic nationalism and spirit in Ireland. It would appear, given O’Hegarty’s strong 
denunciations of the AOH, that even if they had agreed to work with Sinn Fein and bolster 
their standing among Ulster’s inhabitants that O’Hegarty would have been implacably 
opposed to such a union not least as this would have marked the further sacrifice of the Sinn 
Fein ideal to the politicisation of the separatist programme. He wrote that:
Two evils do not balance each other: on the contrary, they embitter and worsen each 
other. The antidote to Ulster Unionist bigotry is obviously nationalist tolerance, 
national broadmindedness. We are preaching a thing which is bigger than any 
sectional thing; and if it is to remain bigger it must be broad and tolerant. The ideal 
of a nation postulates agreement rather than coercion, postulates one national ideal to 
which all sections in the nation may give adherence without forfeiting any sectional 
ideal which they may hold.40
O’Hegarty continued in this vein viewing the AOH as a discriminatory organisation that 
favoured Catholics over Protestants, thereby implanting a policy that weakened the 
pluralistic message he felt was implicit in the civic spirit of Irish nationalism. Consequently, 
the AOH were unrepresentative of the majority of nationalist Ireland‘s fraternal attitude 
toward their fellow Ulster-men.
During its first decade O’Hegarty saw Sinn Fein as the only antidote to altering the sectarian 
damage that the AOH had implanted in Ulster. But he recognised that the traits of 
intolerance and bigotry that he associated with the AOH became increasingly identified with 
Sinn Fein themselves after 1916, most specifically in the eyes of Ulster Unionists. In 
Chapter V it was illustrated that O’Hegarty held a mixed opinion of the 1916 Easter Rising 
and its ‘double-edged sword’ was confirmed for O’Hegarty in its impact on Ulster Unionists
40 An Saoghal Gaedhealach , February 15, 1919.
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who regarded it as an ‘unjustifiable treachery.’41 For unionists it cemented the belief that 
Sinn Fein, who became synonymous with the planning of the Rising, and after the 1918 
General Election represented the nationalist majority was intent on gaining Irish 
independence without compromise. The Rising confirmed for unionists that nationalists 
were willing to enforce their claim to independence through open rebellion at a time of great 
difficulty for the Empire, thus rendering obsolete the earlier more moderate claims of Sinn 
Fein. Given that the IRB and the Irish Volunteers had agreed that no action should be taken 
that would foster disunity within Ireland the events of 1916 represented a major setback in 
preventing the political secession of Ulster from the rest of Ireland.42 
The proclamation of 1916 which enshrined the republican ideal in the nationalist conscience 
stipulated that independence no longer meant Home Rule but total independence now 
represented through Sinn Fein and its more radical elements. Yet despite the extreme 
polarisation of unionists and separatists over the future of Ireland, O’Hegarty remained 
hopefully optimistic during this period that the original Sinn Fein message would eventually 
win through:
After that the only hope lay in Sinn Fein and the establishment of a condition of 
settlement of an all Ireland parliament containing local powers with the federal 
parliament behind it. Anything, even nominal, providing it had a parliament and 
representative structure, would have sufficed.43
For the reason stated above, O’Hegarty put his faith in Griffith’s dual monarchy policy 
which made special provision for unionists and their determination to retain their 
connection with the British Crown. Griffith, as leader of Sinn Fein pre-1917 was mindful of
41 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.50.
42 Reverend Francis Shaw, ‘The Canon of Irish History - A Challenge’, in Studies, vol.61, (1972), p. 150.
43 Ernest Blythe Papers, 20 September, 1949, University College Dublin, P24/1341.
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the Ulster Unionists’ desire to remain a part of Great Britain and their fears of persecution in 
a mainly Catholic state and of how they were determined not to ‘take a blind leap into the 
dark’.44
Griffith’s attempts at countering Ulster Unionist fears consisted of an alternating parliament 
meeting every two years which would preside in both Belfast and Dublin. Griffith was also 
willing to offer Ulster Unionists an exaggerated proportion of seats in an all-Ireland 
parliament if they accepted Ireland’s right to an independent legislative.
Yet these attempts at dispelling unionist fears over Irish self-government proved to be 
fruitless as the issue of minority status dominated every other aspect. The Ulster Volunteers 
had drilled and armed in 1913 to defend the cultural and economic ties with England they 
felt would be severely threatened by their absorption into a Dublin-based government. 
These concession measures that O’Hegarty, like Griffith, believed held a realistic chance of 
success merely emphasised that they misread the reasons that lay behind unionists fears. For 
O’Hegarty, in the current situation existing between unionists and nationalists, it was 
necessary to convince unionists that they would not be severing all ties to the country they 
believed better represented their cultural ethos. O’Hegarty was convinced that this would 
have proved sufficient to convince Unionists to accept an Irish parliament. Arthur Griffith 
too, was equally convinced, but perhaps this was where the problem lay, in the strength of 
their convictions they failed to see the equal convictions of Ulster Unionists to resist the 
nationalist majority‘s will and therefore any of the conciliatory measures offered by Sinn 
Fein.
44 Patrick Buckland, ‘Irish Unionism in the new Ireland’, in Boyce (Ed.), The Revolution in Ireland 1878-1923,
(1988), p.72.
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O’Hegarty’s argument in favour of deploying the dual monarchy policy over the slogans of 
the ’Republic’ were based on the unionists’ theme of loyalty to the British Crown and in 
preserving the union. (Whereby unionists believed it was necessary to oppose the present 
government, but in doing so they were not rescinding on their Lockean contract to the 
British Constitution and the British Monarchy.)
Despite Griffith’s attempts to reach out to unionists’, he could not deny that a fundamental 
trait on which the Sinn Fein programme was based denied the legitimacy of the Act of 
Union itself. The natural outcome of the Sinn Fein policy therefore was to relinquish all ties 
with England and any form of independence, no matter how minor, would result in the 
eventual severing of these ties. Patrick Maume has illustrated: ‘The Act of Union which 
abolished that parliament was unconstitutional and any Irish politicians who had attended 
Westminster afterwards had been wrong tactically and legally.’45
This characterisation of the Act of Union as unlawful irredentism on the part of England 
formed the essence of O’Hegarty’s justification for supporting the Sinn Fein constitutional 
movement. He believed the dual monarchy policy represented a strategy through which the 
unionists could be placated but that de Valera, president of Sinn Fein from 1917 to his 
resignation in 1921:
...preferred rather to attempt to change the British constitution than to take up that 
Irish constitution which Grattan and Flood had framed, and the first volunteers had 
secured; which already possessed historical and international status, and which 
needed no alteration, for the things which brought the Irish parliament of 1782-1800 
to the ground, were things which were not in the constitution at all.. .and if we were 
to retain some connexion with England -  and everybody agreed that we must since 
we could not beat her militarily -  here was the connexion which would have been
45 Patrick Maume, ‘The Ancient Constitution: Arthur Griffith and his intellectual legacy to Sinn Fein”, in Irish 
Political Studies, Vol. 10, (1995), p.45.
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least irksome and most natural. There would have been no partition, and the oath
would have been an oath to the King of Ireland.46
In the previous chapter O’Hegarty criticised de Valera for his deception over the terms on 
which any form of negotiation with the British Government and, the then, Prime Minister, 
Lloyd George, could begin. Furthermore, that de Valera had been fully aware that the 
establishment of the ‘republic’, on which he based his later objections to the Treaty was 
definitely not a realistic submission for discussion and that any settlement regarding the 
constitutional position of Ireland must be formulated to incorporate Ireland within the 
British Empire. As O’Hegarty in A History of Ireland under the Union, made clear, the basis 
on which the Treaty negotiations were set also contributed to the Dail’s failure to address 
the gravity of the ‘Ulster question’ and the institutionalisation of the partition of Ireland. 
Moreover, de Valera’s actions, as President of Dail Eireann, had resulted in Sinn Fein’s tacit 
acceptance of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, the implementation of which had 
effectively set up the exclusion of six counties of Ulster under its own separate government. 
Indeed O’Hegarty was bemused by the actions of the Sinn Fein leaders and believed it was 
their limited perception and capabilities of dealing with Ulster’s intransigence that 
exacerbated tensions and it was through this lack of available leadership in nationalist 
Ireland that the English Government were able to capitalise most effectively in fomenting 
divisions between the Protestant majority in the north east and the rest of the island. 
O’Hegarty believed that as a representative of ‘old school’ Sinn Fein, he was pushed aside 
over the possible separate treatment of the Ulster, which, he believed, had been accepted as 
an inevitable outcome by the new leaders of Sinn Fein. It was while looking back on this
46 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f  Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.81.
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period, in a candid letter to Ernest Blythe written in 1949, that O’Hegarty contemplated this 
possibility while re-addressing his role at the time as one who was manipulated into 
believing that much of the Sinn Fein leadership was reacting to events without any set 
agenda: ‘Personally, I felt sure that, behind the bombast and slogans of 1918-22, there was 
in the leaders some realisation of the new situation, and I was sure they had it all planned 
out.. .1 was used but at the same time pushed to one side.. . ,47
This view lies in contrast to the earlier regard O’Hegarty was held in prior to the Easter 
Rising and marks the fundamental change in the fortunes of Sinn Fein over the prospect of 
holding power in a new state, even one shorn of the north east and therefore its integral 
territory. Although O’Hegarty was kept abreast of events, if not the details, he was not 
consulted over the possibilities for tackling the Ulster issue. O’Hegarty related how on the 
eve of the Treaty negotiations :
On the afternoon of the day in which the plenipotentiaries sailed, about 4.30pm, 
Gavin Duffy came to see me in the bookshop in a state of great indignation. He told 
me that they were crossing that evening that they had had no meeting amongst 
themselves, no meeting with de Valera, no meeting with the cabinet, that he did not 
know “how far we are going.” I said to him that the only way to avoid partition
which should be avoided at any cost was to convince Ulster that they could still be
loyal to the King.48
For O’Hegarty Sinn Fein had lost its way, not in the sense that the Irish Party and Home 
Rule had imbued ‘West Britonism’, but in politicising nationalism, the most prominent 
example of which was the crime of the Ulster boycott.’49
In order to evaluate O’Hegarty’s view of this major event in Sinn Fein’s policy toward the 
idea of Ulster resistance after it had come to power in the 1918 General Election, the
47 Ernest Blythe Papers, 20 September, 1949, University College Dublin, P24/1341.
48 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.16.
49 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.49-53.
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reasons behind the boycott’s implementation must be explained. The use of the boycott as a 
weapon of Irish nationalism had been used since at least the nineteenth century as a means 
to pressurise the Irish ascendancy landlords in to lowering their rents. This was achieved by 
tenants and other members of the local community refusing to buy any of the produce 
produced by the landlord and therefore inducing financial pressures on the household as 
well as the isolation from the rest of the community that ensued. In the prevailing 
relationships between north and south during 1920, the introduction of the boycott was in 
order to replicate this form of intimidation and isolation. The Ulster Boycott was 
recommended by the Sinn Fein leaders and put to the members of the Dail as a policy which 
would persuade the unionists’ leaders to re-employ the nationalist workers who had been 
expelled from their jobs and also to ensure the unionists were mindful of the economic 
pressure that could be brought to bear on them if they resisted a single Irish government. 
While the boycott seemed to have very powerful reasons for being implemented as a 
counter-move to unionist intransigence, there were wider implications that O’Hegarty had 
the foresight to recognise as producing a deepening ill-feeling between the unionist and 
nationalist populations of Ireland.
O’Hegarty’s view of the implementation of the act of boycotting was contained amongst his 
papers, the following description of the act of ‘boycotting’ is W. E. Gladstone’s, and is 
contained in the O’Hegarty collection at the Kenneth Spencer Library at Kansas University:
What is meant by boycotting? In the first place, it is combined intimidation. In the 
second place, it is combined intimidation made use of for the purpose of destroying 
the private liberties of choice by fear of ruin and starvation. In the third place, that 
being what ‘boycotting’ is in itself, we must look to this: that the creed of boycotting 
like every other creed, requires a sanction, and that the sanction of boycotting’ -  that
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which stands in the rear of boycotting and by which alone boycotting can in the long 
run be made thoroughly effective -  is the murder which is not to be denounced.50
An article featured in the journal he edited during 1918-1919, An Saoghal Gaedhealach. 
warned that ‘Republican leaders should take care not to commit themselves to anything 
reactionary in the way of economic policy nor to lend countenance to any sort of politico- 
sectarian society such as the Hibernians.’
For O’Hegarty, the boycott violated all of these warnings and once again O’Hegarty saw de 
Valera as the focal point for his disillusionment with Sinn Fein. O’Hegarty had believed that 
the Treaty negotiations would help avoid partition but ‘he [de Valera] began to flounder 
with the vicious and ignorant Belfast boycott which I opposed.. .at the time.’51 
O’Hegarty’s arguments against the boycott were important in that they highlighted the 
short-sighted and reactionary actions of many of his peers (including Griffith who to 
O’Hegarty’s amazement supported it),52 and their neglect of the boycott’s impact on the 
Ulster Unionist mentality. While the immediate aim of the boycott was to get northern 
Catholics back into work and try to show that the north was economically unviable, it was 
nothing short of a tragedy of Sinn Fein policy for O’Hegarty.
He described the boycott as making Protestant Home Rulers in the north ashamed of their 
principles, and turned apathetic Protestant unionists into bitter partisans. Furthermore, 
amongst Sinn Fein members blind to anything but the pursuit of power and the strong-arm 
tactics they believed were justified in the tense climate, O’Hegarty remarked: ‘When the 
Belfast boycott was introduced, for instance, attempts to discuss it were met with horror at a
50 P.S. OHegarty Collection, Spencer Library, Kansas University, P45.
51 Emesi Blythe Papers University College Dublin P24 1341. O’Hegarty warranted that the boycott had 
constituted a chapter in the Victory of Sinn Fein, which depicted Sinn Fein more as a political, rather than a 
national movement.
52 P.S. OHegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.51.
Sinn Fein branch, and with the information that this was “an order from the Dail Eireann” 
and therefore not for discussion or question.’53
Exhorting his opposition to the boycott O’Hegarty contemplated its overall effect:
It was the things which it produced that did the damage. It raised up in the south 
what never had been there, a hatred of the north, and a feeling that the north was as 
much an enemy of Ireland as was England.54
A recent scholar has confirmed O’Hegarty’s view of the impact of the boycott in dividing 
Ireland’s two main religious communities:
Sometimes the Boycott led to violence. That the Boycott did damage to the northern 
economy there is no doubt....The Boycott also gave Michael Collins a powerful 
lever in his later negotiations with Sir James Craig, but as an instrument for securing 
Irish unity the Boycott was fatally flawed. Industries from which workers were 
expelled were only marginally affected and the boycott could not exert sufficient 
pressure to have workers reinstated.55
Matters of Sinn Fein policy had previously been debated throughout the Sinn Fein 
organisation but now the inclusive and free-thinking environment that had originally drawn 
O’Hegarty to Sinn Fein had been crushed by the authoritarian Dail. In opposing the boycott 
O’Hegarty emphasised the negative aspects it engendered not just in the short term with the 
violence that ensued in the north east but in the long term also in creating another 
foundation for partition in dividing the north from the south. While for O’Hegarty the 
actions of the Irish Party, the sectarian basis of the AOH, the Easter Rising and the
53 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.56.
54 P.S. OHegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.52.
55 Jim McDermott, Northern Divisions: The old IRA and the Belfast Pogroms 1920-22 (Beyond Pale 
Productions, 2001), Introduction.
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‘swashbuckling stupidity of the new leaders of the nationalist majority’,56 exacerbated the 
widening gulf between unionists and nationalists.
A major source for unravelling O’Hegarty’s thoughts on the existing conflict between 
unionists and nationalists is contained in the Ernest Blythe papers located at the Special 
Archives Department at UCD and is contained in a series of correspondences between the 
two former Sinn Feiners. Here, many years later, reflecting on this period in a letter to 
Ernest Blythe, O’Hegarty returned to the main causes of division in Ireland as artificially 
induced and established from the Act of Union as a focal point of England’s strategy for 
holding Ireland’s ‘Underground Nation’, ‘in bondage’. That after the idea of Home Rule 
was put forward by Gladstone in 1886 as a viable method for dealing with Ireland his 
political opponents of this solution focused on Ulster as the best chance for maintaining 
England’s hold on Ireland and for undermining the Liberal government. O’Hegarty 
surmised that:
England made partition...but [that it was] absurd to say that England must undo 
it.. . ‘Chamberlain proposed “special treatment for Ulster” in 1886, as a personal 
move against Gladstone...’ and that it was, ‘Randolph Churchill’ who created the 
phrase ‘Ulster will fight and Ulster will be right.. .57
O’Hegarty continued that it was nothing but Chamberlain’s personal ambition that 
prompted the Ulster question and that the proposition had been rejected by Colonel 
Saunderson MP, leader of the Orangemen during this period. Furthermore in 1892 
O’Hegarty related how the position of Ulster as a focus of special treatment was proposed 
by the:
56 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.51.
57 Ernest Blythe Papers, September 1949, University College Dublin P24/1341. This comment was probably 
prompted by the ill-fated Border campaigns of 1946-1952.
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Dublin MP Cavan, who accepted it, but as a move in the conservative game against 
the liberals. When it would seem that the Home Rule Bill of 1912 was inevitably to 
go on the statute book, the conservatives went for partition, and the Ulster unionists 
accepted it, in order to save their faces. Partition has no real...justification, but what 
no political leader here has been willing to realize is that, once established it began 
to be something. It has an artificial foundation but it is a foundation.58
O’Hegarty suggested that those who claimed unionism as their guiding principle were 
serving the interests of England and that partition was an English construct that unionists 
thought a preposterous notion, only finally accepting it as a last resort.
In A History of Ireland under the Union, O’Hegarty justified his views on the basis that 
unionists were hopeful of a compromise between themselves and nationalists following the 
truce in the Anglo-Irish War and negotiations began on the future of Ireland. O’Hegarty 
conceded the unionists reservations regarding an Irish Parliament but that overall they were 
mindful of their foremost cultural identity and Irish heritage over the prospect of partition:
To the bulk of the unionists it was also a complete surprise, but they for the most 
part accepted its portent with resignation, with the reflection that things could not be 
worse than they had been under the British these last years, and that after all the Sinn 
Feiners were their own countrymen. The general feeling was one of immense relief, 
immense gratitude, and immense hope.59
In response, Ernest Blythe attributed very different reasons for the causes of partition. He 
disagreed with O’Hegarty that England had created within unionists a ‘false consciousness’ 
and that the will behind partition was the sole result of English politicking. (Although he did 
agree that the political machinations of Westminster and the interests of party politics held 
an indirect responsibility.) Blythe traced the emergence of the mass-based nationalist 
movements in the nineteenth century as buttressing a sense of two separate traditions in
58 Ernest Blythe Papers, September 1949, University College Dublin, P24/1341.
59 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.755.
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Ireland as, consisting as they did, of an overwhelming Catholic membership. This equation 
of nationalism with Catholicism became the catalyst for the idea of some form of special 
consideration being provided for Ulster.60 Blythe’s interpretation referred specifically to the 
movements directed by O’Connell and Parnell, who made no secret of their desire to see the 
balance of power between unionists and nationalists reversed. That in real terms, it was the 
fear of the minority i.e. the Protestants, of rescinding their privileged status to the Catholic 
majority that really created the conditions whereby partition as a viable solution to the 
positions adopted by nationalists and unionists was preferred by Ulster Unionists rather than 
the alternative of absorption into an Irish government. O’Connell and Parnell had neglected 
to address Protestant’s concerns, or gain high level support from influential Protestants who 
were sympathetic to the nationalist cause. This engendered a climate of suspicion and 
distrust among the Protestants of Ireland. Mass-based nationalism was therefore fatally 
flawed as it failed to create a unified policy for Irish independence acceptable to both 
Protestants and Catholics. Blythe contended that this neglect weakened the nationalist 
arguments for independence as a bind which could stretch across all traditions on the island. 
Blythe stated that . .its neglect of the binding cement of nationalism was absolutely bound 
to result in maintaining and increasing politico-religious segregation’.61 In response to 
O’Hegarty’s views, most specifically that ‘England made partition’ Blythe countered:
As long as our people swallow the propaganda catch-cry that “Britain made 
partition” so long will it be difficult to get them to accept any policy in regard to it 
other than the idiotic one at present being pursued...I should not expect any of our 
West British or pre-Gaelic League history writers to recognize this fact but I hoped 
that you, as a historian who was in and of Sinn Fein throughout, might both see and 
say it.62
60 Ernest Blythe Papers, 17 October, 1949, University College Dublin, P24/132.
61 Ernest Blythe Papers, 17 October, 1949, University College Dublin, P24/132.
62 Ernest Blythe Papers, 17 October, 1949, University College Dublin, P24/132.
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Blythe contended that O’Hegarty’s explanations for the partitioning of Ireland were 
insufficient in explaining Ulster’s deep rooted intransigence to home rule and that 
ultimately, there was very little that Sinn Fein could have done to prevent partition. This 
countered 0 ’Hegarty‘s view that the demise of the Sinn Fein movement post 1916 
contributed substantially to the eventual partitioning of Ireland. O’Hegarty had been 
convinced that the sense of Irishness that existed prior to the Act of Union and was being 
rebuilt in the early twentieth century through the Gaelic League and Sinn Fein could have 
bridged the divide between unionist and nationalist.
Through these correspondences there was an obvious sense of shared history between 
O’Hegarty and Blythe which resulted in such a candid exchange of views. O’Hegarty would 
not have appreciated Blythe’s reply that chastised him for not acknowledging that he was 
fully aware that the English Government were not the main force behind partition. 
O’Hegarty and Blythe were aiming for the same end, a united Ireland with a shared unitary 
culture existing between Protestant and Catholic, nationalist and unionist. Yet it was as if 
Blythe was stating that the two were no longer engaged in separatist propaganda and that 
they should drop the rhetoric accordingly. But more importantly, Blythe was admitting that 
separatism for all its commendable idealism had many flaws and chief among them was 
O’Hegarty’s Manichean presumption that Ulster Unionists would regain their true Irishness 
over their ‘falsely’ inculcated sense of ‘Britishness’, and that partition would be dismissed 
or would be eventually seen as the unnatural break-up of Ireland by England.
In relating his views to Blythe, that England had created the partitionist mentality in Ireland, 
O’Hegarty avoided the deeper issues that characterised the conflict between unionists and 
nationalists. He could not countenance that there was any truth to Lloyd George’s statement
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of March 7, 1917, that the fundamental difference between the north east and the south’s 
perspectives on culture and nationality, were that the former were: ‘as alien in blood, in 
religious faith, in traditions, in outlook -  as alien from the rest of Ireland in this respect as 
the inhabitants of Fife or Aberdeen’.63
Yet Lloyd George’s assertion laid bare the difficulty of England’s abandoning the unionists 
to such a fate given their sacrifices for the Empire and their sense of Britishness during the 
Great War. Given the Ulster Unionists’ commitment to protect the ‘Empire’ and their 
pledge to remain within its protective boundaries O’Hegarty’s arguments against partition 
failed to see how the issue of identity ran far deeper into the unionist conscience then he was 
prepared to admit. In this respect partition was met with reluctance by unionists but only as 
their first preference that of Ireland remaining a part of the United Kingdom became an 
unfeasible demand. Therefore it was not merely a question of England seizing her 
opportunity to form new bonds as O’Hegarty argued. This was apparent in how English 
Conservatives and Ulster Unionists on matters concerning Ulster and the wider implications 
of Empire were sometimes in disagreement. For Conservative Party leaders such as Bonar 
Law, Ulster had its uses as a bargaining tool. Bonar Law based his Ulster policy on how 
similar crises could be resolved if they were to arise in other colonies. In his view the Ulster 
question could not to be given primacy over matters that could adversely affect the British 
Empire but this was not to say that his sympathies were not with the Ulster Unionist 
position and the belief that the Empire was effectively abandoning its people.
So too, Ulster Unionists were not simply at the mercy of English party politics and the 
politicians who claimed to have their best interests in mind. Indeed Ulster Unionists reacted
63 House of Commons Debate, 22 December 1919, Vol. XCI, Col. 459, quoted in Nicholas Mansergh, ‘The 
Government of Ireland Act’ in Diana Mansergh, (Ed.), Nationalism and Independence (Cork, 1997), p.80.
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with hostility towards various proposals put forward by their Conservative allies as a 
measured response to the Home Rule crisis. The extra-parliamentary methods Ulster 
Unionists employed in resistance to the 1912 Home Rule Bill, reflected their 
comprehension of how fickle England could be and that parliaments did not always come to 
the right decisions, or at least ones that were responsive to their demands. Culturally and 
politically Ulster Unionists could not accept Sinn Fein’s nationalistic version of Ireland’s 
historical right to independence, most notably as it reduced their cultural and economic 
contributions in Ireland to a by-product of English imperialism. While this was never the 
case for O’Hegarty who praised the Anglo-Irish contribution to literature and Ulster’s past 
glories, he was still attempting to co-opt unionists into a parliament they did not believe in. 
For many nationalists, the historical legacy of unionism (dating from O’Connell’s 
increasing identification of nationalism with Catholicism), was regarded as an imposition 
upon the indigenous Irish population who were forced to endure the systematic repression 
of their culture. O’Hegarty blamed the Irish Party leader John Redmond for throwing his 
hand in over Ulster and accepting partition as a fait accompli, citing this action as severely 
hindering Sinn Fein’s chances of reversing the slide into the ‘partitionist mentality’. But in 
reality all Sinn Fein had to offer was a dogmatic insistence on a ’republic’ and Griffith’s 
proposals which were not very much different from the failed assurances Redmond gave to 
northern unionists.
Ideally for O’Hegarty, an all-Ireland parliament would have displayed a mature respect 
toward its Protestant minority. He relied on the belief that an Irish government’s first loyalty 
was to its citizens as a whole under the civic constitutional virtues he passionately believed 
in. O’Hegarty could have stated how in Southern Ireland, post-independence, the safeguards 
that southern unionists requested were put into place, but ultimately, even the relatively
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small southern unionist population was subject to high levels of emigration and a feeling of 
isolation among the nationalist majority.
In the twentieth century the political machine of Sinn Fein and its cultural affiliates the 
Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association became for unionists the equivalents of 
the Catholic majority’s right to govern Ireland. Indeed, unionists in the north in justifying 
their right to resist looked southwards and proclaimed how they had narrowly avoided 
absorption into a Catholic confessional state. They could back up this assertion with the 
special status granted to the Catholic faith by de Valera in his re-writing of the Irish 
Constitution in 1937. O’Hegarty like de Valera had to accept that ‘Ireland was Ireland 
without the North’, and his resignation towards the establishment of partition in Ireland, was 
set as early as 1924, a year before the results of the boundary commission were made 
known. This was in direct contrast to his hopeful tone during a meeting he attended with 
Harry Boland (an anti-Treatyite) and Michael Collins where the latter was convinced that 
the boundary commission would transfer a major part of Northern Ireland to the South thus 
ending partition.64
Despite the mistakes and false assumptions nationalists made in relation to the Ulster 
Unionist’s determination to resist home rule or any other settlement which would transfer 
legislative powers to a Dublin government, O’Hegarty was unrelenting in his belief that it 
was the unwelcome invader i.e. England who had imposed itd foreign culture on a section 
of the Irish people, in order to ensure the political binds between the two countries created 
in the Act of Union would not be totally severed. This was a false bind for O’Hegarty whose 
separatist concept of Irish nationality could never accept the ’two-nation’ theory or entertain 
the deep sense of political and cultural difference that an overwhelming majority of Ulster
64 P.S O’Hegarty, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.754.
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unionists felt from their nationalist counterparts. Partition was for O’Hegarty, as Smith 
contends in his Theories of Nationalism ‘a negation’ of the ‘nation’.65 It decimated a 
fundamental principle of Irish unity which Sinn Fein stood for in O’Hegarty’s view but as 
with the bitterness and disillusionment that surrounded the Irish Civil War, it was difficult 
to accept but, a fact that he had to live with.
It was conceivable to conclude that the English Government was the power bloc by which 
Ulster Unionists managed to stay out of an Irish government, but they were not the driving 
force behind Ulster’s determined resistance. As J.C. Beckett has contended: ‘As far as the 
Protestants of Ulster were concerned, the issue was less a campaign for their rights as 
British citizens, than a ‘revival of the seventeenth century struggle between Roman 
Catholics and Protestants for ascendancy in Ireland’,66 and, as Boyce has commented, that, 
therefore, the Ulstermen were determined to see this struggle through to a successful 
conclusion whether or not it suited the interests of the rest of the United Kingdom.67 The 
resolve of Ulster Unionists was forged on an internalised resilience organised into ‘a 
coherent and tightly knit group’.68 Essentially Ulster Unionism possessed a unitary policy 
that overcame potential internal divisions such as class and were able to discard their 
military organisation, the U.V.F., and channel this discipline into the constitutional 
stronghold of Ulster. Sinn Fein, despite its plethora of inclusive rhetoric directed toward 
placating the fears of Ulster Unionists, asserting the unity of Protestants and Catholics under 
the common banner of Irish citizens, was, nonetheless, striking at the heart of a proud and
65 A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London, 1971), p.223, quoted in, John Bowman, De Valera and the 
Ulster Question (Oxford, 1944), p. 14.
66 J.C. Beckett, The Making of Modem Ireland (London, 1981), p.399.
67 D.G. Boyce, ‘British conservative opinion, the Ulster question, and the partition of Ireland, 1912-21’, Irish 
Historical Studies, Vol. 17, March, 1970, p.97.
68 D.G. Boyce, ‘British conservative opinion, the Ulster question, and the partition of Ireland, 1912-21’, Irish 
Historical Studies Vol. 17, March, 1970, p. 100.
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fiercely separate tradition which had organised itself in order to oppose nationalist demands 
for self-government. Sinn Fein proved incapable of formulating a policy to convert or 
conciliate the Protestant majority in the north east.69
O’Hegarty’s attempts at conciliating unionist fears did not waver very much from standard 
Sinn Fein policy. Specifically, he looked to the forbears of civic nationalism, the seminal 
leaders of nationalism, John Mitchel and Thomas Davis for inspiration, who also stressed 
the essential unity of common citizenship shared between Protestant and Catholic, and to 
his contemporaries such as Robert Lynd and Bulmer Hobson, as representatives of the 
Protestant tradition with a positive nationalist outlook and who saw no contradiction 
existing between their religious and cultural background and the legitimate pursuit of 
gaining Irish national independence. Ultimately though, Lynd and Hobson, proved 
unreflective of the vast majority of Ulstermen and women in sentiment and cultural 
affiliation. At its most fundamental level, Ulster Unionism could not abide by the first 
principle of Sinn Fein, which amounted to a rejection of Anglicisation and its historical 
influence in Ireland. As a Sinn Feiner, O’Hegarty was not able to breach this fundamental 
problem existing between the Ulster Unionist concept of identity and Sinn Fein’s separatist 
ideology. Despite O’Hegarty’s liberal and pluralistic concept of the Irish nation, the paradox 
between the Ulster Unionism and Sinn Fein was written into their very concepts of 
nationhood. O’Hegarty’s attempts at reconciliation were honourable but the transition from 
forming a part of a United Kingdom majority to becoming an Irish minority proved too 
much of a gamble for Ulster Unionists to take.
In 1911, O’Hegarty issued in the pages of Irish Freedom: ‘a grave warning...to those who 
are at present solemnly assuring England that Ireland’s most cherished dream is to ‘take her
69 Jonathon Bardon, A History o f Ulster (Belfast, 1992), p.424.
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proper place in that Empire which her sons have done so much to build.’70 This warning 
was aimed specifically at the Irish Party on the eve of the third reading of the 1912 Home 
Rule Bill and the decidedly limited (for separatists) measures for granting Irish self- 
government contained therein. But the implications of the extract held far more reaching 
consequences for justifying the fears of Ulster Unionists. Namely, that all ties were to be 
eventually severed from the British Empire, a position which eventually occurred and which 
O’Hegarty attributed to the very nature of nationalist agitation with a separatist message. 
Whatever measure of freedom was granted Ireland by England, and then the restless spirit of 
Irish nationalism would continue onward until the bonds of Empire were broken and full 
freedom was won for the Irish nation.
O’Hegarty was unable to contemplate the real cultural and economic fears that were deeply 
engrained in Ulster Unionism, and could only counter that if Sinn Fein had stuck with 
Griffith’s Dual Monarchy policy, as one of compromise where allegiance was sworn to the 
constitutional monarch of both Ireland and Britain, then the necessary groundwork to bring 
the Unionists into an all-Ireland parliament would have been done. To quote once more 
from O’Hegarty in Irish Freedom, ‘it is not the form of government so much that matters as 
the spirit of it; and at present I don’t care what kind of government Ireland adopts when she 
gets her freedom so long as it is an Irish government.’71
Partition became the price of independence, the most definite slur on O’Hegarty’s view of 
Ireland as an integral and integrated nation, bound by a common history and unitary national 
outlook. O’Hegarty had to accept that a local majority in the north east were not convinced 
by the cultural, geographical and economic arguments stressed by Sinn Fein that would
70 Irish Freedom, November, 1911.
71 Irish Freedom, October, 1911.
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eventually form an Irish unifying principle, especially in a united self-governing Irish polity. 
Indeed for Ulster Unionists, Sinn Fein were less the new start O’Hegarty attributed to the 
movement, as remaining the latest manifestation of O’Connell’s nineteenth century 
movement whose popular appeal was firmly equated with Catholicism.
Ulster Unionists did not relate to the nationalist concept of the organic state, as consisting 
of: ‘those which have grown slowly and over a long period of time from some nuclear 
germinal or core area’.72 Subsequently, the promise of future safeguards for the minority 
written into the constitution was not enough to convince the Protestant people of the north 
east to relinquish their majority status and to quell their belief that a parochial Catholicism 
in a fully nationalist state would not become the dominating factor in Irish life.
O’Hegarty’s view of pluralism as implicit within Irish nationalism marked the degree to 
which O’Hegarty placed his faith in the organic and spiritual principles of separatism. He 
was convinced that to be working for Irish independence was to be working for the good of 
Ireland and all its inhabitants. He believed this explanation was enough to expel any fears 
Ulster Unionists might harbour regarding Irish self-government. Unfortunately for 
O’Hegarty the reverse could be said for Ulster Unionists. In their view, the spirit of 
government they identified with was enshrined in the British constitutional process and 
therefore they determined that even partition and a devolved parliament linked to 
Westminster was better than any form of Irish government.
72 NJ.G. Pounds and S.S. Ball, ‘Core areas in the development of the European State systems’, in Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, vol.54, March, 1964, pp24-40; quoted in John Bowman, de Valera and 
the Ulster Question 1917-73 (Oxford, 1982), p.12.
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CONCLUSION
And before we can hope to inspire others with enthusiasm we must ourselves take up 
the movement wholly and intelligently and fearlessly. The young men who believe 
in the movement must take up the burthen of responsibility, and work, preach, and 
write, irrespective of the fact that they are young. Assertion of principle without 
active demonstration of it is harmful and Nationalism in Ireland of recent years has 
been to much a matter of academic belief. This is the last fight; if Sinn Fein fails 
there is no hope for the nation and its success or failure depends upon the 
earnestness and enthusiasm of those who believe in it. Work, anywhere and anyhow, 
so that it be earnest and honest and consistent, is the great weapon, and the making 
of men the great work. Let us bend our backs to it. The Republic. February 1, 1907.
Writing these words in 1907, O’Hegarty had already been involved with the separatist 
movement for nearly 10 years. During this period of writing, Sinn Fein was still enjoying its 
best and most productive phase and O’Hegarty held the optimistic view that the deep 
commitment and industrious attitude he brought to Sinn Fein would eventually win over the 
majority of Irishmen and women to the Sinn Fein programme. O’Hegarty always took the 
long view of the movement over the short-term gains or popular stances that Sinn Fein had 
taken in its newest member’s reduction of the Sinn Fein philosophy to a few popular 
slogans, as described in Chapter Four. This ability to take the long view of events in Ireland 
was also equally pertinent in his attitude to cultural matters as contained in his desire to end 
the classification of Anglo-Irish literature as un-Irish and in his refusal to believe that ’high 
culture’ was restricted to a minority, as his attacks on Annie Homiman’s views of the 
selective target audience the Abbey Theatre should be attracting, testify to.
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In his personal life too, O’Hegarty was no hypocrite. Ireland during the early part of the 
twentieth century and indeed to an extent today, despite O’Hegarty’s attempts to change the 
current force of opinion in Irish society, was subject to discrimination along religious lines. 
O’Hegarty married Wilhelmina Dill Smith a Presbyterian woman, a choice of wife, he felt, 
which held serious repercussions for his relations with the top echelons of the Sinn Fein 
movement when it became known to them that some form of power was to be handed to the 
Irish people and in their ‘rush to secure their valuable interests’. Years later, reflecting on 
this period, O’Hegarty wrote to Blythe that: ’I was a catholic agnostic who had never 
pretended to like the church, and who had married an ex-Protestant agnostic, and they were 
afraid to trust me for that reason.’1 It was this sort of discriminatory thinking within Ireland, 
and which was prevalent within Sinn Fein following the events of the 1916 Easter Rising, 
that O’Hegarty was campaigning against and, indeed, formed the crux of the issue for 
O’Hegarty, as has been analysed throughout this thesis.
Sinn Fein, the IRB and the Gaelic League as the most active sections of the separatist 
movement did not retain their original philosophies or ideals as O’Hegarty saw them. When 
given the chance in 1918 to prove to the electorate exactly what they had originally stood 
for i.e., a new start along civic and pluralistic lines for the citizens of Ireland, the separatist 
leaders of Sinn Fein patently ignored or failed to recognise the original designs of what Sinn 
Fein actually stood for. Much of the old guard, including O’Hegarty and Griffith, who had 
been founding and active members of Sinn Fein had, by then, been ousted from their 
prominent positions, largely as a result of their not being active participants in the fighting 
of Easter week, an event which had been mistakenly associated with the Sinn Fein policy. 
Consequently, the inclusive and pluralistic message of O’Hegarty as defined by Sinn Fein’s
1 P.S. O’Hegarty to Ernest Blythe, Ernest Blythe Papers, University College Dublin, P24/1341.
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earlier years was lost amid the malaise. Ultimately for O’Hegarty, Sinn Fein failed to deliver 
and the last fight for the Irish nation as a civic and pluralist society ended in civil war and 
partition.
O’Hegarty’s adherence to his original separatist principles was to prove an unpopular stance 
amongst his newly acquired peers in Sinn Fein, but, as with his willingness to take on its 
leader Arthur Griffith in 1910, over maintaining the policy of abstention from Westminster, 
and over Griffith’s threatened alignment of Sinn Fein with William O’Brien’s All for 
Ireland League, O’Hegarty fought to the last over issues he felt were intrinsic to the reasons 
why he had become a separatist in the first instance. This side of O’Hegarty’s character was 
pertinent in 1916 as unlike many of his separatist contemporaries he did not jump on the 
bandwagon of the revised meaning of ‘republican’ after 1916. Indeed the fact that he was a 
physical force man who made the important distinction between the grand battles of a 
popular uprising sanctioned by the Irish people and engrained in the revised IRB 
constitution, and the reason behind the inclusion of that amendment, were precisely so that 
an active minority were prevented from committing violent acts in the name of the Irish 
people. In this respect O’Hegarty like his friend, Terence MacSwiney, believed in the swift 
sword thrust combined with the ‘sword of light’,2 or, the cultural build up of the nation, so 
that when independence was realised by the Irish people they would be better prepared for 
the responsibilities of self-government. So too, Roy Foster in his identification and 
recognition of the often neglected pluralistic elements of the Gaelic League could have
2 Dublin Magazine, July-September, 1939.
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included O’Hegarty as a sterling representative of the ‘elements of pluralism and 
inclusivism present which have sometimes been underestimated.’3
O’Hegarty saw the entire separatist enterprise as forming the ‘culmination of many things 
and men gone before’4 and not just a singular enterprise based upon the justification of 
violent means to achieve the end of Irish independence.
Amongst the multitude of historical literature that has been written about the more well 
known separatist figures of the early twentieth century such as Michael Collins, Arthur 
Griffith and Eamonn de Valera, O’Hegarty’s published works prove invaluable sources in 
explaining the motivating factors behind these men’s actions that were to shape a defining 
era in Anglo-Irish relations and lead up to the beginning of Irish independence and the 
responsibilities of self government. The appendices of this thesis include O’Hegarty’s vivid 
and evocative portrayals of Griffith and Collins and while his historical treatment of de 
Valera was harsh and unforgiving in The Victory of Sinn Fein this must be understood in 
the light of O’Hegarty’s emphasis on his contemporaries’ individual characters. In Griffith 
and Collins O’Hegarty saw men of integrity and men of their word, in de Valera, O’Hegarty 
saw duplicity and a sanctimonious hijacking of the separatist tradition and consequently de 
Valera was subjected to the vilification he endured in the pages of The Victory of Sinn Fein. 
Moreover de Valera had claimed to be representing the martyrs of the separatist tradition 
such as Patrick Pearse and Terence MacSwiney, and while O’Hegarty was not in agreement 
with Pearse’s role in the Easter Rising, he was very close friends with MacSwiney, and he 
believed de Valera and the rest of the republicans who followed his lead in declaring against
3 Roy Foster, ‘History and the Irish question’, in Ciaran Brady, (Ed.), Interpreting Irish History, (Blackrock, 
1994), p. 137.
4 Roy Foster, ‘History and the Irish question’, in Ciaran Brady, (Ed.), Interpreting Irish History, (Blackrock, 
1994), p. 137.
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the Treaty and ultimately subverting the right of the Irish people to choose their own 
national destiny, were sullying both these men’s sacrifices for the separatist movement. 
O’Hegarty’s harshness toward de Valera can be contrasted with his portrayals of Cathal 
Brugha, and Mrs. Tom Clarke, both staunch anti-Treatyites whom O’Hegarty treats with 
respect for their positions purely because they were not hypocrites in contrast to his view of 
de Valera. It would seem for O’Hegarty, that it was okay not to support the Treaty if there 
were genuine concerns over its implications for Ireland, but these were to be settled during 
reasoned debate in the Dail, which, now that the truce had been called by the English 
Government in 1921, could function as an ordinary parliament where it was free to debate 
issues of state and the future of the nation.
Nationalism, taken at its core meaning, contained the Irish people’s deeply embedded 
notions of tolerance and plurality, and did not stand motionless in time, for O’Hegarty. He 
justified his acceptance of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on separatist grounds that were not rigid in 
their understanding of what was best for Ireland, or the best way to achieve freedom for its 
people. What O’Hegarty was quick to realise was, that once the bonds of the British Empire 
had been loosened, then violence no longer needed to play a part in the nationalist campaign 
and the Irish people through the exercise of their own constitutional will could decide the 
pace by which they would break the bond with England and achieve their full independence. 
This was the long view of Irish nationalism that O’Hegarty took over the short term gains of 
the republican slogans and braggadocio which characterised the period from 1916 to 1922. 
Unlike many of his contemporary separatists the will of the Irish people and the good of 
Ireland in general were always O’Hegarty’s paramount concerns as his creation, and 
editorship of, the pro-Treatyite organ The Separatist testifies to. The fundamental purpose 
behind The Separatist was to assert the need for reasoned debate to take place over the
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violence which had taken hold in recent years in Ireland. Given the climate of fear that had 
pervaded Ireland especially from the split in Sinn Fein into pro and anti-Treatyites, with 
either side featuring bands of armed men which eventually became armies, O’Hegarty was 
an individual who was willing to make a brave stand in his determination to put the good of 
the Irish nation above every other consideration.
O’Hegarty’s willingness to put the nation first was also seen in his commitment to the 
toleration and veneration of good art, particularly literature. In describing their first meeting 
together, O’Hegarty spoke of his and Arthur Griffith’s conversation as being dominated by 
books5 and, despite their disagreements over the direction in which to take Sinn Fein, and 
O’Hegarty’s belief that Griffith was ‘not fond of him’ they undoubtedly shared in the belief 
of obtaining a united, free Ireland with its foundation set in an appreciation of Gaelic culture 
as their work and commitment in Sinn Fein amply demonstrates.6 Many years later, in an 
article for the Irish Times which featured a centenary tribute celebrating O’Hegarty’s birth, 
Cian O’Heigeartaigh was to write of P.S.:
His great virtue was the originality and self-reliance of his judgement. Nobody had 
ever taught him what he should think about literature; he came fresh to what he read, 
judged it in relation to his own rich experience of life, and because he had a shrewd 
eye and broad sympathies, his judgements have stood the test of time.7
P.S. O’Hegarty stood at the very heart of the inner circles of Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League 
and the IRB and therefore was privy to many private conversations and documents that 
provide original source material relevant to this period.
5 Brian Maye, Arthur Griffith (Griffith College Publications, 1997), p.286.
6 See O’Hegarty’s article in the Separatist entitled ‘Arthur Griffith’ and his chapter in The Victory o f Sinn Fein 
entitled ‘The Death of Griffith’, which is contained in this thesis as Appendix H
7 Cian O’Heagartaih, The Irish Times, Tribute to P.S. O’Hegarty, Centenary Article, 1980.
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O’Hegarty’s intimate portrayals of these individuals during the tumultuous times that 
Ireland experienced in the first decades of the twentieth century have been described as 
more reliable then some of his separatist contemporaries memoirs such as Ernie O’Malley, 
as the latter’s reminiscences were written over two decades later while largely aiming for 
literary effect.8
O’Hegarty maintained ‘in Ireland especially it is important that its political history should be 
understood’9, and this formed his compulsion to explain in A History of Ireland under the 
Union how the Irish people had triumphed over great adversity to become a nation free from 
the cultural and political ‘bondage’ imposed on them by the British Empire. In his depiction 
of the Irish people overcoming adversity O’Hegarty was an intellectual at the vanguard of a 
political movement that believed it offered a new start and could re-shape the political 
landscape in Ireland through a collective memory and shared sense of identity and thus 
enervate the decay upon which they believed the Irish Party had subjected Ireland to. 
However in many respects the question of a collective identity as featured in O’Hegarty’s 
holistic idea of the Irish people has remained the problem in Northern Ireland today, as the 
popular consciousness of the Irish nation as a geographical unit has persisted in the south of 
Ireland and particularly amongst Northern Catholics.
Taking issue with this notion, the Cadogan Group (an eclectic mix of academics who have 
published responses to the developments in political initiatives put forward to help resolve 
the existing situation in Northern Ireland), have recently argued that it is nationalist ideology
8 Tom Garvin, ‘Introduction to The Victory of Sinn Fein’, in P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein, (Dublin, 
1998), p.xi.
9 ‘Prefatory Note’, P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952).
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‘historically and today [that].. .has.. .proved an obstacle to sensible cross border cooperation 
and a shared sense of Irishness, rather than the foremost promoter of such ends.’10 
The Cadogan Group continue that the form of nationalist ideology as portrayed throughout 
O’Hegarty’s journalism and published works has proved a major drawback in the North and 
that the removal of Article 2 of Bunreacht na hEireann,11 (the revised Irish Constitution of 
1937), has done little to dispel this idealistic feature of nationalist ideology among the Irish 
Republican’s campaign which remains pinned to its basic premise. O’Hegarty would have 
approved of the sentiment behind Article 2 in the Irish constitution as it established the 
geographical unity of Ireland and its cherishing of all the different cultures and traditions 
inherent in its population as welcome citizens of Ireland. But if O’Hegarty thought that the 
partitioning of Ireland into North and South was the most disastrous outcome of the 
Anglo/Irish Treaty and the period following 1916 generally, Tom Garvin has still noted, that 
O’Hegarty was one of the first nationalists to vehemently oppose any attempt to coerce the 
inhabitants of Northern Ireland into a united Ireland and that he enunciated a doctrine of 
Northern consent long before it was profitable or popular.12 O’Hegarty did not believe in 
1922 or throughout his life that partition would remain a permanent feature of the island of 
Ireland and thought that some form of accommodation or recognition of mutual interest and 
advantage would eventually be recognised. But again as with his attitude toward the
10 Pamphlet entitled Rough Trade, Negotiating a Northern Ireland Settlement, The Cadogan Group, 1998, p.7.
11 Article 2 of the 1937 Irish Constitution stated ‘It is the entitlement and birthright of every person bom in the 
island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement 
of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation 
cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and 
heritage’.)
12 Tom Garvin, ‘Introduction to The Victory of Sinn Fein’, P.S. O'Hegarty, in P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory of 
Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1998), p.x.
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violence following 1916 he was not willing to compromise on the need for violence in order 
to justify the end goal of a united Ireland.
In stating this, O’Hegarty could not have known that Northern Ireland would emerge as the 
scene for intense sectarian hatreds and its overspill into bloodshed from 1969. It would be 
reasonable to argue that O’Hegarty would have been very much against the violence as he 
condemned the anti-Treatyites’ justification for violence as betraying the Irish people’s 
express wishes for peace and for their assuming the mantle of the guardians of a mythical 
republic. In taking their stance in 1921 it was the anti-Treatyites for O’Hegarty who had 
pushed matters into civil war and it was they who were violating the civil rights of the Irish 
people. O’Hegarty was alive to the danger of the narrowing of Irish nationalism to an ethnic 
and religious identification, for instance as D.P. Moran depicted it in his newspaper The 
Leader, during O’Hegarty’s era, and that formed one reason why O’Hegarty was adamant in 
emphasising that nationalism was a liberal ideology that welcomed all Irishmen and women 
as equal citizens functioning under the rule of law. This he contrasted with the 700 years of 
English rule that Ireland had endured which, while claiming a liberal constitutional position, 
could never justifiably represent this ideal, as by their very colonial presence in Ireland, 
were denying the Irish people their historical right to nationhood and self-government. 
O’Hegarty wanted to right the misconceptions of why constitutionalism was flawed in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries under O’Connell, Parnell and the reconstituted Irish Party 
under Redmond. He felt a keen compulsion to do so and even against the latter he felt no 
real hatred, he just refused to accept that the Irish Party were the best that Ireland could offer 
in resistance to English rule in Ireland. This was a sentiment that O’Hegarty could 
justifiably widen to include the English nation whom he believed had kept Ireland in 
captivity for so long. Sinn Fein:
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...had no hatreds. Although Griffith, and indeed all of us, wrote bitterly and 
scathingly about England and about the Parliamentary party, we had no hatred for 
either. We loved the Protestant as well as Catholic, nay better than, for Tone was the 
first of modem nationalists, and remains the chief; and Protestant names lie thick on 
the separatist roll of honour. The incredibly diabolical mental processes of the 
Irregular mind of the last two years would have been utterly alien to us.13
O’Hegarty was a democrat but the only form true democracy could take in Ireland was to 
discard Imperialism and oust the penetration of English culture as damaging to Irish culture. 
This would enable Irish democracy to take root. But, as outlined above O’Hegarty was 
incapable of bearing a grudge against the English people and as Roy Foster has stated 
O’Hegarty’s time in London while strengthening his anti-clericalism, lessened his 
Anglophobia.14 O’Hegarty made the important distinction between the English people, to 
whom he bore no animosity, and the English Parliament, which he saw as an institution that 
generated the Imperial mindset among the Irish people and whose only real interest in 
Ireland was the maintenance of her selfish cultural and economic interests on the island. The 
advocating of this perspective became the source of much of O’Hegarty’s journalist 
propaganda before the ratification of the Anglo-Irish Treaty.
Ultimately however O’Hegarty exhibited his deeply held liberal and pluralistic beliefs and 
praised England for the generosity of spirit she displayed following her victory in the Great 
War where her imperialistic powers were increased, and in setting the terms in the Treaty as 
opening the path to complete freedom.
The Treaty set up in Ireland an independent Irish state, with full control over 
Ireland’s territory and resources and international relations, subject to certain verbal 
limitations of no practical consequence, these limitations being, none of them, things 
which were unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances. Lloyd George’s government
13 P.S. O’Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), p.163.
14 Roy Foster, Mr. Paddy and Mr. Punch (London, 1995), p.301.
258
went, in the matter of the treaty, to the utmost limits of concession and, whatever 
their motives, they paid magnificent deference to the susceptibilities of a people 
naturally touchy in what might seem to impinge on their full freedom in every 
respect. Lloyd George himself was never forgiven by the Conservatives for his part 
in the Treaty, and it was one of the main causes of his political eclipse. That a nation 
which had just won the greatest war in history should sit down and accept at its face 
value Ireland’s bluff, and give in fact everything which was asked while colouring it 
sufficiently to deceive themselves that something was being withheld, deserves and 
ought to get generous and unrestrained appreciation from Ireland. It does not, of 
course, redress the long centuries’ balance which is still heavily against her, but it 
was a good deed and a magnificent deed, and the writer has no doubt that St. Patrick, 
up aloft, has noted the deed and will see that it is given full weight.15
O’Hegarty saw the nationalism and separatist spirit that originally existed in the Sinn Fein 
movement as paving the way for other Nations. In The Separatist. March 4, 1922 he wrote:
India and Egypt have evolved national will and national consciousness, and leaders, 
and they are extremely unlikely to be held as long as we were. Egypt is clearly 
almost free, and India, in which the sit is admittedly “menacing,” obviously cannot 
long be held against the awakening determination of her millions. All three, we shall 
help each other. The stronger one grows, the stronger we all grow, and the stronger 
we all grow, the weaker grows that empire which tried to swallow us. John Mitchel 
said that we should outlast it. So shall India and Egypt.
O’Hegarty was to expand on this idea in A History of Ireland under the Union claiming
Ireland‘s heritage as the instigator for other colonial nations in their aspirations of freedom:
It did more. It broke up the British Empire, killed England’s will to Empire. In one 
of his article Roger Casement wrote, “The Empire that began on an Island will 
perish on an Island.” And so it did. For centuries Ireland withstood its fury, in the 
end out bluffed it. If to-day India, Burma, and Egypt are free nations, they owe it 
primarily to our example and our softening effectiveness, and secondarily Japan. We
changed not only the name of the British Empire but its nature.16
This thesis has sought to examine the pluralistic and liberal thought of P.S. O’Hegarty and 
illuminate the separatist movements that provided an intellectual outlet for the expression of
15 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History of Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.773.
16 P.S. O’Hegarty, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952), p.774.
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his ideals and aspirations for the Irish nation. Above all, O’Hegarty possessed an originality 
of mind that addressed and sought solutions to the problems of pre-independence Ireland 
over notions of identity and culture. While he was unable to resolve many of these problems 
he did ask the right questions, many of which were ignored as irrelevancies by his 
contemporaries or merely put aside as secondary concerns that an Irish government would 
solve once independence was gained by whatever means possible. He was to deeply dislike 
this attitude and for good reason, as the expectations that an Irish government would bring 
with it an instant solution to embedded problems was not realisable. O’Hegarty was a brave 
individual who was not afraid to stand back and criticise the Sinn Fein movement and the 
Irish nation for its faults both pre and post independent Ireland, who left behind many 
valuable published works and documentary sources and from 1902 onwards his personal 
knowledge of the men, and of the evolution, of the Separatist movement in all its phases17 
which prove invaluable to our understanding of the evolution of Sinn Fein and the Ireland of 
his times.
17 P.S. O'Hegarty, ‘Prefatory Note’, A History o f Ireland under the Union (London, 1952).
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APPENDIX I
Chapter XVI 
Extract from the ‘Great Talk’
I set down here a conversation which I had with Griffith in April, 1922.1 had to see him in 
connexion with Post Office business, and when that was finished, I put to him a question 
which I had been wanting an opportunity to put. [I had seen him only once since his release 
from prison, and then in a crowd.] I said to him, “How did ‘external association’ first 
arise?” “I’ll tell you,” said he. “The first I heard of ‘external association’ was when de 
Valera was pressing me to go over as a plenipotentiary. I went in to him one day, and found 
him with Cathal and Austin at his desk, all three sitting. I was standing. He told me he 
wanted me to go to London. I said to him, 'You are my chief, and if you tell me to go, I’ll 
go. But I know, and you know, that I can’t bring back the Republic.’ Then he produced this 
external association idea - the first I ever heard of it - and after half an hour’s persuasion, 
Cathal gave a reluctant consent to it. Stack said nothing, but sat there, sullen. I said nothing. 
Then the other two left, and left me alone with him. I said to him, ‘look here Dev, what is 
the meaning of this external association idea? What are you getting at with it?’ He replied 
by getting a pencil and paper and drawing a straight line thus - (Here Griffith got pencil and 
paper and drew the line AB) - ‘That,’ said he ‘is me, in the straight jacket of the Republic. I 
must get out of it.’ Then he drew another line, a curved line. (Here Griffith drew the curved 
line AC). ‘That,’ said he, ‘is external association. The purpose of it is to bring Cathal along.’
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Then he drew another straight line-(Here Griffith drew the line AD) - ‘That,’ said he, is 
where we’ll eventually get to.’ Then I was satisfied, and said no more about it.”
I believe that statement of Griffith’s, given in private and friendly conversation, to have 
been absolutely truthful, and to fit in with everything we know about Mr. De Valera. He 
never had any illusions about Ireland’s chances of getting a Republic, and when he first 
nailed the Republican flag to his mast-head, he was only nailing a flag for political and 
bargaining purposes - he was not nailing a principal. The idea of compromise was ever 
present with him, and he was the first Irishman to suggest compromise, as he did in the 
journalistic interview in which he invited England to offer Ireland a Cuban Constitution. 
When he returned to Ireland in December, 1920, his first thought was to stop the war, the 
growing brutality of which, he perceived, made any arrangement difficult.
The Great Talk, at any rate, revealed nothing but bitterness and jealousy and small 
mindedness in the members Dail. They spoke, not on the subject at issue, but to posterity - 
thinking of their reputations, and not of their responsibilities nor of the consequences of 
their words or acts. Men and women, who had looked on and watched the Republic being 
thrown overboard, pretended they wanted to die for it when the irrevocable deed had been 
done. The whole debate was an exposure of the vanity and incompetence of Dail members, 
and of their political irresponsibility. The question at issue was a simple one and a clear one, 
yet numbers of Deputies changed their minds day after day, swayed by this or that. On the 
last day of all, one Deputy, at least, voted against the Treaty because the Freeman’s Journal 
had attacked de Valera; while at least two others voted in its favour because of a bitter 
speech by Cathal Brugha against Collins. The Plenipotentiaries themselves furnished the 
crowning evidence of our utter absence of any sense of responsibility, in as much as one 
plenipotentiary, who did not like the Treaty after he had signed it, regarded himself as at
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liberty to dishonour his signature and vote and act with the Anti-Treaty Party; while another, 
who honoured his signature in the letter, completely broke it in the spirit, and gave every 
encouragement, short of joining them, to those who worked for the rejection of the Treaty. 
The debate revealed the mass of the Deputies engulfed in moral cowardice and in rhetoric, 
desperately attempting to save their faces either by pretending to believe that they were 
voting for the “maintenance of the existing Republic” while they were really voting for 
Document No. 2, or by pretending to believe that they were voting for the future Republic, 
when they were really voting for the postponement of the Republican demand. The machine 
which Sinn Fein had become produced what political machines always produce - mediocrity 
and codology and political incapacity.
Taken from P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), pp. 86-89.
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APPENDIX n
THE DEATH OF GRIFFITH
By the death of Arthur Griffith we lost not only the most constructive and steadfast political 
intelligence in Ireland, but the man upon whom for twenty and odd years had lain the whole 
burden of travail of this nation, and upon whom by rights it should have lain for at least 
another ten. Arthur Griffith was not alone the greatest Irishman of his time, but he was the 
greatest Irishman since Davis and Mitchel, and perhaps the most gifted all-round nationalist 
since Tone.
I had gone away to get a brief holiday, when this fatal news reached me. I could not believe 
it. Nobody who had known Griffith and worked with him could believe it. I felt as Gavan 
Duffy records the Young Irelanders felt when Davis died. Whoever else died, we felt sure 
that it would not be Griffith - Griffith with the iron will, the iron constitution, the importable 
nerve; Griffith whom we all thought certain to live to be one hundred and write the epitaphs 
of all of us; Griffith, upon whom we all leaned, all depended.
My mind went back twenty years, to the day I first saw Griffith, who was then editing the 
United Irishman, and who had just printed my first attempt at journalism. The United 
Irishman is almost forgotten now, but it did its work. It was the beginning of everything and 
of everybody; it was the foundation of everything which in the next twenty years came to 
mean anything in Ireland. It was a paper of which every line was read, and was readable, of 
every week, and nor perfunctorily, but with delight and avidity, a paper behind which was
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the impress of a mastermind, plainly perceptible. It was the great trap set by the Irish 
national instinct to catch the young, and it did catch us. I remember a joke which Griffith 
got hold of some circular or other of some Castle political department, in which people were 
warned in general terms to avoid too much conversation with “the man in the street”. He 
printed it. I don’t remember the exact wording of if now, but I do remember the exact 
wording of his N.B. to it. This was it: “N.B. - The street more particularly referred to is 
Fownes Street.” 17 Fownes Street was the office of the United Irishman.
It was there that I first saw him, and there that I perceived the greatness of the man. It was a 
very small office on one of the upper floors, with an even smaller anti-room. There was just 
room enough for a desk and a couple of chairs - one window, very dusty; walls very dusty; 
dust everywhere. But the visitors never saw those things at first. Sitting at the desk, on a 
chair which mostly was rickety, was a small man, modest in appearance and in demeanour, 
unobtrusive, not remarkable until he looked full at you, and then you forgot everything save 
that powerful head, those hard, steadfast, balancing eyes. Here was power, intellect, and 
determination, and above all and behind all a sturdy commonsense, a commonness in the 
sense that you felt at once that here was a rare thing, a man of the people, bone of their 
bone, and flesh of their flesh, understanding them with all their national instinct and 
national sureness, their decency, and their absence side, and yet the most powerful and 
steadfast intellect in Ireland. Here was a man who was all brain, and all good. The desk, the 
floor, the window recess, the mantel piece, all full of files and papers - even the visitors 
chair had to be apologetically cleared; against the wall at his left hand, bound files of his 
own paper, and in the middle of all this print and dust and quiet, this one man. I don’t think 
that impression has ever left my mind, and I don’t think it will ever leave the mind of any 
one of those who saw him as I did. The room looked to be in hopeless confusion, but that
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was only the appearance of it; he knew where everything was, and could lay his hands on 
anything when he wanted it.
At that time, the number of people who were consciously working for a separation was very 
small. The Gaelic League, itself the most separatist organisation that ever existed in Ireland, 
and seen as such only by Griffith and his friends, was scornful of the “Tinpikemen,” (Those 
who led Gaelic League majority against us in those days are now violent Irregulars). There 
was a handful in Dublin, smaller groups in some country centres, and a fairly large group in 
London. Griffith, in the United Irishman, gave them cohesion, and direction, and 
enthusiasm; gave them true national education; was himself the foundation and the force of 
everything. Without him there would have been no movement.
The present generation knows not Griffith, and probably never will know him, though 
without him it would have been nothing. He was unemotional and unrhetorical, and he 
never in his life made a rhetorical appeal or an emotional appeal. He did not go about 
waving Republican flags and cursing England; but when, in his quiet, even, and decisive 
voice he said, “Let England take her right hand from Ireland’s throat and her left hand out of 
Ireland’s pocket”, it was more effective and more understandable than any sword speech. 
And his pen was the most constructively-destructive pen that startled Ireland since Mitchel. 
Griffith has, in recent years, been spoken of as all sorts of things. He was really one thing - 
he was the Great Separatist, the most utterly separatist intellect that Ireland produced since 
Mitchel, who never wrote a line on any subject that was not a separatist line, and who never 
lost his grip upon reality. He was in his generation the supreme embodiment of his people. 
Griffith supported Parnell. He supported Parnell because Parnell used the methods and 
means of his day - methods and means which were not essentially separatist - as a separatist 
and for separatist purposes; because Parnell, with his material and with his circumstances,
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advanced the separatist cause. He recognised that Parnell used the methods and materials of 
his time as a separatist would use them, and he held it to be good separatist policy to do that. 
So it is. The separatist is not necessarily he who shouts and blows up, but he who 
constructs, who uses. And Parnell, despite his oath of allegiance, was a separatist, because 
all his leading and all his intellect and all his achievement were separatist.
Griffith took the material of his own day, too - and its methods - and he fashioned them into 
the most comprehensive and constructive separatist philosophy that any subject nation has 
evolved. And he persisted. And he won. He forced England to “take her right hand from 
Ireland’s throat and her left hand out of Ireland’s pocket”. He separated Ireland from 
England. He set out to do it, and persisted in it even when he could count his followers on 
his fingers and toes. He knew that Ireland would need him and need his policy. And when 
she needed him and if they were there. And in her service he spent himself.
In that final speech of his recommending the Treaty to Dail Eireann, Griffith referred to 
Thomas Davis as his master; and while it may be said of all Irish nationalists that they are 
influenced by Davis, it was particularly true of Griffith, in as much as he believed 
passionately, with Davis, in not alone the desirability but the practicability of a union of all 
Irishmen against the domination of England. He was convinced of the innate patriotism of 
the Protestant and Unionist class in Ireland, and was convinced that a way could be found to 
unite them with the Nationalists upon the broad issue. And he was steeped in the philosophy 
of Davis and in the teaching of Davis. In himself he was an example of that teaching, for he 
knew Ireland, her capacity and resources, her history, her literature, her possibilities, as 
Davis recommends that all Irishmen should know her; and he gave his days and his nights 
to Ireland with a single mindedness as a persistence which only conviction that was a 
passion could have sustained.
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The tragedy of the death of Arthur Griffith is not the tragedy of work unfinished, not the 
tragedy of a failure. He was always concerned with getting things done rather than any 
particular concrete way of doing them, and in his efforts for Ireland he was concerned rather 
with achieving for Ireland freedom, than with achieving the triumph of any particular 
political formula or structure. When he said that “England must take one hand from off 
Ireland’s throat and the other from out of her pocket”, he said exactly, and in its exact 
proportions, what he was aiming at; and at any time of his life he would have regarded any 
solution which gained that as an acceptable one. What he wanted was freedom for Ireland to 
develop on her own lines, free from outside interference; and it was that freedom, and not 
any particular way of embodying it, that he was concerned with. He was one of the few 
Nationalists, for instance, who had any realization of the comparative value of economic 
freedom; and one of the things which he most consistently preached was that Ireland, by 
working unitedly on economic lines, could so develop her strength as to make it impossible 
for England to hold her. The tragedy of his death was not the tragedy of a failure, for he has 
succeeded in his object and in his policy: he had brought to Ireland a Treaty with England 
which made Ireland absolute mistress in her own house, with full economic and cultural 
freedom, and with practically full political freedom, and which, while it had to bow to 
circumstances in the matter of the Six Counties of Unionist Ulster, carried in itself the 
certainty of an eventual union of all Ireland. The tragedy in his death was this: that he who 
had loved Ireland so well and so passionately, who had been poor all his life for her sake, 
who had in the end raised her up, should have been struck down ere he enjoyed the glory of 
seeing her develop, of seeing all the things he loved to plan for her grow under his 
protecting hand. It is a lesser tragedy than that of any Irish national leader.
Griffith has been written of as a non-believer in physical force. That is not true. He was a 
physical man, and when I first knew him he was a member of the I.R.B., which he 
afterwards left, not on any point about physical force, but because after he had launched the 
Sinn Fein policy and established the Sinn Fein organisation he found the I.R.B. rule - that 
the Supreme Council has the right to dictate a policy to the members of the Brotherhood in 
public organizations - irksome. He was all his life a separatist and a physical force man of 
the old philosophic school, which held that physical force was permissible and necessary, 
that Ireland would eventually gain her independence only by means of it, but which held 
also that a Rising by a minority was unjustifiable, save as a demonstration, a blood-sacrifice 
- which the Rising of 1916 actually was. And the I.R.B never quarrelled with Griffith, but 
always worked with him and recognised him for what he was, the greatest separatist force in 
the country. As a matter of fact, Nationality, which was established during the war and 
edited by Griffith, was financed by the I.R.B.
It was a misfortune for Ireland that, when Sinn Fein was reconstructed in 1917, the direction 
of it was taken out of Griffith’s hands. It could not have been done had he chosen to fight 
against it. But he had Davis’s passion for unity, provided what he regarded as essentials 
were preserved, and he stood down rather than have even the semblance of a split, though 
his credit and his reputation in the country were always far greater than his modesty and 
diffidence would allow him to realise; he could have carried Sinn Fein, on anything vital, at 
any time against anybody. But, with the best intentions, he stood down, and the direction of 
the movement fell into the hands of men who had no philosophical nor trained nor thought- 
out conception of nationalism, of means or of ends, and who applied to every possible 
candidate for Dail two tests; (1) Was he ever in jail, or was he in the Rising, or was he in the 
Volunteers? (2) Was he likely to be independent minded? And if the answer to the first was
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“NO” or to the second “YES” he was barred. So that Dail came to be manned almost wholly 
by people who, when their great test came, proved to have neither moral courage nor 
political intelligence.
And that loss, the loss in the supreme direction of affairs of his trained and Davisized mind, 
which had so fatal an effect on Dail, is the loss which Ireland felt most keenly. For Griffith 
was the only member of the Government (save Eoin MacNeill, who is too full of 
philosophical inertia to apply his national philosophy) who had any philosophy of 
nationalism to rely on, who was in touch with the whole stream of Irish nationalist 
philosophy. In that respect he might be likened to a grown up man amongst children.
Ave Griffith. Ave atque Vale!
Taken from P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), pp. 127-135.
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APPENDIX III 
CHAPTER XXVI 
MICHAEL COLLINS
When Mr. Edward Shortt projected his German Plot, Mick Collins was a man unknown 
save to a few. The Sinn Fein Executive of that day - it was before Dail Eireann - knew that 
it was going to be arrested, and decided to stand on its dignity and be arrested, after naming 
substitutes. One man who was not on the Executive but was on the list of “Plotters” decided 
not to be arrested. He waited in town until well on in the morning and then cycled home, to 
find a lorry standing outside his lodgings. From a halldoor on the opposite side of the street 
he watched them and then rode off to alarm another suspect, who, however, had been taken 
before he got there, and under whose roof the cyclist passed the remainder of the morning. It 
was Mick Collins. And it was the beginning of his emergence out of the ruck into the 
prominence which afterwards was his. The disappearance of the Sinn Fein Executive left in 
Sinn Fein and Volunteer circles one man in whose capable hands all the threads of the 
movement gradually became centred - as these things naturally will come to those who are 
capable and willing - and gradually but certainly Mick came to be the force and directing 
intelligence of the movement. And when the big guns were released finally, it made no 
difference. They had to admit Mick, for they could do nothing without him. He had made 
good. That is almost forgotten now, but to Mick Collins Ireland owed it that the movement
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went on when Mr. Short’s German Plot made a clean sweep of its leaders. He worked, then 
and always, like three men, late and early, and he made others work also.
But it was in the succeeding years, the years of the Terror, that he finally found himself that 
he did for Ireland that Herculean labour which places him amongst the greatest. When 
Arthur Griffith stated in Dail in January, 1922, that Collins had won the war, there was 
violent dissent. But, if any member of the Government or of the army or of Dail can be said 
to have “won the war” it was Collins. His was the brain that conceived the war policy and 
his the courage and determination and capacity that maintained it and that never faltered in 
it. When it was projected, the Volunteer Executive would not sanction it, and Dail Eireann 
would not touch it; but Mick Collins, and Dick McKee, and Sean Treacy organised it 
themselves, and put it into operation. And when it succeeded, then the wiseacres adopted it. 
But right through it Mick Collins was its eyes and its ears, its push and determination, its 
support, its comer stone. Everybody looked at him; everybody depended upon him. He 
represented to the people and to the British the embodied spirit of militant Irish nationalism, 
and he was that. It was not for nothing that the British got him on the brain, that they offered 
reward after reward for him, that in every house that they broke they shouted, “Where’s 
Mick Collins? We know he sleeps here”. They were constantly hot on his trail; several 
times they actually had him in their hands; but they never “got” him. If one wants to realise 
what he meant to the movement then, one has only to look back and think what one would 
have felt like if they had got him. The whole bottom would have gone out of things. When 
de Valera was got just before the Truce, we said to each other “Well, thank God it wasn’t 
Mick”.
Before Michael Collins there lay an unknown future. He had other things besides his 
courage, his quickness of decision, his push, his character. He had a passion for efficiency
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which is rare in Ireland, and he had the rare power of attracting to him able men of all sorts 
who worked with and for him - often men who did not see eye to eye with him politically. 
His Department of Dial Eireann was noted as the only one which, during the Terror, ever 
answered letters; so much so, that the country people wrote to him about everything - and he 
always saw to it that they were attended to. He gave as much attention to little details as 
most men do to big things. And he was feeling his way towards a statesman’s vision of 
Ireland. His record as organiser, as man of action, was a brilliant one, and his power of 
handling and vitalizing mediocrities was akin to that of Parnell.
But he was going farther than that. He was going from that to general speculation about 
Irish life, Irish character, Irish civilization - he was feeling his way to framing of that ideal 
of Ireland which in the coming years he would be working towards. He might have 
developed into the greatest and wisest statesman we ever had, for he was broadbased upon 
his love of the common people, the Irish peasantry, from whom he sprang, the people 
amongst whom he was brought up. On one of the last occasions on which I saw him, he 
tried to explain that; and obviously he found it difficult to put into words. “I stand” said he 
(as nearly as I can recollect) “for an Irish civilisation based on the people and embodying 
and maintaining the things, their habits, ways of thought, customs, that make them different 
- the sort of life I was brought up in. That is what I mean by Irish Ireland, and if Irish Ireland 
means anything else, I don’t want it. Once, years ago, a crowd of us were going along the 
Shepherd’s Bush Road when out of a lane came a chap with a donkey - just the sort of 
donkey and just the sort of cart that they have at home. He came out quite suddenly and 
abruptly, and we all stood and cheered him. Nobody who has not been an exile will 
understand me, but I stand for that.” There were in his brain and in his energy and in the
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whole Irishness of him - Mick Collins was one of the most Irish men that ever lived - 
unexplored possibilities, incalculable riches.
But all that is dust now and we have to remember him on his achievement. Let us remember 
him as the greatest soldier, the greatest man of action of the time of Terror; the sure prop 
and resource of this nation in the time of Terror; the man whose courage, resource, tireless 
energy, superhuman work, and push, enabled Ireland to outlast the British; and the man 
who, from the beginning to the end of this business, never said a bitter word.
Taken from P.S. O'Hegarty, The Victory o f Sinn Fein (Dublin, 1924), pp. 136-140.
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